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1. Introduction 
Armed conflicts pose a great risk to a large number of peoples’ lives and well-being 
around the world. Internal armed conflicts are far more frequent than interstate con-
flicts. While there was an increase in the number of internal conflicts immediately af-
ter the end of the Cold War, such conflicts now occur approximately as frequently as 
for the late Cold War period. In 2000, 33 armed conflicts with more than 25 battle-
related casualties took place in 27 different countries. In 12 of these conflicts more 
than 1,000 people were killed. Thirty-one out of the 33 conflicts were domestic 
(Wallensteen & Sollenberg, 2001). Explanations for the outbreak of conflicts are di-
verse. The purpose of this thesis is to test claims that demographic factors may be 
causally linked to internal armed conflict. 
The social and human implications of armed conflict are enormous. The most 
devastating conflicts that happened in the past decade demanded high death tolls. Dur-
ing the Rwandan genocide1 in 1994 an estimated 800 to 850,000 people were killed 
(Prunier, 1995), while the Bosnian civil war from 1992 to 1995 cost the lives of more 
than 200,000 people (Allcock, Milivojevic & Horton, 1998: 38). But in many armed 
conflicts, the number of people dying from indirect causes of conflict such as under- 
and malnutrition, or diseases that could easily be treated if medicines were available, is 
much higher than the number of battle-related deaths. Armed conflict is also harmful 
to economic development and the environment, especially in poor countries. In several 
works, Paul Collier, Director of the Development Research Department of the World 
Bank, has shown that conflict can tear down levels of economic development that took 
                                              
1 Genocides can happen in the absence of armed conflict. An armed conflict demands two active parts fighting each other, 
while genocides can take place as an action against a defenseless civil population. In this thesis I refer to the Rwandan geno-
cide at some occasions because the genocide in 1994 is frequently explained by high population pressure on land resources. 
However, according to the conflict data used here (Gleditsch et al., 2001), those who were killed during the genocide are not 
counted as casualties of the Rwandan civil war lasting from 1990-94, implying that the genocide is not viewed as part of the 
actual military activities. While this interpretation of the Rwandan genocide is disputed, it is also of little importance to the 
way that I have referred to the genocide in this thesis. The Rwandan genocide was clearly associated with the armed conflict 
between the Hutu-dominated government and the Tutsi-led RPF guerillas, and I believe that it is likely that the same root 
causes apply to both the armed conflict and to the genocide. 
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decades to achieve. Also, for a long time after the termination of conflict, spin-off ef-
fects continue to hamper economic growth (Collier, 1999). 
My aim is to clarify whether population pressure is a contributing cause to do-
mestic armed conflict, and my main research hypothesis is that: 
 
Countries with high population pressure are more likely to experience domestic 
armed conflict than countries with low population pressure.  
 
I will look at two distinct forms of population pressure. One is derived from a 
neo-malthusian definition of population pressure, and focuses on population growth 
and density. The other is youth bulges. 
The neo-malthusian claim is that population growth in a society leads to scar-
city of natural resources, first because more people have to share the limited resource 
base available and second because when too many people are sharing a resource this 
increases the risk that the resource will be overused and depleted. Resource scarcities 
are believed to lead to increased inter-group competition, and under unfavorable eco-
nomic and political conditions, such competition can take the form of violent conflict.  
I contrast the resource pessimist neo-malthusian perspective with a resource-
optimistic or cornucopian view. Cornucopians concede the neo-malthusians premise 
that more people means less resources per person. They believe, however, that an in-
creased pressure on resources leads to innovation and implementation of new technol-
ogy that make resource scarcity and resource dependency increasingly less likely. 
Population pressure is thus believed to be either a neutral factor among determinants 
of armed conflict, or even a possible contributor to economic growth that can reduce 
conflict propensity in the longer run.  
The second form of population pressure that I investigate is the existence of 
youth bulges. A youth bulge is defined as an extraordinary large cohort of youth rela-
tive to the adult population. Youth bulges are not believed to put pressure on natural 
resources, but rather on social institutions such as the labor market and the educational 
system, thereby causing grievances that may result in violent conflict. 
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I restrict the study to domestic armed conflict because the neo-malthusian the-
ory that I aim to test relates empirically to episodes of internal conflict. Another argu-
ment for focusing on domestic conflicts is that this is by far the most frequent type of 
conflict today and thus the most serious threat to human security and development. I 
will use a new set of conflict data that includes all conflicts with a minimum of 25 bat-
tle-related deaths (Gleditsch et al., 2001). In the following, the term ‘conflict’ or 
‘armed conflict’ will mean domestic armed conflict unless specified otherwise. 
The reason why I have set out to test neo-malthusian theories is the prominent 
position held by such theories in the current discussion over causes of conflict, and the 
lack of rigorous empirical studies. The debate over the implications of population 
pressure on renewable resources dates back at least to Thomas Malthus’ (1803/1992) 
concerns that population would exceed food production. This debate has been at the 
core of development research since Malthus (Ohlsson, 1999: 3), although with the 
pendulum swinging between pessimistic and optimistic positions through the times. A 
more pessimistic view reemerged in the middle of the period studied here. In the 1960s 
and through the 1970s, the world saw an explosion in literature concerned with popu-
lation and environmental matters, and with titles such as The Population Bomb 
(Ehrlich, 1968). This pessimistic view was also reflected in policy-making establish-
ments, especially in the US. In 1965, Lyndon B. Johnson said that he would ‘seek new 
ways to use our knowledge to help deal with the explosion in world population and the 
growing scarcity in world resources’ (Green, 1993: 305). And while non-renewable 
resources such as oil and minerals had long been considered to be security issues, 
population pressure and renewable resources were ‘considered as an extremely unin-
teresting factor in studying causes of conflict in the era of developmental optimism’ 
(Ohlsson, 1999: 25). Some isolated cases were however identified in this period 
(ibid.). 
A new and more pronounced round of neo-malthusian concern for security ar-
rived in the 1990s. Explanations for this have been twofold. First, environmental con-
cern had been increasing in Western opinion in this period, and environmental pro-
tagonists succeeded in ‘securitizing’ central environmental issues, and thereby attract-
ing the attention of policymakers (Levy, 1995: 44). In the US, vice president Al Gore 
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initiated the ‘State Failure Task Force’ project in 1994 aimed at revealing environ-
mental, political and social causes of state failure. Second, the end of the Cold War left 
a void in security policy, and Western national security establishments sought ways to 
legitimize their continued existence (Gleditsch, 2001a: 259). In a statement to the Sen-
ate Committees on Intelligence held in 1997, Director of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency Patrick M. Hughes argued that despite the lack of a ‘peer competitor’ to the 
US after the end of the Cold War, ‘the world remains a very dangerous and complex 
place and there is every reason to expect US military requirements at about the same 
level of the past several years’ (Hughes, 1997: 11). When listing the conditions that he 
believed would continue to make the world a dangerous place, the existence of youth 
bulges was his first point, while resource scarcities following from rapid population 
growth was number three on his list (ibid.: 2). 
Not only does the association of population growth, resource scarcity and youth 
bulges with an increased risk of instability and armed conflict have a long history, but 
many claim that demographic and environmental factors have become more important 
after the end of the Cold War. One example is the widely cited article ‘The Coming 
Anarchy’ by free-lance journalist Robert Kaplan, where he argues that ‘West Africa is 
becoming the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental and societal stress’, 
and that anarchy and the crumble away of nation states will be attributed to such fac-
tors in the future (Kaplan, 1994: 46, emphasis in original). de Soysa (2002: 3) argues 
that ecological and demographic pressures are popularly seen as explanations for a 
‘new age of insecurity’ after the end of the Cold War.  
Also, after the terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 youth bulges 
have become a very popular explanation for current political instability in the Arab 
world and for recruitment to terrorist organizations.2 In a background article surveying 
the causes of the terrorist attacks, Newsweek editor Fareed Zakaria argues that 
‘[g]lobalization has caught [the Arab world] at a bad demographic moment. Arab so-
                                              
2 This interest even led to New York Times citing the conference paper on youth bulges that I presented to the ECPR confer-
ence in Canterbury, UK in September 2001 (Sciolino, 2001). The title of the NYT article was ‘Is the Devil in the Demograph-
ics?’, from which I have borrowed the title of this thesis. 
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cieties are going through a massive youth bulge, with more than half of most coun-
tries’ populations under the age of 25’ (Zakaria, 2001: 24). Zakaria believes that youth 
bulges combined with small economic and social change has provided a fundament for 
an Islamic resurgence in the Arab world (ibid.). 
In this study I will put such notions to an empirical test. My research hypothe-
ses will be tested through an event history statistical model covering a high number of 
countries and politically dependent areas over the period 1950–2000, using several 
different indicators of population pressure. The advantage of this approach is that I am 
able to test my hypotheses over a large variety of contexts. Many case studies in this 
field have been criticized for selecting cases that fit the theory. I hope that my ap-
proach may yield more representative results.  
The thesis is structured in the following way: In Chapter 2 I present neo-
malthusian theoretical perspectives and cornucopian objections, and discuss under 
what conditions the neo-malthusian conflict scenario may hold. I further discuss theo-
retically how youth bulges may influence the risk of conflict. In Chapter 3 I describe 
in very general terms what factors that cause population growth and other kinds of 
population changes. The chapter also provides statistics on important demographic 
trends for the period covered by this thesis. Chapter 4 contains the methodological 
presentation and discussion, and the operationalization of my variables. In Chapter 5 I 
present my empirical analysis, while I aim to develop an overall perspective and con-
clusion in Chapter 6. 
The main finding of this thesis is that neo-malthusian indicators of population 
pressure do not seem to be related to domestic armed conflict. Rather, I find some evi-
dence for an alternative cornucopian hypothesis suggesting that high population den-
sity may actually lead to a decreased risk of armed conflict. I do, however, find rather 
robust evidence for a positive relationship between youth bulges and domestic armed 
conflict. 
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2. Demographic Violence 
2.1 Neo-Malthusian Population Pressure 
One of the greatest sources of inspiration for students of the population-resource nexus 
has been Thomas Robert Malthus’ An Essay on the Principle of Population (Malthus, 
1803/1992). In his highly influential and alluringly simplistic theory of the relation 
between population and food availability, Malthus assessed that food production 
would grow arithmetically (1, 2, 3, 4 etc), while the human population would grow 
exponentially (1, 2, 4, 8 etc). An obvious consequence of such a view is that at some 
point there is just not enough food to go around. Malthus termed nature’s response to 
this disequilibrium between people and food ‘positive checks’. Such checks were 
causes ‘which in any degree contributes to shorten the natural duration of human life’ 
and included ‘wars, [...] plague and famine’ (Malthus, 1803/1992: 23). 
History has to a considerable extent proven Malthus wrong. Food production 
has increased more than he expected, while population has grown more slowly. How-
ever, the idea that the human population cannot continue to grow indefinitely without 
at some point reaching and exceeding the carrying capacity of the earth has, under-
standably, survived. And at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, a 
wave of alarmist ‘neo-malthusian’ literature emerged, predicting that the rapidly grow-
ing world population would soon exceed the resource base and lead to serious envi-
ronmental destruction, widespread hunger and massive death tolls.  
The debate initially received much attention, but over the years it has become 
rather sterile. While the economist Julian Simon, a resource optimist stressing the role 
of human inventiveness, argued that every baby that is born increases the likelihood 
that the world will see another Michelangelo, Mozart or Einstein (Simon, 1981: 10), 
the biologist and neo-malthusian pessimist Paul Ehrlich replied that a newborn could 
just as well be a potential Judas, an Attila the Hun or a Hitler (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 
1996: 84).  
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More recently, neo-malthusian oriented scholars have argued that as the size of 
the population exceeds the base of renewable natural resources, violent conflict and 
war over scarce resources can break out. Norman Myers argues that people impover-
ished by population growth and environmental degradation ‘become desperate people, 
all too ready to challenge governments through [...] guerilla groups’ (Myers, 1993: 
22). The general argument is that population growth leads to an intensified use of re-
newable natural resources such as soil and freshwater, eventually leading to a decrease 
both in the quality and quantity of such resources. And if living conditions for a large 
number of people depend on the availability of natural resources that are getting low in 
supply, people will experience deteriorating living standards. This causes grievances 
among people that under certain conditions can turn into violent conflicts between 
groups over the exploitation of limited resources. Thus, the neo-malthusian conflict 
scenario is often referred to as a grievance perspective. 
Violent conflicts between two or more states are relatively seldom explained by 
population pressure and scarcity of renewable natural resources.3  The incident that is 
most often mentioned as an example of population-induced interstate conflict is the 
‘Soccer War’ between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969 (Renner, 1996: 106–107). 
The underlying cause is said to be migration of marginalized Salvadoran peasants into 
Honduras, while the triggering event was a soccer game. But neo-malthusian factors 
have attracted more attention as potential underlying causes of internal armed conflict. 
An often cited, although disputed, example is the Rwandan genocide. In one of the 
most authoritative accounts of the Rwandan civil war, Gérard Prunier argues that ‘the 
genocidal violence of the spring of 1994 can be partly attributed to [...] population 
density’ (1995: 4).  
But attempts to foresee future development is a more prominent feature of 
much of the neo-malthusian literature than explaining historical cases. In 1968, Paul 
Ehrlich stated that ‘[t]he battle to feed humanity is over. In the course of the 1970s the 
world will experience starvation of tragic proportions - hundreds of millions of people 
                                              
3 Although shared freshwater resources are frequently referred to as an underlying cause of conflict, especially in the Middle 
East. Empirical evidence for such a relationship is however relatively weak (Toset et al., 2000). 
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will starve to death’ (Ehrlich, 1968: xi). This proved to be wrong, but much like the 
messenger boy in Samuel Becket’s Waiting for Godot who tells the awaiting lot that 
‘Mr. Godot told me to tell you he won’t come this evening but surely tomorrow’, the 
Ehrlichs now argue that there is no reason to expect the danger to be over, as: 
Warning signs that the human enterprise is nearing the end of exponential 
growth include declines in the amount or availability of good farmland, soil, 
freshwater, and biodiversity, all of which are crucial elements of natural capital 
essential for sustaining humanity, and especially for sustaining agricultural 
growth (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 1996: 68). 
 
The focus on potential future resource wars rather than actual has been criti-
cized for not being testable (Gleditsch, 2001a), and some of the most notoriously pes-
simistic contributors have rightfully been characterized as ‘doomsayers’. As the pre-
dictions that population-induced resource scarcity can cause violent conflict have such 
a long history, I assume that they do not just apply to the future, but also to the past. 
There, they should be expected to stand up to empirical testing. 
2.1.1 Cornucopian Objections 
The neo-malthusian view that population pressure and resource scarcity can cause con-
flict is met by counter-arguments on several grounds from a research tradition often 
referred to as cornucopians, resource optimists. Believing that the world is continu-
ously improving by both human and environmental standards, cornucopians offer 
three main challenges to the neo-malthusian models. First, they claim that resources 
are not generally scarce and that we are not going to experience a major resource crisis 
even in the face of continued population growth. Second, if some resources are getting 
scarcer, humankind is able to adapt to these challenges. And third, it is the availability 
and abundance of lootable natural resources that causes conflict, and not scarcity. 
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Objection 1: Resources are not Generally Scarce 
One of the first to question the environmental pessimists of the 1970s was Julian 
Simon. He claimed that the many ‘alarmist’ environmental concerns were not sup-
ported by empirical evidence, that living conditions on a world basis were steadily im-
proving despite strong population growth, that there were no signs of serious environ-
mental degradation and that resources did not seem to become scarcer (Myers & 
Simon, 1994). While much of the attention in the beginning of the resource scarcity 
debate centered around mineral wealth and other non-renewable resources, the focus 
has more recently returned to the original Malthusian concern over renewable re-
sources. 
The traditional malthusian concern is that food production will not keep up with 
the growth in population size. Claims that this is what is happening today (Ehrlich & 
Ehrlich, 1996) are countered by Tim Dyson (1999). He argues that an extrapolation of 
recent trends of cereal production should be sufficient to cover the increased world 
demand for food following from population growth at least until 2025. There are how-
ever regional differences. The major exception to the optimistic picture is Sub-Saharan 
Africa for which expected food production is lower than expected demand. Dyson pre-
dicts a major expansion of food trade and aid to compensate for regional variations. 
The high-profile cornucopian Bjørn Lomborg (2001) argues that the bad news 
about the world’s development far outstrip the good news in the public opinion - for 
no good reason. Presenting substantial statistical evidence, he sets out to prove that 
widespread environmental concerns over food, forest, energy and water are ground-
less. Lomborg’s book caused a heated and polarized international debate.4 However, 
opponents of Lomborg tend to agree with him that there is no global resource crisis 
going on. They claim rather that he understates the potential scarcity of particular re-
sources and especially the seriousness of resource scarcity to less developed countries. 
                                              
4 For an own web page devoted to anti-Lomborg material, see www.anti-lomborg.com. For a collection of some leading 
environmental scientists’ critique of Lomborg, see Scientific American 286 (1), 2002. 
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Objection 2: We Can Adapt to Scarcities 
A point related to the above is that if some resources should be limited in supply, hu-
manity will be able to adapt to this. If market mechanisms function satisfactorily, the 
use of resources in limited supply will be regulated by price mechanisms. This is espe-
cially relevant for minerals and other resources, like energy, where it is possible to 
substitute one source for another. But Lomborg (2001: 156) believes that a wider use 
of pricing of water could also lead to more effective use of a resource that is in relative 
scarcity in many localities. 
Linked to the argument of pricing, technological development is central to the 
argument of adaptation. Ester Boserup argues that population pressure on natural re-
sources is the key to development and implementation of new techniques in agricul-
tural production (Boserup & Schultz, 1990). The higher population density relative to 
the resource base, the more are societies forced to take new technology into use. His-
torically, already known technology has not been implemented until an area has 
reached a certain level of population density. The relatively low agricultural effective-
ness of many African states is explained by the continent’s low population density 
(Boserup & Schultz, 1990). To Boserup, population growth is neither positive nor 
negative, it is just something societies adapt to through more efficient production to 
keep up the living standards. Simon (1989) is more explicit on the positive role of high 
population growth, believing that this sparks a higher level of economic productivity 
than that experienced by societies with low population growth. He argues that popula-
tion pressure on resources generates technological innovation that makes scarcity an 
ever diminishing problem and creates economic growth. Simon takes this argument 
even further to infer that increases in population can actually end wars as population-
induced economic growth makes it less attractive for states to go to war.  
Finally, some scholars have questioned whether it is desirable to try to reverse 
certain processes of renewable resource degradation if the expected cost is too high 
relative to the potential gain. Lomborg (2001) argues that both the loss of biodiversity 
and possible global warming could fall within this category. While recognizing the 
difficulties measuring the real cost of such environmental change, he suggests that it 
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could be far more expensive to do something to reverse these processes rather than just 
adapting to a permanently changed environment. 
Objection 3: Abundance, Rather than Scarcity, Causes Conflict 
More recently, a group of scholars have suggested a very different causality between 
resources and regime instability and violent conflict. Paul Collier (2000) claims that 
rebel groups are likely to have economic agendas, although seldom explicit, implicat-
ing that conflict is far more likely to be caused by economic opportunities than by 
scarcities. Civil war is likely to be caused by groups challenging weak central gov-
ernments over the access to and revenues from lootable resources. This perspective is 
especially relevant to non-renewable resources, and especially minerals such as gems 
and oil, but also potentially applies to products from renewable resources such as 
drugs, tropical timber and cash-crops.  
In a recent study Indra de Soysa (2000) tests both the perspectives of greed-
motivated and of grievance-driven civil wars. He finds that an abundance of mineral 
wealth is positively and significantly related to armed conflict. The more general ar-
gument of both Collier and de Soysa is that resource-rich countries also have a higher 
probability of conflict than resource-poor ones due to what is called the ‘resource 
curse’ (de Soysa, 2000: 120). Countries with an abundance of natural resources be-
come dependent on these resources and fail to innovate, causing a slower economic 
growth than resource-poor countries. 
The greed and grievance perspectives are usually presented as competing sce-
narios, but this can be questioned. The two perspectives are more likely to be supple-
mentary, explaining somewhat different phenomena. The debate nevertheless illus-
trates that the causality between resources and conflict is not straightforward and sim-
ple. Le Billon (2001: 562) argues that lootable resources have become a more impor-
tant way of financing civil wars after the end of the cold war and the drying up of su-
per-power financial support. He states that greed-motivated wars have become more 
frequent over the last decade, but makes a very small point out of the fact that most of 
these are old conflicts financed by new means. However, he does admit that ‘few wars 
are initially motivated by conflict over the control of resources’ (Le Billon 2001: 580). 
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I believe that the greed perspective may be more important for explaining continuation 
of armed conflict than explaining onset of conflict. 
2.1.2 Homer-Dixon: The Moderate Neo-Malthusian Position 
Even the most arch-typical cornucopian would not argue that resource scarcities never 
occur or matter. Natural resources essential to human life and welfare are unevenly 
distributed between and within states, and this may pose a threat to the lives of a large 
number of people. Similarly, even the most pessimist neo-malthusian would not argue 
that resource scarcities would always produce widespread suffering and violent con-
flict. Not all cases of severe environmental degradation result in violent conflict. Scar-
cities can be overcome, and even though such scarcities should produce serious griev-
ances they do not automatically lead to armed conflict. Furthermore, not all armed 
conflicts occur under conditions of strained natural resources. Resource scarcity is thus 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient factor for internal armed conflict to erupt.  
In the following sections, I will present the main theoretical framework of one 
of the most influential neo-malthusian scholars, Thomas Homer-Dixon. Homer-Dixon 
has been a main contributor to the environmental security debate, and his works have 
attracted a lot of attention from policymakers. His projects at the University of To-
ronto have produced a number of case studies investigating the role of population and 
environmental factors for a number of conflicts. Based on the works of Homer-Dixon 
and associates as well as related works, I will discuss the conditions for the neo-
malthusian prediction that population pressure produces resource scarcities that erupt 
into violent conflict.  
Like other neo-malthusian scholars, population variables are also central to 
Thomas Homer-Dixon and the EPS project. He sees population pressure closely linked 
to the potential scarcity of renewable resources. While he argues that resource scarci-
ties can cause violent intrastate conflict under unfavorable conditions, he believes that 
such scarcities are less likely to cause interstate conflict. Homer-Dixon somewhat con-
fusingly uses the term environmental scarcity about resource scarcity. I prefer the lat-
ter term and will attempt to use that throughout in order to try to separate scarcity of 
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resources from the processes of environmental change that are assumed to cause such 
scarcities. 
2.1.3 When is a Resource Scarce? 
Homer-Dixon and associates distinguish between three main sources of resource scar-
city (Homer-Dixon & Blitt, 1998: 6) (see Figure 2.1). Supply-induced scarcity results 
from degradation or depletion of natural resources. It simply becomes less of a re-
source as a result of non-sustainable use that does not allow the resource to regener-
ate.5 In some cases this process go so far that a resource can become irreversibly and 
permanently degraded even though the human activities that caused degradation are 
halted. Demand-induced scarcity is primarily caused by population growth.6 If a re-
source base is constant, the availability of resources per person will diminish with an 
increasing number of persons that have to share it. Such scarcity can also arise from an 
increase in demand per capita. A third form is structural scarcity. This is a form of 
scarcity that only applies to certain groups that, relative to other groups, are excluded 
from equal access to particular resources. Such unequal social distribution of a re-
source does not presuppose actual scarcity if the resource was distributed evenly. The 
sources of environmental scarcity are illustrated in Figure 2.1 below. 
 
                                              
5 Homer-Dixon focuses mainly on degradation of natural resources resulting from human activity. But natural resources can 
be both degraded and depleted from causes other than human activity, such as natural disasters or less dramatic natural varia-
tion. 
6 Homer-Dixon is unclear with regard to demographic concepts.  In one of his first articles on the subject he argues that 
‘population size and growth are key variables producing the syndrome of environmental scarcity’ (Homer-Dixon 1991: 102). 
The size of the population is however irrelevant as long as it does not relate to the resource base on which the population 
survives. In the following I will use the term population growth to describe how demographic change can increase the de-
mand for natural resources. I will return to the distinction between population growth and density in Section 2.1.7.  
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Figure 2.1 Some Sources and Consequences of Environmental Scarcity 
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Homer-Dixon’s original model. I assume that population growth can lead to overex-
ploitation of renewable natural resources, that eventually causes lower return as re-
sources are degraded. For instance an increasing population in an area with a fixed 
amount of cultivable land may experience that it is possible to intensify agricultural 
production for a long time, but that at some point the soil is too exhausted to produce 
sufficient amounts of food. Of course, this relationship is influenced by the availability 
of technology and knowledge to the population in question. Population growth can go 
along with sustainability if a diminishing share of resources per person is compensated 
through a supply in technology and knowledge. 
Resource distribution, or structural scarcity, may influence whether population 
growth causes resource degradation. If resources are unequally distributed, this can 
force a poor and fast growing population to over-exploit the renewable natural re-
sources available to them. Since a poor population is unlikely to have the means, nei-
ther in the form of technology nor education, to alleviate the pressure on natural re-
sources, degradation in the quality and quantity of the resource in question is a likely 
scenario. 
However, structural scarcity in itself should not be viewed as a potential source 
of resource scarcity, but rather as a potential source of distributional conflict. Struc-
tural scarcity says nothing about the availability of resources per capita, only about 
asymmetrical power relations between persons or groups of people that empower 
someone to capture more than their fair share of the pie. Homer-Dixon and associates 
have recently replied to the critique that the inclusion of distributional issues makes 
their concept of environmental scarcity too broad since they could risk classifying a 
violent conflict that is solely a distributional conflict as environmental conflict 
(Schwartz, Deligiannis & Homer-Dixon, 2000: 80). In this reply they claim that ‘un-
even distribution never acts on its own: its impact is always a function of its interac-
tion with resource supply and demand’ (Schwartz, Deligiannis & Homer-Dixon, 2000: 
80). This is an important specification, and limitation, of the role of structural scarcity 
that Homer-Dixon and associates previously have undercommunicated in their model 
of causes and consequences of environmental scarcities (Figure 2.1).  
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The pie metaphor presented above can further illustrate how the issue of scar-
city has become the most contended between neo-malthusians and cornucopians. To 
cornucopians scarcity exists by definition when a resource is not in infinite and un-
conditional supply, but they refuse to see resources as pies of a fixed size. They give 
primacy to the human ability to overcome resource scarcity through technology and 
knowledge. The level of technology influences the size of the pie, in the case of fresh 
water it both determines the quantity that can be extracted from the ground and the 
ability to purify polluted water. Thus, high elasticity without any absolute limitation is 
assumed to exist for the supply of many natural resources. But technology also deter-
mines the size of the pie that each individual needs, through for instance water-saving 
measures. This causes elasticity in demand, deflating the effect of an increasing popu-
lation. Furthermore, pies can be traded for other pies. In some cases one resource can 
be substituted for another. Also, since most scarcities are local rather than universal, 
areas can trade a type of pie that is locally abundant for another pie that is locally 
scarce (Gleditsch, 2001a: 253), thereby benefiting from comparative advantages. 
Cornucopians probably have a better case against those neo-malthusians who 
argue on a more general basis that we are facing a global environmental crisis because 
the overall capacity of the world’s ecosystem is stretched beyond its capacity. Homer-
Dixon and associates are careful not to promote such a ‘global’ view. They argue 
rather that local resource scarcities arise and persist because market mechanisms and 
technological development rather often fail to work locally in many developing coun-
tries. A logical inference stemming from this line of argument is that scarcity can be 
seen as a result of social inability to utilize the full potential of natural resources. It is 
not very controversial to argue that resource scarcity can arise locally. More important 
for me is to ask under what conditions resource scarcity may arise and how such scar-
city can increase the risk of armed conflict. This will be discussed in Sections 2.1.5 
and 2.1.6, but first I will present types of potentially contested resources. 
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2.1.4 Types of Contested Resources 
Most armed conflicts and wars are over objectives that can broadly be defined as re-
sources (Gleditsch, 2001a: 252). Neo-malthusians are primarily concerned with re-
sources that are linked to food production. Homer-Dixon and Blitt argue that large 
populations in many developing countries are highly dependent on four key resources 
that are especially crucial to food production: freshwater, cropland, forests and fisher-
ies. The availability of these resources determines people’s day-to-day well-being, and 
scarcity of such resources can under certain conditions cause violent conflict (1998: 2). 
The availability of water is central for purposes of both agricultural and indus-
trial production. In addition, water is used for drinking and personal hygiene. The per 
capita supply of freshwater is varying significantly around the world, and many re-
gions, particularly the Middle East and most parts of Africa, experience that ground 
water reservoirs are being depleted as a consequence of over-use (Falkenmark, 1990). 
In many areas, population growth ‘consumes the water potential still available to meet 
an increasing water demand’ for industrial and agricultural purposes (Falkenmark, 
1990: 86), hindering both economic development and increased agricultural output. It 
is estimated that about one-third of the world’s population is currently living under 
moderate or severe water stress (World Bank, 1999b: 28).  
Cropland is also central to food production, but it is contested whether it is 
scarce. Some estimates indicate that less than half of the world’s potential cropland is 
actually cultivated, but Homer-Dixon & Blitt (1998: 3) argue that these numbers in-
clude land that is either too marginal for cropping or is today under forest cover. Bose-
rup (1981: 16–17) argues on the other hand that much unproductive land is actually 
part of long-fallow systems, and that marginal land can be transformed into productive 
areas by the use of fertilizers and irrigation. Earlier claims that population pressure 
was about to cause irreversible large-scale erosion and desertification is today largely 
discredited. Annual rainfall and other natural processes have proven to be far more 
important than human activity in explaining the variation in the extent of the Sahara 
(Pearce, 2001). And although the last two centuries have seen a net loss of topsoil, the 
picture is more complex with some areas gaining and some losing (Lomborg, 2001: 
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105). The total losses are not very dramatic, and the effect of erosion on agricultural 
production is believed to be relatively limited. 
Depletion of forests is believed to influence agricultural production more indi-
rectly. The argument is that population growth causes deforestation through cultiva-
tion of new land and search for firewood, and that this contributes to soil erosion 
(Homer-Dixon & Blitt, 1998: 4). Furthermore, deforestation increases the risk of 
flooding that can lead to large damages to harvests. There is however little evidence of 
serious global deforestation. The world’s over all forest cover has changed marginally 
over the past 50 years (Lomborg, 2001: 111), although aggregate figures may mask 
local variation. The fourth resource believed to be of great importance is fisheries. 
Fisheries are food suppliers that are important supplements to agricultural production 
in many areas, and are suffering from local overexploitation (Homer-Dixon & Blitt, 
1998: 4). 
Homer-Dixon & Blitt (1998: 2–5) believe that global warming and depletion of 
the ozone layer are unlikely to have a major effect on people’s well-being in the near 
future, and that these environmental concerns are not likely to be immediate causes of 
violent conflict. The two issues deserve attention, however, ‘ because when they do 
eventually have an impact, they will probably interact with already present environ-
mental and demographic pressures, thus making those pressures much worse’ (Homer-
Dixon & Blitt, 1998: 2–3). By mentioning these two environmental problems along 
with changes in the supply of their four key resources, Homer-Dixon and Blitt illus-
trate their conceptual difficulties. Global warming and ozone depletion are not issues 
of resource scarcity by themselves, but influence the availability of natural resources. 
Gleditsch (2001b: 55) points out that in the Homer-Dixon model ‘any form of envi-
ronmental degradation can be translated into a problem of resource supply’ and that 
‘one consequence of such a view is that all environmental problems can be interpreted 
as resource problems, but not vice versa’. When they apply resource scarcity as the 
main explanatory variable for violent conflict, Homer-Dixon and associates should 
make a stronger effort to analytically separate resource scarcity from the environ-
mental problems that cause this scarcity. 
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2.1.5 Conditions for Adaptation 
One of the most pronounced arguments made by cornucopians is that we are able to 
adapt to resource scarcity. They believe that human beings are more likely to invent 
ways to avoid and get around resource scarcity than to fight over the little there is. A 
pressure on resources makes it more likely that already existing technology is taken 
into use, but it also sparks innovation and production of new technology. 
Thomas Homer-Dixon (1995) agrees with some of the premises of this cornu-
copian argument, and acknowledges that the human ability to generate ideas, what he 
terms ‘ingenuity’, is the crucial factor for overcoming resource scarcity. But he holds a 
more pessimistic view than the cornucopians, stressing that many societies, especially 
in poor countries, are in limited supply of ingenuity. While most neo-malthusians fo-
cus on the absolute physical limits to growth in a society, Homer-Dixon is more con-
cerned about those societies that are ‘locked into a race between a rising requirement 
for ingenuity and their capacity to supply it’ (1995: 105). As the supply of ingenuity 
gets shorter relative to resource scarcity, societies will eventually experience a ‘critical 
ingenuity gap’. This raises social dissatisfaction to increase the risk of violent conflict. 
There are three factors that especially limit the supply of ingenuity in poor 
countries. First, market mechanisms that are supposed to increase the supply of inge-
nuity as resources get scarcer, often fail to work properly. This is both because many 
renewable resources are common goods and thus difficult to divide into salable and 
‘priceable’ units, and because the use, and overuse, of many resources produce hidden 
costs through ‘negative externalities’. For instance river siltation can be a result of up-
stream deforestation. Poor countries are more likely to experience market failures than 
more developed countries because many of them have underdeveloped economic insti-
tutions that are ill-suited to deal with such complex price settings (Homer-Dixon, 
1995: 598–599). 
The second factor is social friction. This phenomenon arises with the existence 
of ‘narrow distributional coalitions’ that are able to attract a large share of the re-
sources for the use of their members only. Such coalitions are more interested in secur-
ing resources for themselves than to enable society as a whole to increase the availabil-
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ity of resources. This prevents the development of new and reformed institutions that 
could help generate innovation in a society. Again, influential small coalitions are sys-
tematically present in unstable countries, which are often also poor countries. Stability 
is a precondition for the establishment of large coalitions that could overcome narrow 
self-interests (Homer-Dixon, 1995: 600). 
Finally, shortages of financial and human capital reduce the supply of ingenuity 
in many poor countries. Lack of financial capital reduces the ability for a government 
to provide public goods such as infrastructure, limiting the possibilities for private en-
trepreneurs. Furthermore, many poor countries lack the human capital necessary to 
increase the supply of ingenuity, both because of lack of means to finance large scale 
education and because many well-educated people in poor countries are leaving for 
higher income possibilities in developed countries, a phenomenon known as brain 
drain (Homer-Dixon, 1995: 602–603). 
Homer-Dixon admits that the main weakness of the ingenuity approach is the 
current inability among researchers to quantitatively measure ingenuity, and thereby 
predict where and when critical ingenuity gaps will appear (Homer-Dixon, 1995: 589). 
This also implies that it is impossible to empirically verify post facto whether it is the 
lack of ingenuity that is the reason why some countries experience resource scarcity.  
2.1.6 Causal Pathways from Scarcity to Conflict 
Thomas Homer-Dixon predicts that increased environmental scarcity is likely to cause 
social effects that increase the likelihood of internal violent conflict (see Figure 2.1). 
Environmental scarcities can lead to constrained agricultural and economic productiv-
ity causing widespread poverty.7 Migration can occur either because the environmental 
quality of their habitat has become unlivable (push factors) or, more commonly, be-
                                              
7 High population growth can strain economic development through other mechanisms than environmental scarcity. If the 
dependency burden is high, meaning that the number of non-producers in a population is great relative to the number of 
producers, a larger share of the economic outcome is spent on consumption rather than reinvestment. This can potentially 
lead to reduced economic growth. Analyzing cross-country data over three decades, Kelley & Schmidt (1995) found that 
there was a negative impact of population growth on economic development in the 1980s, while this relationship was non-
significant for the 1960s and 1970s. 
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cause the migrants’ economic outcome is likely to be better in areas with greater re-
source availability (pull factors). Both constrained productivity and migration are fac-
tors that are likely to strengthen the segmentation around already existing religious, 
class, ethnic or linguistic cleavages in a society. Increased competition and tensions 
among such segments reduces the interaction between them, and makes non-violent 
articulations of interest less likely. 
Acknowledging that objective deprivation, the mere fact that people are poor, 
seldom produces strong grievances, Homer-Dixon relies on the theory of ‘relative dep-
rivation’ (Gurr, 1970). Individuals and groups can experience relative deprivation 
when they perceive a gap between the situation they believe they deserve and the 
situation that they have actually achieved. But the deprivation hypothesis significantly 
overpredicts the likelihood that violent conflict occurs from grievance, and is thus not 
sufficient to explain the incidence of such an event (Kahl, 1998: 83). For grievances to 
erupt into violent conflict, Homer-Dixon & Blitt assume that two other factors need to 
be present (1998: 11). First, the aggrieved individuals need to participate in some sort 
of collective that is capable of violent collective action against the authorities. Second, 
the political structure must fail to give these groups the opportunity to peacefully ex-
press their grievances at the same time as it offers them the openings for violent action.  
According to Kahl (1998: 83) there are significant collective-action problems 
that need to be overcome for grievances to be the source of violent conflict. There are 
strong incentives for individuals to ‘free ride’ by not participating in the violence 
themselves, because of the high potential cost of lost income and perhaps even one’s 
own life. Homer-Dixon & Blitt acknowledge these problems and argue that the pres-
ence of strong collective identities such as ethnicity, religion and class, are prerequi-
sites for grievance-driven collective violent action (1998: 11). People must also feel 
the relevance of their group identity for their grievances, that they are aggrieved as a 
group.  
The second contextual factor that Homer-Dixon & Blitt believe to be of great 
importance is the type of political regime. If the political and economic structures fail 
to give groups opportunities to raise demands peacefully, it becomes more rational to 
react violently to grievances. The likelihood that such violence shall succeed depends 
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largely on the strength of the state. A state characterized by notorious instability and 
disintegration, a feature often referred to as state weakness, is more likely to offer op-
portunities for violence than a stark and authoritarian state (Goldstone, 2001; Homer-
Dixon & Blitt, 1998). Homer-Dixon & Blitt (1998: 11) argue that resource scarcity 
may also cause state weakness as such scarcity can lead to ‘corruption, falling reve-
nues, rising demands for services, or factional conflicts among elites’.  
Homer-Dixon & Blitt predicts that one consequence of resource scarcity is mi-
gration, which again is likely to produce violent ethnic conflict (Homer-Dixon & Blitt, 
1998: 9–10). The ways that refugees can increase the likelihood of violent conflict is 
similar to the ways through which population pressure in general is believed to influ-
ence conflict proneness. What is different is that refugee movements can put a sudden 
and serious strain on resources in the area of arrival at the same time as refugees sel-
dom have the same moral claim on assistance from the government as the local popu-
lation. This is especially true for transboundary migration. Furthermore, refugees are 
often impoverished, and thus lacking the resources to make effective demands on the 
host community. 
Suhrke (1997) notes that refugees are not necessarily a source of conflict. The 
result could very well be the opposite. Refugees are often incorporated in society and 
contribute to increased productivity and economic prosperity, often through an ethnic 
division of labor causing interdependence. One possibility is that this takes the form of 
systematic exploitation of the refugees. Suhrke does admit, however, that the integra-
tion perspective is more relevant to gradual migration processes than sudden refugee 
movements (1997: 263). While the most striking characteristics of refugee populations 
in general are their powerlessness and their poverty, conflict and social strife is likely 
‘if displacement becomes long-term, and if the victims acquire autonomy or powerful 
allies that enable them to overcome powerlessness and make demands on their hosts’ 
(1997: 263). While such empowerment can be the result of state intervention (Suhrke, 
1997: 269), the degree of state weakness will also here matter to the opportunities for 
violence.  
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2.1.7 Indicators of Neo-Malthusian Population Pressure 
I am unable to test every step of Homer-Dixon’s model empirically in the research 
design applied here. What I aim to do is to identify valid indicators of population pres-
sure that I believe are likely to be potential causes of resource scarcity. I then assume 
that when population pressure is high, countries are more likely to experience resource 
scarcity than when population pressure is low, all other things being equal.8 I further 
assume that resource scarcity generally produces grievances among the affected popu-
lation. These two steps are general assumptions in the theoretical framework of Tho-
mas Homer-Dixon, and I believe that I do not have to be able to observe these causal 
mechanisms directly in order to investigate whether population pressure influences the 
risk of armed conflict. 
The other two factors that Homer-Dixon argues are prerequisites for resource 
scarcity to be the cause of conflict, social segmentation and weak states, are factors 
that are believed to be important for armed conflict regardless of the root cause. These 
are ‘filters’ that decide whether any grievances will be articulated through violent ac-
tion. Some degree of social segmentation exist in all societies, as ethnic, religious, 
class, geographic or even kinship affiliations. According to Homer-Dixon, any kind of 
social segmentation will do, and I do not attempt to actually control for this. I do how-
ever attempt to control for state weakness through a separate regime variable. This will 
be further described in Chapter 4. In the rest of this section I will discuss indicators of 
population pressure. 
Population Growth 
The traditional malthusian focus has been on population growth. The concern has been 
that high population growth would outstrip growth in revenues from natural resources. 
Population would then eventually exceed the productive capacity of natural resources, 
                                              
8 The assumption that all other things are equal is of great importance here. It implies for instance that I do not attempt to 
empirically test whether a high supply of ingenuity make societies able to avoid resource scarcity. But as Homer-Dixon 
admits himself, the level of ingenuity is an aspect of societies that is not measurable. However, since Homer-Dixon argues 
that lack of ingenuity is mainly a problem in developing countries I will test his ingenuity hypothesis indirectly through an 
interaction effect between population pressure variables and level of development. 
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a situation often referred to as overpopulation. Like Malthus, Thomas Homer-Dixon 
also analytically separates the two elements of the population-resource nexus. In his 
model, population growth is one side of the equation, the demand side. Continued 
population growth simply means that an ever-increasing number of people have to 
share the resources that are available.  
But population growth is a dynamic measure that says nothing about the popu-
lation-resource ratio, only that given a static supply of resources every person gets 
less. This reduces the validity of the measure as an indicator of population pressure, 
since countries with high population growth may very well have a plethora of avail-
able resources making population increase possible, and maybe even desirable. On the 
other hand, population growth is strongly related to population density. Given a certain 
level of density, countries with the highest population growth will be the countries to 
experience the highest density in the future. If one then assumes a given level of popu-
lation density, the countries with the highest population growth rates will be the first 
ones to experience shortages of natural resources, if technology and knowledge is 
evenly distributed. I thus assume that 
Hypothesis 1: Countries with a high population growth are more likely to ex-
perience domestic armed conflict than countries with low population growth. 
Population Density 
Another measure that is often seen as an indicator of population pressure is population 
density. But when advancing this measure one is no longer exclusively talking about a 
demand side factor. Population density is a combination of both supply and demand 
side factors, measuring people relative to area. But population density is a static meas-
ure, and I assume that countries that have experienced a relatively high and stable 
population density over some time are likely to have found ways to cope with it. Thus, 
population density in itself says nothing about the acuteness of the situation, whether a 
society has recently experienced that resources have become scarcer. Homer-Dixon 
believes that neo-malthusian grievances are produced in a dynamic process, where 
people experience that their living conditions are worsened. Since population density 
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does not capture this dynamic process, the validity of this measure as an indicator of 
population pressure is reduced. 
An additional shortcoming of this measure is that the conventional definition, 
the number of people per square kilometer in a country, says very little about the ratio 
between population and the resource base. High density is more of a problem in arid 
areas than in fertile ones. Partly on these grounds, Ehrlich & Ehrlich (1996: 70) criti-
cize the use of population density as a measure of population pressure calling it the 
‘Netherlands fallacy’. If density instead is measured as population relative to the area 
that potentially could be used for food production, what I term arable land, one is able 
to measure the population pressure relative to the perhaps single most important re-
newable natural resource, although this ignores the role of international food trade. 
While there are a few examples of large-N studies of armed conflict that have included 
population density among the independent variables, none of these have attempted to 
measure the total population relative to arable land.  
Despite the limitations of the population density measure discussed above, I as-
sume that countries with low population density are less likely to have ever experi-
enced a serious pressure on natural resources, and are thus in general less likely to ex-
perience such a pressure at any given time compared to countries with high population 
density. I hypothesize that 
Hypothesis 2: Countries with high population density relative to arable land are 
more likely to experience domestic armed conflict than countries with low den-
sity. 
Population Growth in the Context of High Density 
The two most widely used measures of population pressure thus fill different functions 
that scholars need to be aware of when applying them in empirical studies. While 
population density is a static measure controlled for the availability of fertile land, 
population growth is a dynamic measure that is decoupled from actual resource avail-
ability. While none of the measures are very valid indicators of population pressure on 
their own, I would expect that the coexistence of the two factors, high population 
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growth in a context of already high population density, would indicate an extraordi-
nary strain on natural resources. 
I am surprised that the relationship between population growth and density has 
been completely neglected in previous large-N studies. While there have been some 
attempts to test neo-malthusian hypotheses on a larger scale, none have apparently 
ever tried to investigate whether the interaction of the dynamic and static measures of 
growth and density is what causes situations of neo-malthusian resource scarcity. This 
interaction is the most valid indicator of neo-malthusian population pressure that I 
have been able to identify, and I assume that 
Hypothesis 3: The higher population density relative to arable land a country 
experiences, the stronger is the conflict-conducive effect of high population 
growth. 
Migration 
A third form of population pressure is migration. Homer-Dixon is mainly concerned 
with how migration can be the outcome of resource scarcity. Such migrants, often la-
beled with the dubious term ‘environmental refugees’, can set off into new areas as a 
result of long-term resource degradation or more sudden environmental disruption, a 
distinction often used to analytically separate migration caused by pull and push fac-
tors. Most often, however, environmental change is only one factor working together 
with factors like political oppression and economic deterioration to cause migration 
(Trolldalen et al., 1992). Environmental change can be a source to migration, but such 
links are ‘complex, uncertain and difficult to detect’ (Suhrke, 1997: 255). 
While Homer-Dixon and associates primarily focus on how environmentally 
induced migration can lead to inter-group ethnic and religious conflict, there is also 
vast evidence that large groups of migrants can be a source of serious environmental 
degradation in the receiving area. This is especially the case with large refugee camps 
(ECHO, 1995: 5). The impact that migrants have on the environment in the receiving 
area depends on their total number, the degree of concentration and on whether the 
movement of people is large scale and sudden or small scale and long term. 
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Migration can thus be seen as a demand side factor. When migration is gradual, 
it is probably more correct to treat it as a component of population growth, and not as 
a distinct form of population pressure. But large-scale and sudden influxes of migrants 
into an area will be treated as a separate analytical category of population pressure, no 
matter the cause of migration.9 Such population movements are likely to produce more 
acute and sudden social and environmental challenges than population growth. This is 
also a relationship that, to my knowledge, has not yet been tested in any previous 
large-N study.  
Hypothesis 4: Countries that host large refugee populations are more likely to 
experience domestic armed conflict than countries that do not. 
2.2 Population Pressure Beyond Malthus: ‘Youth Bulges’ 
The population-conflict debate has primarily been over neo-malthusian concerns, fo-
cusing heavily on demographic macro indicators such as population growth. Surpris-
ingly little attention has been given to other forms of population change that might be 
strongly associated with political instability (de Sherbinen, 1995). It has been sug-
gested that under certain conditions particular kinds of population change such as ur-
banization, migration, strong growth in the agrarian population, unequal growth rates 
between ethnic groups, and changes in the age composition of a population, can spark 
violent conflict (Goldstone, 2001; Tir & Diehl, 2001). These kinds of population 
changes do not necessarily affect the likelihood of violent conflict through scarcity of 
renewable resources, but are linked to issues such as wealth distribution, employment, 
public services and cultural differences. Goldstone (2001: 100) argues that the risk of 
conflict increases substantially when specific population changes occur in the context 
                                              
9 I choose to focus here on refugee populations. To be termed refugee, a person needs to fill certain criteria defined in the 
United Nations Refugee Convention. My refugee measure includes only refugees who are recognized by the UNHCR as 
such, thus including only people who have fled across a border from their country of origin. I assume that large groups of 
internally displaced people (IDPs) may put an equally strong pressure on natural resources as refugees, but reliable informa-
tion on IDPs are not available. 
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of limited economic growth. This causes a population pressure on the absorptive ca-
pacity of societal institutions such as educational institutions and the labor market. 
Among the specific kinds of population change mentioned above, changes in 
age composition in the form of ‘youth bulges’, have received the most attention from 
scholars. I define youth bulges as a relatively high number of 15–24 year-olds in a so-
ciety compared to the total adult population (15 years and above). To my knowledge, 
only two other studies with a similar research design as mine have attempted to test 
empirically whether youth bulges increase the risk of armed conflict. But as I will ar-
gue in Chapter 4, both of these studies have serious shortcomings. Furthermore, I at-
tempt, unlike the previous studies, to investigate whether youth bulges and important 
contextual factors may work together to influence the risk of conflict. In the next sec-
tions I will explore possible links between youth bulges and violent conflict theoreti-
cally and attempt to model under what conditions and in what kind of contexts youth 
bulges can cause armed conflict. 
2.2.1 Youth Bulges and Armed Conflict 
One of the leading theorists on the role of youth in political violence, Jack A. Gold-
stone, claims that 
Youth have played a prominent role in political violence throughout recorded 
history: and the existence of a ‘youth bulge’ (an unusually high proportion of 
youths 15–25 relative to the total population) has historically been associated 
with times of political crisis (Goldstone, 2001: 95). 
 
One of the factors that seems to have triggered the debate about youth bulges 
and conflict is the rioting of the baby-boom generation (the relatively large cohorts 
born in the years after the end of World War II) of the US and Western Europe. Jones 
(1990: 176) believes that the sheer number of baby-boomers is an important factor for 
explaining conditions like the student unrest of the 1960s and the employment crisis 
and escalating house prices of the 1970s and 1980s. While none of the episodes of stu-
dent unrest qualify for the term ‘armed conflict’, there are other historical events that 
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support the youth bulge hypothesis. Among the more prominent are the role played by 
the historically large youth cohorts (caused by the rapid decline in infant mortality 
some 20 to 30 years earlier) in the French revolution of 1789, and the importance of 
economic depression hitting the largest German youth cohorts ever in explaining the 
rise of Nazism in Germany in the 1930s (Moller, 1968: 240–244).  
Some theorists have suggested that a generation that undergoes a common uni-
fying experience develops a generational consciousness. This experience may be a 
military victory or defeat, a shift in the economy and labor markets, or even the mere 
awareness of belonging to a generation of an extraordinary size and strength 
(Goldstone, 1999: 4–5). Generational consciousness binds the members of one genera-
tion together as they have ‘shared the same hopes and disappointments, and experi-
enced a common disillusionment with respect to elder age groups, toward whom their 
sense of opposition is defined’ (Feuer, 1969: 25). A self-conscious generation in oppo-
sition to the elders can produce generational conflict. 
Generational consciousness may be an important source to identity for young 
people, and the existence of a strong sense of belonging to a group that share your 
grievances and/or aspirations can serve as a basis for collective action. However, vio-
lent conflict between groups only divided by age are rare. Other dividing factors of a 
social, economic or geographic character tend to fragment generations. This produces 
‘generational units’ (Braungart, 1984) of people who share the same grievances, and 
such units are potential spearheads of protest and violent conflict. Goldstone (1999: 6–
7) assumes that ‘if social and political conditions are such that a majority of the popu-
lation is at least thinking about rebellion, the dynamics of revolution may be greatly 
affected by the age-distribution of the population’.  
I believe that the generational approach has some serious shortcomings with re-
gard to the explanatory power of the relationship between youth bulges and violence. 
The development of generational units may explain the formation of youth movements 
that can function as identity groups. Identity groups are necessary for collective violent 
action to take place. But it is not necessary that identity groups are generation-based 
for youth bulges to increase the likelihood of armed conflict. Furthermore, the genera-
tional approach does not offer explanations for the motives of youth rebellion nor does 
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it provide a sufficient explanation for the opportunities of conflict. It is clear that if 
large youth bulges that hold a common generational consciousness would always pro-
duce conflict, we would have seen a lot more of violent youth revolts. Conditions that 
provide youth bulges with the necessary motives and opportunities for armed conflict 
will be discussed below. As a general starting point, I assume that: 
Hypothesis 5: Countries that experience youth bulges are more likely to experi-
ence domestic armed conflict than countries that do not. 
2.2.2 Youth Grievances 
I have constructed a model for the assumed relationship between youth bulges and 
armed conflict presented in Figure 2.2. The model assumes that youth bulges are likely 
to experience unemployment because they increase the supply of labor substantially 
when entering the labor market. Unemployment is believed to cause grievances, and 
especially so if expectations are raised through expansions in education. Similarly, 
grievances arise if possibilities to influence the political system and attain elite posi-
tions are limited. 
 
Figure 2.2 Youth Bulges as a Source of Armed Conflict 
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sorbing capacity of the labor market as the most important factor for causing griev-
ances among youth.  
 If young people on a greater scale are kept out of the labor market this is likely 
to cause dissatisfaction and grievance. Unemployment is normally greater among 
younger than older cohorts in most societies, and youth bulges put an additional strain 
on the labor market. If the ability in the market to absorb a sudden surplus of young 
job seekers is limited, a large pool of young unemployed and frustrated people arises. 
The absorbing capacity of the labor market depends heavily on the degree of diversifi-
cation and flexibility of the economy. Youth bulges will be especially vulnerable to 
unemployment if they coincide with periods of serious economic decline, as those en-
tering the labor market most recently usually are the most likely to experience unem-
ployment. Choucri (1974: 73) believes that such coincidences generate despair among 
young people that moves them towards the use of violence. The belief in the ‘system’ 
is eroding: 
Unemployment in any society weakens the political system’s legitimacy and 
stability. Such conditions produce a climate of radicalism particularly among 
unattached youth who have the least to lose in the gamble and struggle for revo-
lutionary gain (Braungart, 1984: 16). 
 
Focusing less on possible grievances, Paul Collier (2000: 94) assumes that the 
willingness of young men to join a rebellion depend on their other income-earning 
opportunities. If young people are left with no alternative but unemployment and pov-
erty, they are likely to join a rebellion as an alternative way of generating an income. 
For a rebel force to initiate a rebellion Collier assumes that the rebel force must grow 
rapidly, and that their likelihood to succeed is much smaller if there is a relatively tight 
labor market (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002a: 6). What Collier holds in common with pro-
ponents of the grievance perspective is that unemployment reduces the cost for young 
people to engage in conflict, which makes it easier to overcome collective action prob-
lems. The less opportunities for young people to get a job, the more likely is it that 
they engage in violent conflict.  
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Reliable time-series information on employment opportunities, and especially 
on employment opportunities for youth groups, is not available for a large number of 
countries, making a direct empirical testing of the relationship between youth bulges, 
employment and conflict difficult and unreliable. Instead I opt for an indirect testing of 
this relationship. Since the general economic performance of a country is usually 
strongly influencing employment opportunities, I assume that: 
Hypothesis 6: The less economic growth a country experiences, the stronger is 
the conflict-conducive effect of youth bulges. 
 
The way that employment opportunities influence the conflict potential of youth 
bulges is strongly linked to level of education. Goldstone (2001: 95) argues that a 
rapid increase in the number of educated youth seems to precede episodes of political 
upheaval. Well-educated youth have often been observed in central positions in epi-
sodes of riots, more recently student groups have entered the streets of Jakarta, Tehe-
ran, Belgrade and Harare demanding democratic reforms. One reason why students 
would want to revolt is if their aspirations of employment and political influence are 
not met. Choucri speculates that ‘the greater the unemployment among the educated 
youth, the greater are the propensities for dissatisfactions, instability, and violence’ 
(1974: 73). Braungart (1984: 16) observes that 
The underemployment and unemployment prospects for university educated 
youth in many developing countries, as well as in more advanced developed 
countries, enlarge the reservoir of latent rebellion from which revolutionary 
politics can be drawn. 
 
But why should educated youth be more aggrieved by unemployment than un-
educated youth? Collier (2000) argues that there is reason to expect that a higher level 
of education among men rather reduces the risk of conflict, resulting from the higher 
opportunity cost of rebellion for educated men. Since educated men have better in-
come-earning opportunities than the uneducated, they would have more to loose and 
would then be less interested in joining a rebellion.  
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Collier’s argument illustrates that the role of education in causing grievance is 
not straightforward. Collier is right that education increases the value of a person’s 
labor, but it also raises this person’s expectation of a relatively high income. This 
means that educated youth experience a greater gap between expectations and actual 
outcome if they face unemployment. Kahl (1998: 103) argues that the high expecta-
tions among educated urban youth in Kenya caused frustration and anti-state grievance 
when unemployment hit this group at the end of the 1980s. This illustrates that the 
opportunity cost of system maintenance is highest for those with high education, mak-
ing it more rational for educated youth to take part in rebellions than for uneducated 
youth. 
Collier is right, I believe, to argue that a high level of educational attainment in 
a society generally reduces the risk of conflict. But inflexible developing economies 
are unlikely to be able to absorb a sudden rapid increase in the number of young 
academics. So when youth bulges go along with rapid expansions of education this is 
likely to be a potential for youth grievances. Braungart (1984: 14–15) finds that the 
most explosive episode of violence in Sri Lanka (1971) happened in a situation with a 
great increase in youth cohorts in the context of a rapid expansion of education and 
rising unemployment.10  
The second interaction I wish to investigate is that of youth bulges and regime 
type. Regime characteristics may provide the incentives for youth to riot against the 
government, but this relationship has been largely neglected in theoretical works on 
youth bulges and conflict. My argument is that autocratic regimes are likely to have a 
very closed recruitment process both for political and economic positions (which are 
often intertwined in autocracies), and that this recruitment process is more closed the 
more autocratic a regime is. Level of education is important also to this argument; I 
assume that educated youth may generate conflict if their expectations of influence in 
society and access to elite positions are not met. This may be one explanation for re-
                                              
10 Unfortunately, data on educational attainment is so sparse that this prevents a direct testing of the relationship between 
youth bulges, level of education and conflict onset in the present analysis. Information on education drawn from the World 
Development Indicators (World Bank 1999) only covers a very limited part of my dataset. These data shortages also prevent 
the construction of a variable measuring expansion of education in a country. 
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cent episodes of violence initiated by students in Myanmar, Iran, China and Zim-
babwe. This argument is in itself not dependent on the existence of a youth bulge, 
youth can be deprived of elite positions even though they are relatively few. But if the 
youth make up a large share of the adult population they are more likely to succeed in 
causing a violent clash with the government. I thus assume that: 
Hypothesis 7: The less democratic a country is, the stronger is the conflict-
conducive effect of youth bulges. 
 
The only scholar that I have seen specifically addressing the role of regime type 
in interaction with youth bulges is Jack Goldstone. He argues that a rapid increase in 
educated youth aspiring to elite positions can increase the risk of violent conflict, es-
pecially ‘in the context of a relatively limited, semi-closed structure of elite positions’ 
(2001: 95). This is not the same expectation as mine, as I interpret Goldstone to expect 
intermediate regimes, those that are not fully autocratic nor fully democratic, to be 
most exposed to youth generated conflict. While I will also test for this possible rela-
tionship, it is important to note that I separate the interaction effect between regime 
type and youth bulges from the general filtering effect of state weakness (as presented 
in Section 2.1.7). The former represents a cause for youth bulges to rebel while the 
latter is a condition (and control variable) that influences the likelihood that a latent 
conflict will turn into a violent conflict, no matter what the root cause of the conflict 
is.  
2.2.3 Opportunities for Youth Violence 
The underlying main argument why youth bulges create opportunities for violent con-
flict lies in the sheer number of individuals that make up the bulge. Relative to previ-
ous generations, the pool of potential rebels increases. And since large youth cohorts 
stretch the limits of social institutions such as the labor market, youth bulges in them-
selves are likely to produce more aggrieved individuals. But as discussed above, the 
existence of serious grievances is not sufficient for collective violent action to erupt. 
What can explain how aggrieved youth become rebellious youth? 
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In general, youth seem to be more available to participation in violent conflict 
than older people. This has to do with both cultural and structural factors. Samuel P. 
Huntington (1996: 117) argues that ‘young people are the protagonists of protests, 
instability, reform, and revolution’, suggesting that youth generally have a natural urge 
for change. Also focusing on the troublesome idealism of the young, Goldstone (2001: 
95) claims that large youth groups can cause conflict because they are more easily at-
tracted towards new ideas and religions and thereby challenge traditional forms of au-
thority. According to Feuer (1969: 32), students that take part in generational struggles 
often live in relative material comfort, but are driven by an ‘ethical compulsion’. 
In addition to being more open to change, young people generally have fewer 
responsibilities for families and careers and ‘are simply free, to a unique degree, of 
constraints that tend to make activism too time consuming or risky for other groups to 
engage in’ (Goldstone, 1999: 3). In economic terms, the cost of recruiting young peo-
ple to rebel movements is relatively low since the opportunity cost for a young person 
generally is low (Collier, 2000: 94). As will be further discussed in Section 3.1.4, 
demographic literature suggests that this is even more true for many pre-conflict peri-
ods. In periods of serious economic decline, that often precede violent conflict, mar-
riage and child bearing tend to be postponed (Lee, 1990). This reduces the responsi-
bilities and increases the availability of young people to engage in violent conflict. 
As argued above, a strong collective identity is a precondition for people to act 
violently in response to grievances. Since I believe that generational consciousness in 
itself is insufficient as a strong identity marker, other forms of social segmentation 
need to be present for youth grievances to increase the risk of violent conflict. Some 
empirical evidence suggest that ethnicity is the form of social segmentation that is 
most likely to be transformed into a manifest, violent conflict as a result of the exis-
tence of youth bulges. Huntington argues that the existence of large youth bulges ac-
count for many of the intercivilizational conflicts in the late twentieth century (1996: 
261). He holds that the most serious episodes of ethnic violence in Sri Lanka have 
taken place in periods when the rioting ethnic groups have had their youth bulge peaks 
(1996: 259–60). Furthermore, Esty et al. (1998: 3) claim that their empirical study 
shows that the risk of ethnic conflict in a country greatly increases by the presence of a 
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youth bulge. As argued in detail in Sections 2.1.6 and 2.1.7, the type of political re-
gime, the degree of state weakness, is another important factor determining the possi-
bilities for peaceful action and the openings for violent conflict.  
An important, but neglected, way that youth bulges can increase the likelihood 
of violent conflict, is by ‘the demonstration or vanguard effect that a larger youth co-
hort can provide’ (Goldstone, 1999: 6). Goldstone argues that ‘studies of collective 
action have noted that a key ingredient for successful protest is the existence of a core 
of committed leaders and followers’. He believes that a core of young and risk-willing 
rebels can provide an effective leadership; ‘[g]iven the leading role of the young, small 
changes in the age composition of a population can have a marked effect on popular 
mobilization’ (Goldstone, 1991: 136). I assume that especially collectives of educated 
youth can bridge the gap between different groups in order to gather sufficient popular 
support for a successful revolt. 
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3. Processes of Demographic Change 
3.1 Determinants of Population Growth 
Increases in population growth can come about as a result of reduced mortality, in-
creased fertility, increased migration, or a combination of the three. Factors that lead to 
changes in the levels of these proximate determinants of population growth are nu-
merous and diverse, and fall into socio-economic, cultural, ecological, geographical 
and physiological categories. The more important factors will be discussed in greater 
detail below. 
In pre-industrial and pre-modern Europe, population was more or less station-
ary, with high rates of mortality and correspondingly high rates of fertility. Population 
growth was low. Following the age of modernization and industrial revolution, agri-
cultural productivity and sanitary conditions improved, causing mortality declines and 
strong population growth. The fall in mortality, and especially the sharp decrease in 
infant mortality, reduced the functional necessity of high fertility. It was no longer 
necessary for parents to have a high number of children to make sure at least some of 
them grew up to support them at old age. As the idea of family planning became more 
legitimate and children became more of an economic burden to their parents partly 
because of universal education, fertility started to decline. Again population returned 
to a stationary level, now with low rates of mortality and fertility and little population 
growth (Jones, 1990: 20). 
In many developing countries, fertility is higher and the fall in mortality hap-
pened much faster than in nineteen century Europe. Mortality has dropped substan-
tially in many developing countries over the past fifty years following from improved 
health care systems. As will be argued below, the societal changes that accompanied 
the industrialization in Europe to cause a lower demand for children have not applied 
to developing countries to the same degree. Emigration opportunities have also been 
more limited than for nineteenth century European countries. This has caused a popu-
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lation growth in many countries over the past decades that is much greater than was 
ever the case in Europe, and a growth in world population that is unique in history.  
However, the last decade has seen a substantial decrease in fertility in many de-
veloping countries, also in Sub-Saharan Africa (Cohen, 1998). Cleland (1993: 234) 
notes that ‘countries that have succeeded most in reducing childhood mortality also 
tend to record earlier and sharper declines in fertility’. Below I will discuss what fac-
tors that contribute to strain fertility in some areas and countries, and what explains 
continued high fertility and population growth in other. 
Processes of migration will not be treated in detail here, although rates of mi-
gration are sometimes significant contributors to overall population growth rates. As 
mentioned earlier, the strong population growth in Europe in the nineteenth century 
was eased by the emigration to the US. In the period 1840 to 1914, 750,000 persons 
emigrated from Norway to the US. This corresponds to 40% of the annual natural 
growth in this period (Jones, 1990: 232).  
3.1.1 Mortality 
During the period 1940–70 mortality in less developed countries declined substan-
tially. This reduction was partly due to developmental improvements, and partly to 
medical and public health programs designed to combat epidemic diseases. These pro-
grams were provided by colonial powers and international organizations (Jones, 1990: 
49). Many countries experienced over a decade declines in mortality that took 150 
years to achieve in Europe, but in the beginning of the 1980s, the decline stagnated 
(Caldwell, 1986: 51). Today high infant and child mortality, under one and five years 
respectively, are the main reasons why many developing countries do not achieve the 
same levels of life expectancy as developed countries. 
Economic development has often been recognized as the most important road to 
low mortality, but this is only true to a certain extent. Jones (1990: 28–29) argues that 
mortality declines with an increase in GDP per capita as long as countries are rela-
tively poor, but the effect diminishes above a certain level of wealth. For higher in-
come countries, the internal distribution of wealth is more important. Furthermore, the 
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level of economic development is only one of several factors influencing the level of 
mortality; ‘some countries reach health levels far above those that would be dictated 
by their economies and others fall far below’ (Caldwell, 1986: 173). 
The reasons for high infant mortality in developing countries are under- and 
malnutrition resulting from poverty, lack of clean and safe water, limited health ser-
vices especially in rural areas, and a lack of financial means to combat epidemic dis-
eases (Jones, 1990: 52–54). While general economic improvements can alleviate some 
of these problems, an alternative route to low mortality for poor countries go through 
factors such as increased female autonomy, and by giving high priority to the provi-
sion of health services and education (Caldwell, 1986). Countries that have success-
fully followed this path include China, Cuba, Sri Lanka and Costa Rica (Cleland, 
1993: 234).  
3.1.2 Fertility 
There is no unifying theory that explains why fertility declines. There are enormous 
variations between countries that have undergone a fertility transition with regard to 
demographic, social, and cultural contexts. One precondition that does seem to be uni-
versally necessary is a mortality decline. Without a fall in mortality, a fertility decline 
is highly unlikely (Mason, 1997: 446). Reduced mortality is however seldom a suffi-
cient condition, and fertility decline can occur at many absolute levels of mortality. 
It is common to explain fertility decline with processes of social change related 
to socioeconomic modernization in combination with the availability of family plan-
ning programs. Mason (1997: 449) argues that the first country within a geo-
graphic/cultural region to undergo a fertility transition is likely to have experienced 
some kind of cultural, social structural or environmental changes. In nineteenth cen-
tury Europe, the same processes of social change were associated with both mortality 
and fertility decline. In most developing countries mortality decline followed largely 
from the introduction of western modern medicine and was not immediately accompa-
nied by processes of social modernization. 
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The perhaps single most important socioeconomic factor that influences fertility 
decisions is the potential economic benefit of children. With the industrialization of 
Europe, production changed from family-based to capitalist. This, in combination with 
the introduction of universal education reduced the value of children as producers 
(Jones, 1990: 103). In societies that have not undergone a fertility transition it is gen-
erally not until the number of surviving children exceeds the family’s capacity to ac-
commodate them that parents will resort to fertility control (Mason, 1997: 449). In the 
one region that has not yet experienced a major fertility decline, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
the positive economic assets still provided by children is one of the main explanations 
for this (Cohen, 1998: 1445). 
Another aspect of socioeconomic modernization that has contributed to fertility 
decline is the expansion of educational opportunities, especially for women. Female 
education has proved to be an important determinant of fertility decline over a broad 
set of contexts and countries, and is also a crucial factor in the recent onset of a fertil-
ity decline in Sub-Saharan Africa (Caldwell, Orubuloye & Caldwell, 1992; Cohen, 
1998). Jejeebhoy (1995) argues that female education influences fertility through em-
powerment and autonomy of women. She believes that this increases the knowledge, 
social status, openness to modern ideas and independence from traditional sources of 
authority, to allow women to reduce their fertility. Female education is further linked 
to female labor force participation, another factor that is likely to reduce fertility. 
There are also cultural forces in play to determine fertility levels. Generally, 
cultures differ with regard to the acceptability of family planning influencing the indi-
vidual cost of fertility reduction. Furthermore, some forms of religious practices, most 
notably African traditional religions, promote large families. Central to these religions 
is that ancestor spirits live on exclusively through the rites conducted by descendants, 
and no surviving descendants mean no life in the hereafter (Caldwell & Caldwell, 
1987). The persistence of high fertility in parts of West Africa is partly due to such 
religious belief (Cohen, 1998: 1445). 
For processes of socioeconomic change to result in a fertility decline, modern 
contraceptives need to be available and taken into use. Economic costs of fertility con-
trol can be overcome with the provision of free, far-reaching and effective public 
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health services and family-planning programs. While family planning programs do not 
seem to influence the number of children that couples wish to have, such programs ‘do 
help to crystallize latent demand’ (Freedman, 1997: 10). 
3.2 Age Structure – What Causes Youth Bulges? 
The age structure of a population can become skewed in favor of younger cohorts, 
thus causing youth bulges, in two ways. First and most common, the size of younger 
cohorts can increase relative to previous ones. Youth bulges are especially associated 
with what is generally referred to as demographic transition. Transition periods are 
marked by reduced mortality and continued high fertility. Although demographic tran-
sition is far from being a globally uniform phenomenon, most countries in the world 
have over the past two centuries experienced periods of substantial mortality reduc-
tions. In most countries, fertility has begun to drop some time after the fall in mortal-
ity, and falls in fertility levels are quite recent experiences for many developing coun-
tries.  
Transition periods are likely to cause youth bulges since falling mortality means 
that an increasing number of children survive. Since fertility levels continue to be high 
for a relatively long time after mortality reductions, the total number of young people 
will be high relative to the sizes of previous generations. Youth bulges can also be 
caused by extraordinary periods of postponed fertility, like the baby-boom in the US 
and Western Europe after World War II. Such youth bulges are however small com-
pared to those caused by periods of demographic transition. 
Second, in some societies age structure can be skewed in favor of youth cohorts 
because older cohorts become more than naturally depleted. Especially is this the case 
with countries that are strongly affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Many countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa are now experiencing prevalence rates that will literally wipe 
out whole generations of adults in the near future. In most of these countries fertility 
remains high, and in combination this will cause an extreme skewedness in the age 
structure in the years to come. In some countries, high rates of labor migration can 
contribute to a depletion of the adult population. Especially island states like Cape 
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Verde and small Caribbean states have experienced large youth bulges resulting from 
high emigration rates (see Section 4.5.5). 
If the number of people in younger cohorts increases, this can later add a sig-
nificant contribution to population growth. When cohorts that are considerably larger 
than their parents’ cohorts proceed into the childbearing age groups, population 
growth will still be strong despite any reductions in fertility rates per woman. This 
phenomenon is called demographic momentum. An illustrative example is China that 
continues to experience relatively high rates of population growth two decades after 
the introduction of the one child policy. Fertility rates have recently declined to a level 
below replacement fertility (although far above one child per woman), but the large 
cohorts of young people that are the results of previously high fertility will cause con-
tinued population growth for still some time. 
3.3 The Effects of Crisis and Conflict on Demography 
Severe economic crisis and armed conflict are potentially important factors of demo-
graphic change through increased mortality and migration, and reduced fertility (Lee, 
1990). Even relatively modest economic recession can cause demographic responses, 
such as the fertility decline in Sweden following the economic setback of the first half 
of the 1990s. The magnitude of the demographic response is expected to increase with 
the severity of an economic crisis or an armed conflict. 
During times of crises, marital fertility may be reduced because people want to 
postpone childbearing to times of greater economic security and predictability. To 
some extent reduced fertility is also achieved through postponement of marriages and 
through reduced fecundity, the biological ability to conceive, potentially resulting 
from under- and malnutrition. After the end of a crisis, fertility often rises above nor-
mal levels for a period, but it is unlikely that this increase fully catches up the previous 
fertility loss. Mortality is likely to increase as a result of under- and malnutrition, ei-
ther because people starve to death or because they are more vulnerable to diseases. 
Some time after the end of a crisis, mortality often falls below normal level following 
from the premature deaths of weak and elderly individuals. Lee (1990: 1) argues that 
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‘mortality has greater responsibility in poorer settings and fertility in richer settings’. 
Another important response to economic crises is migration. People tend to move to 
areas where there are jobs or fertile land available, or even to other countries that offer 
better opportunities.  
Empirical evidence for the relationships between economic crises and demo-
graphic change are however ambiguous. Surveying literature on the consequences of 
economic crisis possibly linked to structural adjustment programs in developing coun-
tries, Mason (1993: 426) argues that ‘there is no evidence of a widespread decline in 
childbearing or increase in mortality’.  
The ways that economic crises influence demographic change are similar to the 
effects of armed conflict, although conflict can produce even more drastic demo-
graphic change, especially through massive migration or expulsion and extensive mor-
tality. Recent and severe examples of both are Bosnia and Rwanda. In a survey of 
demographic consequences of war, Rasler & Thompson (1992: 256–257) argue that 
while ‘the demographic influence of war is relatively insignificant insofar as total 
world population is concerned’, they find that the demographic influence of war in-
creases with the intensity and the proportion of the male population mobilized, that 
wars produce postwar compensatory birth waves, that deaths caused directly by war 
are fewer than deaths caused indirectly by war-related disease, epidemics, and famine, 
and that among civil victims are children, the aged and the unhealthy strongly over-
represented. Further, they conclude that wars make significant dents in the age and sex 
composition of the population. 
Armed conflict can thus have important influences on demographic change, af-
fecting both population growth and the age structure. Following the arguments above, 
the existence of armed conflict can thus produce demographic changes that again can 
lead to new or renewed conflict. This is especially serious to societies that have an ex-
tensive conflict history.  
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3.4 Population Trends 1950–2000 
The population trends have been diverse in different world regions in the latter half of 
the twentieth century. Yet, at the end of the century, the trends are pointing more or 
less in the same direction with lowered population growth, reduced fertility and con-
tinuing declines in infant mortality. World population has been growing at annual rates 
of 1.33 between 1995 and 2000, which are the lowest growth rates for the whole of 
this fifty-year period (Figure 3.1). Growth rates are at present highest in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, but even in this area they are starting to decline. In the beginning of the period, 
Latin America and North Africa saw the highest population growth, but both areas 
have experienced substantial reductions in growth rates over the last decades. 
 
Figure 3.1 Annual Population Growth 
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Source: UN (1999). 
 
In Europe, population growth is now almost negligible, only 0.03% annually 
for the last five year period of the century. Eastern European countries like Hungary, 
Latvia, Estonia and Bulgaria are already experiencing population decrease. The main 
reason for this development is the low level of fertility (Figure 3.2). Both North Amer-
ica and Europe have experienced fertility below replacement level all the way since 
the 1970s. Population has continued to grow in these regions only as a result of high 
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immigration and continued declines in mortality. Population projections predict nega-
tive population growth for Europe for the next 50-year period (UN, 1999). Figure 3.2 
shows that fertility levels in the regions of Asia, Latin America and North Africa 
started to decline in the 1970s, while fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa remained virtually 
unchanged until mid 1980s. 
 
Figure 3.2 Total Fertility Rates 
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Infant mortality rates have steadily improved in all regions of the world over the 
past 50 years (Figure 3.3). Sub-Saharan Africa has not experienced such dramatic 
drops in infant mortality as the other developing regions, and is lagging behind with 
rates almost the double of the second worst regions of Asia and North Africa.  
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Figure 3.3 Infant Mortality Rates 
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With regard to age distribution, all regions except Sub-Saharan Africa are now 
experiencing substantial decreases in the proportion of the total population below 25 
years (Figure 3.4). The African regions and Latin America have seen under-25 year 
shares of more than 60% over the 1950–2000 period. In Europe, the younger cohorts 
now make up less than one third of the population. 
 
Figure 3.4 Share Under 25 Years 
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As illustrated in Figure 3.5, population density, measured as total population 
size over total land area, differ substantially between regions. Throughout the period, 
Asia has had a much higher density than any other region, presently at 116 persons per 
square kilometer. Sub-Saharan Africa has been one of the least densely populated re-
gions, although on an increase, while Oceania has had the most space by a wide mar-
gin. There are qualifications to be added to these regional numbers, though, especially 
with regard to population density in Asia. As Lomborg (2001) points out, Netherlands, 
Belgium and Japan all have higher population densities than India, and Ohio and Den-
mark far outstrip the density of Indonesia. The population density of the United King-
dom is double that of South-East Asia (UN, 1999). 
 
Figure 3.5 Population Density 
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Demographic projections have been continuously corrected over the past dec-
ades following the relatively rapid, and to some degree unexpected, declines in fertility 
in the developing world. It is likely that the world the next half-century will see that 
the total population of the planet is nearing a stationary level. Compared to the present 
annual growth rates of 1.33%, the medium-variant projection of the UN foresees an 
annual population growth of 0.38% in the period 2040 to 2050 (UN, 1999). According 
to this projection, the total population of the world will be close to nine billion by 
2050.  
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4. Research Design 
4.1 A Quantitative Approach 
The empirical work on the population-conflict nexus is heavily dominated by qualita-
tive case studies, such as the studies at the University of Toronto led by Thomas 
Homer-Dixon. These case studies have been of great importance in identifying causal 
mechanisms through which population pressure is believed to influence the risk of 
armed conflict, and the theoretical framework presented in this study draws heavily on 
their findings. 
King, Keohane & Verba (1994: 85) stress the importance of identifying causal 
mechanisms, arguing that ‘any coherent account of causality needs to specify how the 
effects are exerted’. While the case study literature fares relatively well in this respect, 
it is far more uncertain whether the many projects have actually succeeded in identify-
ing significant causal effects, despite such claims. Much of the literature has been 
criticized for selecting cases on the dependent variable, i.e. only cases in which con-
flict has occurred (Gleditsch, 2001a: 391; Levy, 1995). One solution to this problem 
would be to conduct a series of case studies that differ with regard to the values on 
both the dependent variable and the main explanatory variables. But with a small 
number of cases, one would still run the risk of ending up with a deterministic model 
(Lieberson, 1991). 
Large-N studies are less likely to be questioned on the ground of case selection, 
and can test hypotheses over a much broader set of contexts. This increases the likeli-
hood that our causal inferences are correct. The obvious fact that ‘correlation is not 
causation’ must never prevent social scientists from stating causal hypotheses or draw-
ing causal inferences (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994: 75). One can never fully reject 
the possibility that a significant statistical relationship is incorrect as far as causality is 
concerned. But the finding of a statistical relationship does provide support for a hy-
pothesis predicting a causal relationship. Furthermore, instead of defining variables in 
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terms of being necessary or sufficient, which is the standard approach in a comparative 
low-N design, large-N tests allow for the possibility that causes are probabilistic 
(King, Keohane & Verba, 1994: 87).  
The potential weakness of the large-N approach lies in the high level of aggre-
gation. Using states as the units of analysis, one can potentially fail to properly analyze 
conflicts that are rooted in local contexts, and may ignore local population pressure as 
causes of local conflicts. It is however difficult to identify one sub-national geographic 
level out of regions, districts or local communities as the appropriate level to address. 
The advantage of focusing on the national level is that comparable data are widely 
available. Furthermore, national demographic aggregates are usually also quite good 
indicators of population pressure on sub-national levels. This is above all due to the 
likelihood that sub-national forms of population pressure are alleviated through intra-
state movements. Overall national population pressure is less likely to be alleviated 
this way, as migration is restricted on state level. This is not to say that quantitative 
analyses on a sub-national level would be of little interest. Such analyses would pro-
vide very important supplementary knowledge about how population pressure influ-
ences the likelihood of internal armed conflict. 
If data are not reliable, advanced statistical tools are of little help. Like many 
other kinds of data used in large-N surveys, demographic data are not very reliable. 
While for instance the regime characteristics of a country are relatively easily observ-
able to an objective party, they are subject to considerable interpretation. The most 
problematic point about demographic data is that they generally rely on information 
provided by each country. There are many examples of biased reporting of demo-
graphic data. The Soviet Union and other communist states were consequently under-
reporting the level of infant mortality and other mortality data during the cold war, in 
order to give the impression of having a higher standard of living than they actually 
did. And methods to estimate demographic characteristics have changed considerably 
over the past 50 years, causing great disparities in estimates that are obviously due to 
different estimation techniques. A comparison of different editions of Demographic 
Yearbook (UN, annual) supports this. 
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In this study I am using UN population indicators (UN, 1999) that have been 
adjusted in order to avoid problems of underreporting and measurement errors. The 
data have been run through population models so that unlikely trends have been cor-
rected for. Though the estimates may well deviate from the actual, and today unob-
servable, demographic characteristics of countries for the past 50 years, the demo-
graphic data used in this study are comparable, both over countries and over time. The 
UN (1999) data cover approximately 92% of my dataset. For the remaining 8% data 
have mainly been gathered from Demographic Yearbook (UN, annual), and some data 
on total population size have also been collected from Statistical Abstract of the World 
(Reddy, 1994). I believe that the demographic data used in this study are the most reli-
able data that are available, and that this strengthens my results compared to studies 
using only data from Demographic Yearbook, as in Hauge & Ellingsen (2001). 
The other kinds of data used in this study stem from datasets that are frequently 
used in large-N studies, and that are believed to be of high reliability. Data on regime 
type are gathered from the Polity Project (Marshall & Jaggers, 2000). This is the re-
gime data that most comparable studies use. My economic data originate from three 
well-reputed sources, World Development Indicators (World Bank, 1999a), the Penn 
World Tables (Summers & Heston, 1991) and the World Factbook (CIA, annual). 
These sources are widely recognized to contain the best economic data available. 
When necessary, further concerns regarding reliability and validity of data are dis-
cussed in section 4.5 under the operationalization of each of the research variables.  
4.2 Previous Empirical Work 
There has been little systematic comparative empirical research on the causal effects of 
demographic factors on conflict. Two recent studies, Hauge & Ellingsen (2001) and 
Tir & Diehl (2001), examine relationships between indicators of resource scarcity and 
conflict through multivariate statistical analyses for all states in the international sys-
tem. Both studies to some extent address the assumption that population pressure can 
lead to conflict over scarce resources. Tir & Diehl (2001) focus on interstate war, and 
find a significant and positive effect of population growth on the likelihood of onset of 
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war, while there is no such effect of population density. As in this thesis, the depend-
ent variable in the study of Hauge & Ellingsen (2001) is domestic violent conflict. 
While not testing for population growth, they find that high population density slightly 
increases the likelihood of conflict.  
The first comparative empirical study of the role of youth bulges in armed con-
flict was undertaken by Nazli Choucri (1974). By comparing qualitative case studies 
of 45 ‘local conflicts’ but not comparing these with any control cases, she found that 
the existence of large youth cohorts did play a minor role in ten conflicts, but was 
never a crucial factor in the initiation of these conflicts. I am only familiar with two 
large-N quantitative studies of the effect of youth cohorts on violent conflict. Collier 
(2000: 97) finds that large proportions of young men in a society increases, although 
only marginally, the likelihood of civil war. In a revised version of the study, however, 
he fails to find significant effects of such youth bulges (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002a: 21). 
Esty et al. (1998) test the effect of large youth cohorts for several categories of ‘state 
failures’ for the period of 1955–94, and find that youth bulges significantly increase 
the likelihood that a country will experience what they characterize as ‘ethnic con-
flict’.  
4.3 Value Added to the Population-Conflict Research 
All the works mentioned above are rigorous and solid. But for several reasons, many 
aspects of the population-conflict nexus are still insufficiently explored empirically. 
The aim of this study is, unlike previous comparable ones, to systematically explore 
the possible links between several indicators of population pressure and domestic 
armed conflict in an empirical analysis. I am not familiar with any large-N study ad-
dressing the effect of interactions between indicators of population pressure, such as 
the interaction between population growth and density, for the risk of armed conflict. 
Nor have I seen anyone testing interaction effects between population pressure vari-
ables and important contextual factors, such as youth bulges and regime type, and 
youth bulges and economic opportunities. The dataset also covers a temporal and spa-
tial domain far greater than previous studies in the field. 
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As will be argued below, some central demographic measures employed in pre-
vious analyses are not satisfactorily operationalized. This goes for both the measure of 
population density in Hauge & Ellingsen (2001), and that of youth bulges in Collier 
(2000). Furthermore, Esty et al. (1998) have been criticized both for their sampling 
methods of conflict and control cases (King & Zeng, 2001), and for their rather wide 
definition of ‘state failure’, which is their dependent variable (Hauge & Ellingsen, 
2001: 57). None of these previous studies treat the relationship between population 
pressure and domestic armed conflict satisfactorily. 
4.4 Coverage in Time and Space 
The units of this quantitative study are country-years. Time intervals could have been 
smaller (or greater), but most of the data used are available only on an annual basis, 
minimizing the potential gain from using smaller time intervals. Also, the demo-
graphic processes under scrutiny are relatively slow-moving, and drastic changes that 
can influence the risk of armed conflict usually do not happen within time intervals of 
days, weeks or even months.  
Included are all sovereign states in the international system and all politically 
dependent areas (colonies, occupied territories and dependencies) for the whole period 
1950–2000. An additional criterion for including dependent areas is that their esti-
mated total population had to reach a minimum of 150,000 in 1995. The reason for 
this is that annual population data are not available in UN (1999) for dependencies 
with smaller populations. The reason for the temporal restriction is that demographic 
estimates are generally far more unreliable prior to 1950. Additionally, the conflict 
data analyzed only go back to 1946. 
A considerable number of states leave and enter the dataset as a result of an-
nexations (examples are Germany, Yemen and Vietnam) or partitions (Yugoslavia and 
the Soviet Union) of states in the fifty-year period analyzed. Demographic data used 
for this study, however (UN, 1999), are only available for present-day countries, and 
not for historical states. So data are available for Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and all the 
other successor states of the Soviet Union for the whole period of 1950–2000, while 
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data are not available for the Soviet Union as a whole. Similarly, data for reunited 
Germany are available for the whole period, but not for the separate Eastern and West-
ern entities during the period of separation.  
Demographic data are then available for all current states for the whole period 
from 1950–2000 (UN, 1999), and variables had to be constructed for historical states. 
For country-years of states that were later partitioned, I merged variables on the basis 
of the additive values of the successor states (i.e. the total population of Soviet Union 
in 1950 was constructed from the 1950 population sizes of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus 
etc.). Ratios and per capita measures were weighted according to each successor 
state’s population size. Merged states are more rare, but constitute a more difficult 
case. For these states, I had to rely on supplementary historical information sources 
such as previous editions of the Demographic Yearbook (UN, annual). When informa-
tion was not available for different entities, I assigned the ratios of the united state to 
all historical parties. 
The total number of country-years contained by the dataset adds up to 9,183, 
covering 217 different states and dependent areas (see Appendix 1 for a comprehen-
sive list). Demographic data are missing for up to 5% of the country-years, depending 
on the demographic indicator. It is mostly the same country-years that lack informa-
tion over the different demographic indicators, making the total loss of units related to 
these variables low. 
4.5 Operationalizations 
4.5.1 Domestic Armed Conflict 
The dependent variable is onset of domestic armed conflict (coded 1 for years of con-
flict onset, 0 otherwise), and data are drawn from the Uppsala dataset (Gleditsch et al., 
2001). This dataset has been published annually in Journal of Peace Research since 
1993 (Gleditsch et al., 2001: 3) but has only recently been extended beyond the post-
Cold War period. Shorter series, mostly for the post-Cold War era, have been analyzed 
in earlier studies (de Soysa, 2002; Hauge & Ellingsen, 2001). The reason for opera-
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tionalizing the dependent variable as onset of armed conflict rather than incidence (the 
latter including all years of a conflict) is claims that onset of conflict is likely to have a 
different causation from the continuation of conflict (Gleditsch et al., 2001: 8). In this 
study, conflict thus refers to domestic conflict onset unless specified otherwise. I in-
clude colonial wars in my operationalization of conflict, as I see no reason to treat 
armed conflicts between a liberation army and a present colonial power differently 
from any other form of internal riot directed towards an autocratic regime. 
The Uppsala dataset defines a relatively low threshold for conflict, and distin-
guishes between minor armed conflict (a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths per 
year), intermediate armed conflict (at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and an ac-
cumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths, but fewer than 1,000 per year), and war (at 
least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year). In this analysis, I do not distinguish between 
different levels of conflict. For my purpose I assume that conflict data with a relatively 
low threshold of violence are more meaningful than data with a higher threshold such 
as the Correlates of War dataset (Singer & Small, 1994) that only includes conflicts 
with more than 1,000 battle-related deaths per year. I expect demographic pressure to 
be more relevant for explaining minor than major conflicts. This applies especially to 
neo-malthusian forms of population pressure that I believe are most often manifested 
in local conflicts. Also, using a very high threshold can mean that the starting point of 
an escalating conflict is not measured correctly, increasing the risk of interpreting cor-
relations with assumed explanatory variables faulty as causal effects. According to the 
Uppsala criteria, an armed conflict is further defined as a contested incompatibility 
concerning government and/or territory, between at least two parties, of which one is 
the government of a state, using armed force (Wallensteen & Sollenberg, 2001: 643).  
The reliability of the Uppsala data is high for the years of the original dataset 
covering the period of 1989 to 2000. However, due to limited and inaccurate historical 
records, the recent extension of the dataset back to 1945 (Gleditsch et al., 2001) has 
increased the likelihood that episodes of armed conflict are underreported. This prob-
lem may be greater for the Uppsala data than for other conflict data precisely because 
of its lower threshold. Low-intensity armed conflicts can more easily be hushed up 
than wars. This potential problem will remain unsolved. I assume that the problem is 
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most severe for low-intensity conflicts that took place in the beginning of the period 
covered by the dataset.  
A substantial number of the conflicts registered in the Uppsala dataset broke out 
at a time when there was already at least one other conflict going on in the same coun-
try. Typically, large countries like India and Indonesia have experienced several local 
conflicts taking place at the same time. The number of such overlapping conflicts is 
greater for the Uppsala data than for most other conflict datasets, since the Uppsala 
data include a large number of low-intensity conflicts. During the period of 1950– 
2000, 38 out of a total of 245 conflict onsets happened at a time when the country was 
already experiencing another armed conflict. As will further be discussed below, over-
lapping conflicts pose a methodological challenge since studies of armed conflict onset 
usually study transitions from peace to war, omitting consecutive years of war.  
My solution to this has been to code the dependent variable in two ways. The 
first restricted coding (‘Onset1’) only includes armed conflicts that erupted in a state 
of peace. The consequence is that if a country that is already in conflict experiences 
another conflict, this later conflict is treated as a spread of the first conflict, and not 
coded as a separate one. An objection to such a restriction would be that it is question-
able to treat all higher-order conflicts as spreading of the first no matter what the in-
compatibilities are. And by omitting a high proportion of all conflicts, much informa-
tion is lost. 
The second coding (‘Onset2’) includes all armed conflict onsets regardless of 
whether the conflicts broke out in a state of peace or war. The only exception is if 
more than one conflict broke out in the same country in the same year, such rare cases 
are coded as one conflict onset only. One relevant objection to this approach is that I 
run the risk of violating the assumption that the explanatory variables are endogenous. 
Many of the independent demographic, economic and regime variables in this analysis 
are believed to be strongly influenced by the incidence of armed conflict. On the other 
hand, it could be argued that changes on the explanatory variables following from an 
ongoing conflict could actually be causes of consecutive armed conflicts. For the pur-
pose of the study of the more extended conflict data I will return to the potential prob-
lem of endogeneity.  
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Table 4.1: Distribution of Armed Conflict on Continent 1950–200011 
 All years America Europe Africa Asia Oceania 
Country-years, Total 9,183 1,921 1,797 2,634 2,220 611 
Conflict Onset, From Peace 207 30 22 88 65 2 
% of all Country-Years 2.3 1.6 1.2 3.3 2.9 0.3 
Conflict Onset, All 245 30 24 95 94 2 
% of all Country-Years 2.7 1.6 1.3 3.6 4.2 0.3 
Total Years in Conflict 1,143 143 63 420 510 7 
% of all Country-Years 12.4 7.4 3.5 15.9 23.0 1.1 
Mean Length Per Conflicta 5.5 4.8 2.9 4.8 7.8 3.5 
Source: (Gleditsch et al., 2001)           
aBased on ’Onset1’, Measured in Years. 
 
If a conflict fell below the threshold of 25 deaths for at least one year for then to 
blaze up again, this renewed conflict is coded as separate from the first. This applies to 
both ways of coding. The descriptive statistics show that domestic armed conflicts are 
unequally spread between regions (Table 4.1).  
Africa has been the continent experiencing the highest number of conflict on-
sets from a state of peace (Onset1) relative to the continent’s total number of country-
years, while Asia has experienced the highest relative number of all conflict onsets, the 
highest relative number of years in conflict, and the longest lasting conflicts. Fortu-
nately, armed conflict onset is a relatively rare phenomenon, only 2.7% of all country-
years in the period 1950–2000 have experienced a conflict onset. The likelihood of 
experiencing a conflict onset is greater if the country is already at war; in 4.2% of the 
1,143 country-years in conflict there is another conflict onset. While in only 2.5% of 
all years in peace is there an onset of armed conflict. 
 
                                              
11 Collier & Hoeffler (2002b) have shown that the reason for the higher frequency of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa is not 
due to some unexplained continental-cultural traits, but to the accumulation of conflict-generating factors that explain con-
flict onset worldwide. This is also confirmed in my study; no continental dummy variables yield statistical significant results 
when all important explanatory variables are included. 
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Figure 4.1 Armed Conflict Incidence and Conflict Onsets 1950 – 2000, Relative to the 
Number of Countries per Year 
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Figure 4.1 shows that armed conflicts have become much more frequent over 
the past 50 years, although there was a considerably drop in the relative number of 
country-years that experienced an ongoing conflict after the top year 1992. The data 
should be comparable over time since conflicts that started prior to 1950 are counted 
as ongoing conflicts if they continued into the 1950s. Conflict onsets are more evenly 
spread over time, but there was a considerably higher frequency of onsets in the period 
1989–92, reflecting largely the dissolution and following conflicts in the former Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia. At the end of the period, the relative incidence of conflict onset 
dropped. Conflicts that erupted from a state of conflict have become slightly more fre-
quent in the 1990s. 
4.5.2 Population Growth 
Data on all the main demographic independent variables are primarily drawn from the 
dataset ‘Sex and Age Quinquennial 1950–2050’ (UN, 1999). This dataset is produced 
by the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the 
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United Nations, and contains demographic data for all independent countries and sev-
eral dependent areas with total populations of more than 150,000 in 1995. 
To measure population growth I have used the available estimates of annual 
population growth over six-year periods (1950–55, 1955–60 etc.). For the relatively 
low number of states with smaller populations than 150,000 in 1995 (in the following 
referred to as ‘small states’) such data was not available through the UN dataset, and I 
have collected data on total population from Demographic Yearbook (UN, annual) and 
Statistical Abstract of the World (Reddy, 1994). Since data on total population are not 
available on an annual basis for all countries, I have interpolated linearly between the 
observed data points.12 Population growth rates were then calculated on an annual ba-
sis. 
Since population growth rates are constant over each five-year period for most 
countries, this measure represents population growth trends over a longer time period 
than just one year. In addition, I have lagged the measure with five years. These fea-
tures strengthen the validity of the variable as an indicator of population pressure, as 
such pressure is believed to be a result of long term and aggregative processes. I as-
sume that it takes some time before, as Thomas Homer-Dixon claims, a strong in-
crease in population may result in migration and reduced economic and agricultural 
productivity. Since population data are not available for the period of 1945–50, I have 
assumed that growth rates for these years were identical to those of 1950–55.  
4.5.3 Population Density 
Thomas Homer-Dixon claims that ‘population size and growth are key variables pro-
ducing the syndrome of environmental scarcity’ (1991: 102). But population size is 
totally irrelevant if it does not relate to the resource base. Defining population density 
relative to the total area of a country, as done by Hauge & Ellingsen (2001), misses the 
                                              
12 My choice of linear interpolation produces very similar results to those obtained through exponential interpolation. While 
the latter would have been more theoretically appropriate, the former alternative was technically easier given the data struc-
ture. 
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important aspect that countries differ significantly with respect to the productive ca-
pacity of their territory.  
I have aimed to establish a measure of population density that relates the num-
ber of people in a country to the area available to them that potentially can be used for 
food production, what I call arable land. In a globalized and trading world such a 
measure may seem as an anachronism, since countries that possess other kinds of re-
sources can trade the food they need. In many developing societies, however, self-
subsistence agricultural production is an important way of living for a great number of 
people. And it is precisely the lack of available cropland in conflict-ridden developing 
societies that has been the main concern of neo-malthusian literature. 
Earth quality and other conditions influencing the crop potential differ substan-
tially between, but also within, different climate zones. This makes comparisons of 
food production potential somewhat unreliable. I rely on data on land-use that origi-
nates from FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations), assum-
ing that these should be comparable over countries. The FAO data have been available 
through the World Factbook (CIA, annual) as the share of total land area that is arable 
land. I define arable land to include all sorts of land that people potentially can use for 
any kind of agricultural production, either harvests or cattle. I also include forests in 
this definition, since I believe that forests are reservoirs of fertile land that most likely 
will be cut down to clear new land for food production if there is a pressure on land 
resources. This definition of arable land is far more extensive than the conventional 
meaning of the term, which usually includes cultivated land only.  
I define arable land as all of a country’s land that fall into the following FAO 
categories: arable land (cultivated for crops that are replanted after each harvest), per-
manent crops (cultivated for crops that are not replanted after each harvest), permanent 
pastures (land permanently used for herbaceous forage crops), and forests and wood-
land (land under dense or open stands of trees) (CIA, annual). Land that is excluded 
from this definition includes, but is not limited to urban areas, mountains, roads and 
deserts. I base the measure on observations for one year per country only, and the es-
timates date from the period 1993–2001. I thus ignore the problem of changing land 
use over time, since reliable information is not available for a large number of coun-
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tries. Unfortunately, the measure is probably not as reliable as I should have wished. 
Very different types of land assumed to have very different qualities regarding food 
production potential are categorized together. Also, the data do not take into account 
different climate zones that also matter a lot to food production potential. More ideal 
measures weighting the quality of land more properly according to its’ food produc-
tion potential may be available in the future. But despite extensive searching, I have 
not been able to find a more reliable indicator for arable land. 
Since data on arable land have been available as shares of total land area, I have 
gathered data on total land area (in square kilometers) from the World Development 
Indicators (World Bank, 1999a), the World Factbook (CIA, annual), and the Encyclo-
pedia Britannica (Britannica, annual). The data on total population size originate from 
UN (1999), and have been available to me only as estimates for every five years 
(1950, 1955, 1960 etc.). For the non-observed years I have interpolated total popula-
tion linearly between the five-year data points. To cover the period from 1995 to 2000 
I have interpolated between the 1995 estimates and the 2000 medium projection num-
bers. For small states I have collected data on total population from Demographic 
Yearbook (UN, annual) and Statistical Abstract of the World (Reddy, 1994). 
Thus, population density is defined here as total population size over the total 
number of square kilometers of arable land. The variable is log-transformed in order to 
reduce the huge variation in values, especially represented by city-states with extreme 
values, such as Macau, Hong Kong and Monaco. 
4.5.4 Refugees 
Large-scale and sudden cross-border movements of refugees are likely to pose a great 
challenge to the host state with regard to providing subsistence to the refugees. In 
some cases, large refugee populations can put a strain on the natural resources of the 
area of arrival, potentially competing over resources with the original inhabitants. 
Data on refugee populations is available only for recent years. For establishing 
a refugee measure, data has been drawn from statistics of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 1998, 1999, 2000). I have created a dummy 
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variable taking on the value 1 for countries that hosted more than 100,000 refugees in 
a given year, and 0 otherwise. Refugees are defined by UNHCR as those who are 
recognized as such by the 1951 United Nations Convention or its 1967 Protocol, or by 
the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention, and otherwise persons 
recognized as refugees in accordance with the UNHCR Statute, and persons granted 
humanitarian status or temporary protection (UNHCR, 2000: 1). The definition only 
applies to people who have taken refuge in another country than their country of ori-
gin. Reliable statistics on internally displaced persons, which can be seen as another 
possible indicator of population pressure, is not available. 
Since the UNHCR only estimates annual ‘net’ refugee populations and not 
gross refugee movements in and out of a country, it is not possible to establish a meas-
ure that takes into account possible temporal effects, i.e. whether refugee movements 
have an effect on conflict propensity within a certain time period after arrival. I am 
thus only able to measure whether the presence of a large refugee population increases 
the likelihood of armed conflict. Data on refugee populations is available for the years 
1988–99 only. All estimates are as of 31 December, and the variable is lagged one 
year in order to determine causality. Estimates of the size of refugee populations are 
generally very unreliable. Since I have dichotomized the variable and used a high 
threshold, I believe that it is unlikely that I have inadvertently omitted cases of large-
scale refugee movements. 
4.5.5 Youth Bulges 
The literature suggests several ways to operationalize youth bulges. Some of these 
suggestions produce serious flaws that could easily jeopardize the possibilities of de-
tecting effects of youth bulges on armed conflict. Somewhat surprisingly, the opera-
tionalization producing the most serious flaw is used by many prominent theorists 
(Collier, 2000; Goldstone, 2001; Huntington, 1996) without any discussion about its 
validity. That is to measure the size of youth cohorts (most commonly defined as those 
between 15 and 24 years) relative to the total population rather than to the adult popu-
lation.  
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First, this is not theoretically sound. Most theories about youth revolt assume 
that conflict arise as a result of competition between younger and older cohorts, or be-
cause youth cohorts run into institutional ‘bottlenecks’ because they are more numer-
ous than previous cohorts. Second, rapid growing youthful populations will then get 
an unreasonable low score for youth cohorts because their under-15 populations are so 
large that this inflates the total population. To avoid this, I have chosen to measure 
youth cohorts as 15–24 year-olds relative to the total adult population (15 years and 
above). Data on age distribution are drawn from the World Population Prospects (UN, 
1999), and from the Demographic Yearbook (UN, annual) for small states. 
Figure 4.2 Distribution of Youth Cohorts, All Country-Years 1950–2000 
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As Figure 4.1 shows, the values for youth cohorts between the ages 15 and 24 
vary greatly between 10% and 45% of the total adult population for this dataset. The 
industrialized countries of Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia and New 
Zealand all have youth cohorts between 13% and 20% today, with the exception of 
Ireland. The most frequent values are between 30% and 36%, representing a heteroge-
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neous group of country-years with respect to geography, level of development and 
regime characteristics. The mean value for the whole dataset is 29,8% while the me-
dian is 32%. Historically, high values close to 45% were achieved by small island 
states such as Cape Verde, Western Samoa, Guam and St. Kitts-Nevis that probably 
experienced high levels of labor emigration. Countries like Liberia and Zambia have 
experienced especially large youth cohorts in the late 1990s, and among the 20 coun-
tries with the greatest youth bulges in 2000, 15 were in Sub-Saharan Africa. Three 
were in the Middle East, Gaza, Syria, and Yemen, while the remaining two were Gua-
temala and Nicaragua in Central America. Countries with exceptionally small youth 
cohorts include Monaco, Germany, Italy and Switzerland. 
Huntington (1996: 259–261) argues that societies are especially war prone 
when the number of young people aged fifteen to twenty-four reaches a ‘critical level’ 
of 20% of the overall population in a country. By dichotomizing the youth cohort vari-
able or introducing a threshold level, much information would be lost compared to a 
continuous measure. Nor do I believe that there are absolute critical levels that make 
countries that tip over especially conflict prone. It could be, however, that the effect of 
youth bulges on conflict is not linear, but increases with larger youth cohorts. To in-
vestigate whether the effect of youth bulges may take a curvilinear form, I will include 
a squared term for youth bulges.  
4.5.6 Control Variables 
Existing literature suggest a broad variety of other factors that can contribute to ex-
plain the incidence of domestic armed conflict. In this analysis I include a set of con-
trol variables that measure some important causes of conflict. 
Level of development is a variable that has been found to strongly influence the 
likelihood of domestic armed conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998; de Soysa, 2002; 
Hauge & Ellingsen, 2001; Hegre et al., 2001; Henderson & Singer, 2000). Develop-
ment as a concept conveys a wide range of aspects, and there are many different, and 
often conflicting, theoretical explanations that aim to explain how and why societies 
get more peaceful through development. Referring to Douglas A. Hibbs’ moderniza-
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tion theory, Hegre et al. (2001: 37) argue that developed countries are more peaceful 
since development reduces class conflict, which stimulates the establishment of 
institutions that promote negotiated settlements. This implies a theoretical expectation 
of a higher conflict propensity in countries that are in an early stage of 
industrialization than for very poor and pre-industrialized countries. 
de Soysa (2002) focuses more on the role of higher state revenues, following 
from higher income, which enable states to pacify, or crush opposition. Wealthy coun-
tries can also more easily redistribute resources in order to dampen dissatisfaction 
(Henderson & Singer, 2000: 281). On the individual level, increasing income means 
that the opportunity costs of potential rebels increase following from their possible 
earnings in the regular economy (de Soysa, 2002).  
Most comparable studies have applied indicators of development that primarily 
capture economic aspects of income and industrial production, such as GDP per capita 
(de Soysa, 2002; Hauge & Ellingsen, 2001) or energy consumption per capita (Hegre 
et al., 2001; Henderson & Singer, 2000). There are two main weaknesses in these 
measures. First, they do not account for possible internal inequalities, and second they 
do not directly capture non-economic issues of development that potentially influence 
people’s quality of life. Sambanis (2002: 27) argues that findings from quantitative 
studies of civil war suggest that economic policies that not only promote economic 
growth, but also increase levels of education and improve public health, reduce the 
risk of civil war significantly. 
In this study I apply a proxy variable that may better capture the many aspects 
of development, the infant mortality rate (IMR).13 Amartya Sen (1998) has argued that 
mortality is a good indicator of a country’s level of development. And, as argued 
above, the level of infant mortality in a society is highly dependent on both material 
living standards, levels of education and health care systems. In addition to capturing 
non-economic aspects, IMR is not nearly as flawed by distributional effects since the 
                                              
13 For the sake of comparison, I also constructed a measure of log-transformed GDP per capita based on information from the 
World Development Indicators (World Bank 1999a), the Penn World Tables (Summers & Heston, 1991) and the CIA World 
Factbook (CIA, annual). The GDP data cover 76% of my dataset. 
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rich cannot fully make up for the poor in societies with great inequalities. Another 
great advantage of IMR over other proxies for development is its broad availability for 
the period studied here.14 The IMR is defined as the fraction of live-born children who 
die before the age of one year.   
IMR data have been gathered from the World Population Prospects (UN, 
1999), and the Demographic Yearbook (UN, annual) for small states. The data have 
been available to me only as rates for six-year periods (1950–55, 1955–60 etc), and 
not for single years. To avoid the possibility of conflict influencing the level of IMR, I 
lagged the variable for some countries where infant mortality rose dramatically in 
connection with armed conflict.15 I chose not to do a universal lag of this variable, as 
IMR may change rapidly. Such a lag would mean that conflict would be explained by 
the level of infant mortality some 5–10 years prior to the year of observation. The IMR 
variable has been log-transformed in to reduce the great variety, and I also include a 
squared term for the log-transformed IMR in order to investigate whether the conflict 
proneness related to development may follow a moderate curvilinear pattern as found 
by Collier & Hoeffler (1998) and Hegre et al. (2001). 
Could infant mortality be too closely connected to other central demographic 
measures? Infant mortality is clearly a factor influencing especially population growth 
and youth bulges. But processes of demographic change are complex and, as argued in 
chapter 3, a number of other factors than infant mortality are involved. However, 
youth bulges correlate strongly with both IMR and GDP per capita, suggesting that 
multicollinearity may be a problem in models including any of the development prox-
ies. I will return to the issue on how to avoid this problem later. Correlation between 
population growth and IMR is not troublesome. 
Population growth and youth bulges can be viewed as intermediary variables 
between infant mortality and armed conflict. Since infant mortality levels are impor-
                                              
14 Given the high correlation between the measures of IMR and GDP per capita (Appendix 5), data availability is probably 
the single most important argument for using IMR as a proxy for development. 
15 Iraq (1985-90 level lagged to 1991), Rwanda (1985-90 level lagged to 1991) and Sierra Leone (1985-90 level lagged to 
1991). 
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tant predictors of population growth and youth bulges, the inclusion of IMR in the 
models will contribute to tap the effect of these two measures. This will strengthen any 
significant results of population growth and youth bulges on conflict. 
A second control variable previously found to strongly influence the likelihood 
of domestic armed conflict is regime type. While the democratic peace argument is a 
well-known explanation of why democracies never fight each other, the level of de-
mocracy is also found to have an impact on the incidence of armed conflict (Hegre et 
al., 2001). The impact of regime type is generally believed to take an inverted U-
shaped form, meaning that stark autocracies and fully developed democracies are both 
less likely to experience conflict than the intermediate and more unstable regimes. I 
find this assumption identical to the state weakness hypothesis presented in Section 
2.1.6, arguing that regime type is defining the opportunities for conflict. Democratic 
regimes offer opportunities for peaceful voicing of grievances, while strong autocratic 
regimes will oppress all attempts of opposition. Intermediary regimes are the weak 
states that neither offer democratic institutions to voice grievances peacefully, nor pos-
sess the oppressiveness of the autocracies.  
I use the Polity IV data (Marshall & Jaggers, 2000) to measure regime type, the 
most updated dataset include information up until 1999 for all independent states with 
populations greater than 500,000. The Polity score is coded based on the authors’ sub-
jective assessment of the three elements; ‘the competitiveness of political participa-
tion, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and the level of con-
straints on the chief executive’ (Jaggers & Gurr, 1995: 471). Two regime dimensions 
ranging from 0 to 10 are measured independently by the Polity project, one represent-
ing aspects of democracy and one aspects of autocracy. I follow Hegre et al. (2001) 
and others, and establish one single regime indicator, subtracting the score for autoc-
racy from that of democracy. The values for the regime variable thus ranges from -10 
(most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic). I use this as a continuous measure, and also 
include a squared term in order to measure the assumed inverted U-shaped effect of 
regime on armed conflict. The Polity codings are from the end of the year, and the 
variable is thus lagged one year in order to determine causality. 
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The Polity data are consistent and correlate strongly with other often-used 
measures of democracy, such as the Freedom House’s political rights and civil liber-
ties index and the Polyarchy index focusing on participation and competition exclu-
sively in electoral processes (Jaggers & Gurr, 1995: 474; Vanhanen, 2000: 260), indi-
cating that validity and reliability is high. One problem about the Polity data, however, 
is that during periods of armed conflict and war, countries are assigned special missing 
codes (‘transition codes’) if the central political authority collapse, or if a country is 
occupied by a foreign power. These situations occur regularly under episodes of armed 
conflict. When assessing my dataset I find that for country-years of conflict onset, 
transition codes for the Polity index occur three times as often as they do for all coun-
try-years. Since Polity data generally do not exist for politically dependent areas, a 
total of 18% of all observations of armed conflict onset have no regime information. 
As will be further described below, I have used a simple data imputation method to 
avoid a loss of units. 
As yet another control variable, I include an indicator of economic opportuni-
ties. The relative deprivation hypothesis states that the likelihood of conflict increases 
as the gap between people’s expectations of an economic outcome and what they actu-
ally get becomes greater. One way to measure the level of relative deprivation is to 
address relative changes in the economy rather than the absolute level of wealth, as 
people generally relate their economic situation to their own past experience. If eco-
nomic opportunities are worsening through economic recession and rising unemploy-
ment, this is likely to cause grievances no matter the prior level of wealth.  
I found the best way to operationalize economic opportunities to be the average 
annual change in GDP per capita over the five-year period prior to the year of observa-
tion. I believe that a decrease in the income level over a longer period will produce 
higher unemployment and less wealth to share, and that this is a valid measure for eco-
nomic opportunities. Homer-Dixon (1994: 26) argues that ‘more recent research has 
shown that, to cause civil strife, economic crisis must be severe, persistent, and perva-
sive enough to erode the legitimacy or moral authority of the dominant social order 
and system of governance’. As argued above, limited economic growth is considered 
in neo-malthusian theory to be an intermediary variable between population pressure 
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pressure and armed conflict. The inclusion of this variable could thus tap some of the 
causal effect of population pressure variables. 
An argument questioning the reliability of this measure is that it does not cap-
ture alternative income-earning opportunities such as self-subsistence farming and 
black-market activities, ways of generating income that are of great importance in 
many developing countries. Despite this, I believe that GDP per capita growth is the 
most reliable measure. One alternative measure of opportunities, the rate of unem-
ployment, only covers a very small part of my country-years, and information is unre-
liable for a large number of countries. GDP per capita data have been gathered from 
the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 1999a), the Penn World Tables 
(Summers & Heston, 1991) and the World Factbook (CIA, annual).  
The states studied here include multi-cultural mega-states with more than one 
billion inhabitants, and also ethno-linguistic homogenous mini-states with only some 
ten thousand people. It is likely that these structural differences influence conflict pro-
pensity, and one way to partly account for these differences is through including a 
variable for total population size. I believe that the size of a state’s population influ-
ences the propensity for conflict both because more people means more potential con-
stellations for conflict and generally a higher degree of linguistic, religious, ethnic or 
cultural fractionalization, and second because larger populations to a considerable ex-
tent mean larger geographical areas that are more difficult to keep together than 
smaller areas. Data are drawn from the World Population Prospects (UN, 1999), and 
from the Demographic Yearbook (UN, annual) for small states. The variable is log-
transformed as I assume the size of the population to have a diminishing effect on con-
flict.  
Finally, I also control for political dependency status and communist state disso-
lution. Political dependency is a dummy variable coded 1 for political dependent areas, 
and 0 for sovereign states. The data were gathered from Gleditsch & Befring (1986), 
the Encyclopedia Britannica (Britannica, annual), and the World Factbook (CIA, an-
nual). Communist state dissolution is also a dummy variable, coded 1 for all successor 
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states for five years following after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, and 0 otherwise.16  
4.6 Statistical Method 
The dependent variable in this analysis is dichotomous, taking the value 1 for years of 
the event that I study, conflict onset, and 0 for the non-event, years with peace. Thus, 
the use of OLS regression would be inappropriate as it may predict values outside the 
0–1 interval. I will use logistic regression, which is better suited for treating dichoto-
mous dependent variables, and will apply a discrete time event history model. The 
logit model is specified as 
Log(Pit/(1-Pit) = α + ßXit + eit 
Where α is the intercept, ßX is a set of (possibly time-dependent) explanatory 
variables with corresponding coefficients, e is the random error term, for country i at 
time t.  
Like in many comparable analyses of domestic armed conflict, the nature of the 
available data forces me to measure all observations in discrete time, and aggregated 
over countries. Ideally, one could wish to have data for smaller time intervals and for 
smaller geographical areas, but the country-year framework is most likely detailed 
enough to answer my hypotheses. Most quantitative studies of domestic armed conflict 
use the country-year as the basic unit of analysis (Gleditsch et al., 2001: 8).17 
                                              
16 The reason why I include such a variable is because the many conflicts in the successor states of the Soviet Union and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the beginning of the 1990s are not well explained by the model suggested here. This 
causes a problem especially for the youth bulge variable, since almost all of the former communist states had very small 
youth cohorts in this period. Early runs of my model yielded predictions of increased risks of conflict onset both on very low 
and on very high values of youth bulges, and I believe the former result is due to the many conflicts in post-communist 
states. When ranging episodes of conflict onset after the size of the youth cohorts in the country, 11 out of the 17 conflict 
onsets in the countries with the smallest youth cohorts took place in successor states of the Soviet Union and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia within few years of dissolution. Since there have been no suggestions that conflicts in these post-
communist states were attributable to high dependency burdens or other effects of small youth cohorts, I believe that the 
inclusion of a post-communist dummy variable will potentially capture effects of causal variables that are unobserved in my 
model. 
17 Despite its wide use, the nation- or dyad-year approach is disputed. Raknerud & Hegre (1997: 387) argue for instance that 
‘the problems with the dyad-year tradition fundamentally derive from statistical dependence’, and suggest instead a continu-
ous-time Cox-regression model. In this study I apply some suggested remedies for statistical dependency into a basic coun-
try-year model. 
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The initial assumption for a logistic regression is independence across all ob-
servations. This independence is not easily defended in this case. There is very likely 
to be dependence in time and possibly in space. An example of the latter is if an armed 
conflict in one country spread into another country to cause conflict there. The former 
is illustrated by the higher conflict probability of countries that have experienced con-
flict before, compared to countries with no conflict history (Gleditsch et al., 2001). 
More obviously, a country that experiences conflict over several years will find subse-
quent years of conflict to be heavily dependent on the first year. It is common in the 
literature to avoid this latter problem by omitting all observations of conflict, except 
for observations of the onset of conflict given that the country was at peace at t-1. But 
this is not unproblematic with regard to the phenomenon being explained. Since a new 
conflict can erupt in a country already in civil war, we risk loosing valuable informa-
tion. India is a good example, where there are several parallel conflicts over different 
incompabilities. A scientifically sound approach to this problem is to apply several 
operationalizations of the dependent variable, remedying the different problems and 
observing whether the results are robust to the different approaches. 
The first operationalization, ‘Onset1’, includes only armed conflicts that 
erupted in a state of peace. It is logically only possible to have transitions from peace 
in the whole of the country to armed conflict, even though the conflict takes place in a 
remote part of the country. This is by far the most common way to operationalize con-
flict in comparable analyses.18 When using this dependent variable, units of consecu-
tive years of a conflict are omitted from the analysis. This is the methodologically 
most sound approach, but as discussed above, not without a cost. 
                                              
18 Gleditsch et al. (2001: 8) note that ’[m]ost quantitative studies of armed conflict use the country-year or the dyad-year as 
the basic unit of analysis. The dependent variable may be the onset of a new conflict, the onset of new dyadic conflict (a new 
country joining an on-going conflict), or the incidence of conflict in a given year. While Bremer (1992) argues that the onset 
of war is likely to have a different causation from the continuation of war, Russett & Oneal (2001: 95), on the other hand, 
hold that leaders reevaluate their positions during a conflict and that it is therefore most appropriate to use incidence of con-
flict as the dependent variable. Others (Gleditsch & Hegre, 1997) report results for onset as well as incidence, in order to test 
if their findings are robust. Each type of analysis raises some substantive and statistical problems.’ Some examples of quanti-
tative studies that differ with regard to theme, but use country-years or dyad-years as the basic unit of analysis and conflict 
onset as the dependent variable are Oneal & Russett (1999), Henderson & Singer (2000), Buhaug (2001), Fearon & Laitin 
(2001), King & Zeng (2001).  
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The second operationalization, ‘Onset2’, derives from a different logic. When 
using this measure as the dependent variable I assume that I investigate transitions 
from peace in one part of the country to armed conflict in that part of the country. This 
allows for the possibility that there can be other transitions from peace to armed con-
flict in other parts of the country even though there is already an armed conflict going 
on. Consequently, I do not omit consecutive years of conflict from the analysis. In-
stead I include a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for all years of conflict except 
the year of onset of the first conflict, and 0 otherwise. This variable, termed ongoing 
conflict in country, controls for spatial dependence. It may be easier to a rebel group B 
to act militarily on the government, if the government is already involved in an armed 
conflict with group A. 
Omitting consecutive years of war, as I do for one of my dependent variables, 
does not solve the problem of time dependency entirely because the same statistical 
dependency prevails for consecutive years of peace. This problem is thoroughly de-
scribed in quantitative political analyses.19 To account for it, I will apply a control 
variable for time dependency that is widely used in comparable analyses: the number 
of years in peace since the previous conflict.20  
It is generally assumed that the risk of experiencing a new conflict is high in the 
immediate time after an armed conflict, and that this risk diminishes as time goes by 
and wounds are healed. 21 I have chosen to follow the suggestion by Hegre et al. 
(2001) and assume that the effect of a previous conflict is decaying over time accord-
ing to the formula exp{(-years in peace)/X}. I call this variable brevity of peace.22 In 
                                              
19 For an excellent introduction to this debate, see Raknerud & Hegre (1997), and Beck et al. (1998). For a further discussion 
on methodological design in relation to time dependency and other fundamental problems in cross-sectional and cross-
temporal conflict data, see the discussion on fixed-effects versus pooled cross-sections analyses in the special symposium on 
research design and method in IR in International Organization 55(2) (Green et al., 2001; Oneal & Russett, 2001; Beck & 
Katz, 2001; King, 2001). 
20 For different applications of years in peace as time dependency control, see Beck et al. (1998) and Hegre et al. (2001). 
21 I have not seen any theoretical suggestions for what is a reasonable half-life for the onset of conflict. Scholars have gener-
ally tested empirically what value provides the best fit (maximizes log likelihood). Thus the assumptions for the time it takes 
before the effect of a previous conflict is halved ranges from three to sixteen years in three comparable studies (Toset et al., 
2000; Hegre, 2000; Hegre et al., 2001).  
22 Håvard Hegre uses this term in his most recent studies, and I am grateful to him for suggesting the term to me. 
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the formula, ‘years in peace’ is the number of years since a country experienced an 
armed conflict, while the value on X decides at what rate the effect of a previous 
armed conflict on conflict proneness diminishes over time. In this study, the value 
chosen for X is 4, which means that the risk of conflict is halved approximately every 
3 years. This value for X is chosen because it maximizes the log likelihood in model 1 
(log likelihood = -819.01).23 The brevity of peace variable takes on values close to 1 
immediately after the end of a conflict, while it comes closer to 0 as time goes by. For 
countries that have never experienced armed conflict in the period studied here, I as-
sign the value 0.24 
I will also apply a control variable for dependence across events, counting the 
number of previous conflicts. The variable previous conflict is coded as the number of 
conflict onsets a country has experienced prior to a given year of observation. This 
reflects the assumption that grievances caused by prior armed conflict increases with 
the number of previous conflicts. The variable takes the value 0 for all countries that 
enter the dataset, and increases by one for each conflict onset that is coded. Two alter-
native variables are coded, corresponding to the two differently coded dependent vari-
ables. 
Since my dataset include so many states and dependent areas, some of the vari-
ables are missing values on a relatively high number of units. In order not to decimate 
the number of units analyzed, I have assigned the value for the sample average for 
missing values on the regime (31% missing) and economic opportunities (24% miss-
ing) variables. I have additionally created two dummy variables, missing regime data 
and missing economic data corresponding to the two variables, taking on the value 1 if 
information on the corresponding variable is originally missing from the dataset, and 0 
otherwise. These dummy variables control for potential skewness caused by imputing 
the mean value. If such a dummy variable should yield a statistically significant effect, 
this means that the units that have been assigned the value for the sample average have 
                                              
23 A brevity of peace variable in the same model assuming a half-life of five years produced a log likelihood of -822.6, ten 
years one of -826.0, and sixteen years one of -827.8. 
24 Since information on domestic armed conflict prior to 1945 is not available, the variable is systematically underestimated.  
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a significantly different risk of conflict than units that originally takes on the value of 
the sample average, all other things being equal.25 
                                              
25 The method of imputing the univariate mean value and controlling for skewness through a dummy variable is a well-used 
technique among statisticians in order to avoid listwise deletion of units with missing values. But this procedure is controver-
sial. King et al. (2001: 66) argue that such a method may be biased or inefficient, and that it may ’give standard errors that 
are too small because they essentially ”lie” to the computer program, telling it that we know the imputed value with as much 
certainty as we do the observed values’ (ibid.). King et al.  (2001) suggest instead to carry through a multivariate imputation 
procedure. This procedure is however less suited for my dataset since I would then impute values for regime and economic 
variables based on demographic variables alone. Because I would have questioned the reliability of multiple imputed vari-
ables in this case, and because the variables with the most severe problems of missing values are control variables rather than 
main explanatory variables, I assume that the procedure that I have chosen here is the most appropriate. 
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5. Testing the Population Pressure Hypotheses 
In this chapter I aim to test the population pressure hypotheses from Chapter 2. I de-
rived two sets of hypotheses in that chapter. The neo-malthusian hypotheses assume 
that countries experiencing high population growth and population density, and espe-
cially the combination of the two, and countries hosting large refugee groups are more 
likely to experience a pressure on natural resources, and thus more exposed to the risk 
of armed conflict. The youth bulge hypotheses assume that countries with large youth 
cohorts are more likely to experience armed conflict, and especially so if the countries 
at the same time experience low economic growth and if they score low on the regime 
variable (are more autocratic). 
To get a first idea of how my population pressure variables are related to armed 
conflict, I present bivariate analyses in Table 5.1. The results are unfit for drawing 
conclusions regarding causal relationships, but they give an indication of the demo-
graphic characteristics of countries that experience conflict. Later I will control for 
other relevant factors. 
 
Table 5.1 Bivariate Analyses of Armed Conflict, 1950–2000, All States and Depend-
ent Areas 
Neo-Malthusian Population Pressure Variables β st.e. p-value N 
Population Growth 0.043 0.039 0.274 8,247 
Population Density, Arable Land -0.119 0.039 0.003 8,083 
Population Density, Total Area -0.098 0.042 0.018 8,227 
Growth x Density -0.001 0.007 0.873 8,083 
Refugees 1.052 0.261 <0.0005 2,043 
     
Youth Bulges     
Youth Bulges 0.083 0.014 <0.0005 7,787 
Youth Bulges, Squared 0.0002 0.002 0.898 7,787 
Youth Bulges x Regime Type -0.0008 0.0004 0.045 7,787 
Youth Bulges x Economic Opportunities -0.0026 0.0006 <0.0005 7,787 
     
Note: The single and squared youth bulge terms have been analyzed jointly. 
 
Countries experiencing armed conflict are not particularly marked by indicators 
of neo-malthusian population pressure. Conflict-prone countries do not have a signifi-
cantly different population growth than peaceful countries, not even when population 
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growth happens in a context of high population density. As argued in Chapter 3, the 
level of population growth is believed to be highly influenced by the level of devel-
opment. Since less developed countries are likely to both have high population growth 
rates and also a high conflict propensity, I find it surprising that the bivariate relation-
ship between population growth rates and armed conflict is not statistically significant. 
Countries with high population density are, contrary to my expectation, less likely to 
experience a conflict than more sparsely populated countries. Furthermore, the nega-
tive effect on conflict propensity is even stronger when I use a population density 
measure that takes into account only arable land, relative to the conventional measure 
based on total land area. Countries hosting large refugee groups have a significantly 
higher risk of armed conflict, and this is the only indicator of neo-malthusian popula-
tion pressure that behaves as expected.  
My indicator of non-malthusian population pressure, youth bulges, is as ex-
pected positive and statistically significant, indicating that countries experiencing con-
flict do have relatively larger youth cohorts than peaceful countries. The squared term 
for youth bulges indicates that the effect on conflict propensity is linear, not support-
ing an expectation that the effect increases with the size of the youth bulge. The 
bivariate effects of the interaction terms are also promising. Countries experiencing 
youth bulges have a higher risk of conflict the less democratic they are, although this 
statistical relationship is rather weak. Countries with youth bulges and economic re-
cession are also particularly conflict prone. 
The rest of this chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part I test neo-
malthusian hypotheses over a set of multivariate models, while the second is dedicated 
to a similar testing of youth bulge hypotheses. In both parts I first present the basic 
models for the two types of population pressure. Then I run the same models for the 
dependent variable including all conflict onsets, i.e. both conflicts that erupted from a 
state of peace and conflicts that erupted while the country in question was experienc-
ing an already ongoing conflict. Models analyzing this dependent variable (‘Onset2’) 
are referred to in the following as including ‘all conflicts’. Finally, I run the models for 
different decades to see if the effect of population pressure has changed over time. For 
most models I have calculated exp(β) for the different variables. Exp(β) is also called 
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odds ratio, and measures the change in odds associated with an increase of one unit of 
an independent variable, if all other variables are kept constant. 
5.1 Evidence for a Neo-Malthusian Conflict Scenario 
In Table 5.2 I present the main models covering the relationship between neo-
malthusian forms of population pressure and armed conflict. Model 1 includes popula-
tion pressure indicators along with the most important control variables, measuring the 
likelihood of domestic armed conflict for all sovereign states and dependent areas.26 
Model 2 includes in addition one intermediary variable and one interaction term.  
Indicators of population pressure do not seem to be of great importance for 
armed conflict in the multivariate model either. In both models, the interaction effect 
between population growth and density has the expected positive sign, while the sepa-
rate effects of growth and density27 are negative, contrary to my expectation.28 All 
three variables are however clearly statistically insignificant29, supporting a null hy-
pothesis that there is no association between neo-malthusian forms of population pres-
sure and the likelihood of armed conflict. 
 
 
 
Table 5.2 Risk of Armed Conflict by Neo-Malthusian Population Pressure Variables 
1950–2000, All States and Dependent Areas 
                                              
26 When I restrict the sample to include only sovereign states, it does not seriously alter the effects of any main explanatory 
variables in any models. The results reported here should then be comparable to those of studies that only analyze sovereign 
states.  
27 When my population density measure defining population relative to potentially productive land area is replaced by the 
conventional measure, population over total land area, the effect of population density is still negative and insignificant. 
28 When the interaction term between growth and density is omitted, the separate effects of population growth and density 
are virtually unchanged. 
29 In prefer to present full p-values rather than levels of significance in my models. The conventional levels of 10%, 5% or 
1% certainty of whether a statistical relationship holds for the universe of units are after all casually set, and strict adherence 
to such levels can potentially lead to the neglect of interesting relationships that do not meet formal criteria for statistical 
significance. In the text, unless other is stated, statistical significance refers throughout this thesis to p-values below 0.05. In 
this study I consequently report two-sided tests, although all hypotheses are stated as one-sided. 
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 Model 1 Model 2 
Explanatory Variables β 
st.e. 
p-valuea 
Exp(β) 
β 
st.e. 
p-valuea 
Exp(β) 
Population Pressure Variables     
Population Growth* -0.038 
(0.063) 
0.549 
0.96 
-0.061 
(0.068) 
0.374 
0.94 
Population Density* -0.066 
(0.053) 
0.216 
0.94 
-0.059 
(0.053) 
0.267 
0.94 
Growth x Density* 0.037 
(0.040) 
0.354 
1.04 
0.044 
(0.043) 
0.306 
1.04 
Growth x Infant Mortality Rate*   0.036 
(0.092) 
0.700 
1.04 
Control Variables     
Total Population 0.248 
(0.048) 
<0.0005 
1.28 
0.261 
(0.049) 
<0.0005 
1.30 
Dependency -0.753 
(0.365) 
0.039 
0.47 
-0.594 
(0.381) 
0.119 
0.55 
Infant Mortality Rate* 0.559 
(0.118) 
<0.0005 
1.75 
0.626 
(0.132) 
<0.0005 
1.87 
Infant Mortality Rate, Squared* -0.032 
(0.111) 
0.773 
0.97 
-0.027 
(0.121) 
0.824 
0.97 
Regime 0.021 
(0.014) 
0.127 
1.02 
0.021 
(0.014) 
0.129 
1.02 
Regime, Squared -0.011 
(0.003) 
<0.0005 
0.99 
-0.011 
(0.003) 
<0.0005 
0.99 
Missing Regime Data -0.171 
(0.299) 
0.567 
0.84 
-0.124 
(0.300) 
0.679 
0.88 
Economic Opportunities   -0.053 
(0.019) 
0.004 
0.95 
Missing Economic Data   -0.250 
(0.257) 
0.331 
0.78 
Controls for Statistical Dependency 
Previous Conflict 0.074 
(0.076) 
0.332 
1.08 
0.077 
(0.077) 
0.323 
1.08 
Brevity of Peace (3 Years) 2.136 
(0.300) 
<0.0005 
8.47 
1.984 
(0.304) 
<0.0005 
7.27 
     
Constant -5.584 
(0.466) 
<0.0005 
- 
-5.733 
(0.481) 
<0.0005 
- 
N 
Log Likelihood 
Pseudo R2 
7,770 
-819.01 
0.132 
 7,770 
-814.29 
0.137 
 
Note: Variables marked with an asterisk have been centered (or standardized) in order to avoid problems of 
multicollinearity. If parameter estimates are highly intercorrelated (above 0.5) this is an indication of multicol-
linearity, i.e. the variables are explaining too much of the same variance, making the estimates that are intercor-
related unreliable. When centering a variable, the mean value is subtracted from the value of all units, so that 
the new mean of the variable is 0. While the scale of the variable is as broad as it was originally, this procedure 
enables us to separate the effects of the intercorrelated variables. For all the variables that have been centered 
in this study, a correlation matrix of the original parameter estimates indicated problems of multicollinearity. In 
all later models, centered variables are marked with an asterisk. 
a Effects that are significant at 0.05 level in bold. 
 
In Model 2, an interaction term between population growth and infant mortality 
rate is included to see whether less developed countries that experience high popula-
tion growth rates are especially conflict prone. This interaction term is included to test 
 86
indirectly the ingenuity-hypothesis of Thomas Homer-Dixon. Since countries that are 
less developed are much more likely to experience a lack of ingenuity than developed 
countries, they should be more exposed to conflict in the face of population pressure 
and resource scarcity. But while the sign is positive, this interaction term is also statis-
tically insignificant.30 
Neo-malthusian theory suggest that one of the most important ways that 
population pressure increases the likelihood of armed conflict is through its negative 
effect on economic productivity. When I introduce the economic opportunities 
variable in Model 2, measuring economic growth, this does not cause much of a 
change in the effect that population growth has on conflict. Economic opportunities do 
seem to have a significant effect on conflict propensity though, an increase of one 
percentage point of annual economic growth is associated with an approximate five 
percent drop in the risk of having an armed conflict. It does not seem from these 
results that population pressure is a very important determinant of economic growth.31 
Most of my control variables are statistically significant in Models 1 and 2, and 
mostly they also behave as expected. Countries with larger populations are clearly 
more exposed to the risk of armed conflict than countries with small populations, 
probably reflecting that countries with many people are also countries with large terri-
tories and more fragmented populations. Since the variable is log-transformed, it 
means that the effect on conflict propensity of an increase of one unit diminishes with 
larger populations. The parameter estimate in Model 1 suggests that countries with 
populations of 1 million are almost 80% more likely to experience a conflict than 
                                              
30 Interaction terms between population density and development, and population growth, population density and develop-
ment produced similar, insignificant results. Also, when the development measure is changed from IMR to GDP per capita, 
the interaction term between population growth and development is still insignificant. 
31 The evidence for a relationship between population and GDP per capita growth rates is ambiguous. Kelley & Schmidt 
(1995) argue that scholars generally have failed to find such correlation. In their own study they do find a negative impact of 
high population growth on economic outcome for less developed countries in the 1980s, but not in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
data on population and economic growth rates used in the present study have not initially been arranged for an analysis 
similar to that of Kelley and Schmidt. But when I run linear regression models with economic opportunities as the dependent 
variable, population growth rates do have a negative and significant effect on GDP per capita growth rates over a broad 
variety of model specifications. The two growth measures are run for parallel time periods, and the results may thus indicate 
that population growth has an immediate negative impact on economic growth through an increased dependency burden. As 
argued in Section 2.1.6, the negative impact that population growth may have on economic growth through a higher depend-
ency burden does not have to operate through natural resource scarcity. 
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countries with a population of 100,000. Countries with populations of 10 million are 
only approximately 19% more likely to experience a conflict than countries with 5 
million inhabitants. 
Political dependency status is negatively related to armed conflict, and the ef-
fect is significant at 0.05 level. The dependency variable is strongly correlated with the 
missing regime data indicator, since the Polity Project does not provide regime scores 
for dependencies. When I omit the missing indicator from the analysis, the effect of 
dependency is negative and significant at 0.01 level in Model 1, and borderline sig-
nificant at 0.05 level in Model 2.32 Dependencies can thus be viewed as a separate re-
gime category, and they exhibit a lower conflict propensity than sovereign states. In 
Model 1 dependencies run less than half the risk of conflict compared to sovereign 
states. The explanation for this relationship is probably that colonial wars have been 
relatively rare and were primarily a phenomenon of the first half of the period studied 
here. Most dependencies in the dataset are areas that could have achieved independ-
ence by peaceful means, but retain their dependency status out of their own free will. 
Only two out of the total of 19 conflicts that broke out in dependencies in my dataset, 
happened after 1975. 
My proxy variable for development, infant mortality rates, is strongly signifi-
cant and positively related to armed conflict in both models, supporting a hypothesis 
that less developed countries are more likely than more developed countries to experi-
ence conflict. While this is consistent with many previous studies using economic de-
velopment indicators, I fail to find a curvilinear shape.33 Thus, the less developed a 
country is, the more prone it is to conflict, although the effect is diminishing for in-
creasing levels of infant mortality (see Figure 5.1). In Model 1, a change in IMR from 
200 to 150 corresponds to a reduction in conflict proneness by 15%, while a reduction 
from 20 to 10 is associated with a risk reduction of more than 30%. If the Sub-Sahara 
African countries would improve their level of development relative to a reduction in 
                                              
32 Similarly, the missing-regime indicator is statistically significant and negative when dependency is omitted in model 1. 
33 This finding is consistent over all model specifications presented here, and I will omit the squared term for development in 
consecutive models. 
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IMR from their present (2000) level of approximately 90 to the present Western Euro-
pean average level of 6.4, this would reduce their risk of conflict by more than 75%, 
all other factors being equal. 
 
Figure 5.1 Probability of Armed Conflict as a Function of Infant Mortality Rate, All 
Control Variables at Mean 
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The figure is based on estimates from Model 1 in Table 5.2. 
 
Type of political regime seems to matter for armed conflict, and the effects are 
consistent with the findings of previous studies.34 The squared regime term is signifi-
cant at 0.001 level, suggesting that there is indeed an inversed U-shaped relationship 
between regime type and conflict, where intermediary regimes are more conflict prone 
than democracies and autocracies (see Figure 5.2). The curve is not perfectly symmet-
ric around the mean value 0, somewhat surprisingly full-fledged democracies do have 
a slightly higher risk of conflict than stark autocracies. Countries with the value of +1 
on the regime scale are most conflict prone. Compared to the most conflict-exposed 
                                              
34 I also ran the models with and alternative democracy scale, the Polyarchy data (Vanhanen, 2000). The results were almost 
identical to those attained when using the Polity scores, both for the democracy variable itself and for the other independent 
variables, over all models. The only main difference was that dependencies were set to the lowest score of the Polyarchy 
scale, 0, since Polyarchy is primarily concerned with electoral institutions. Resulting from this, the separate effect of de-
pendency status vanished. 
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regimes, fully developed democracies (+10) are 60% less likely to experience a con-
flict, while consistent autocracies (-10) are almost 75% less exposed, all other factors 
held constant. In Figure 2.3, the infant mortality rate and regime variables are repre-
sented jointly. 
 
Figure 5.2 Probability of Armed Conflict as a Function of Regime Type, All Control 
Variables at Mean 
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The figure is based on estimates from Model 1 in Table 5.2. 
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Figure 5.3 Probability of Armed Conflict as a Function of Infant Mortality Rate and 
Regime Type, All Control Variables at Mean 
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The figure is based on estimates from Model 1 in Table 5.2. 
 
The indicator for missing regime data is statistically insignificant 
pendency variable is included, while negative and significant at 0.05 lev
dependency variable is omitted from the analysis. The interpretation of 
ship is that dependent areas, that have been assigned the regime value 
significantly lower risk of conflict than independent states that origina
value 0 on the regime variable. Since the effect of the missing indicato
when controlling for dependency status, I conclude that country-years 
states that have been assigned the regime value 0 as a result of missing v
have a significantly different conflict propensity than countries that are
have had a regime value of 0, all other factors held constant. Also, the mi
tor for economic opportunities is not significant, indicating that count
have been assigned the mean value do not have a significantly different ri
than country-years that are observed to have had the mean value. 
The brevity of peace variable is clearly significant and positively re
flict; immediately after the secession of an armed conflict, a country is 
times as likely (Model 1) to experience another conflict than countriesInfant Mortality 
Rate LowHigh 
when the de-
el when the 
this relation-
0, do have a 
lly have the 
r diminishes 
of sovereign 
alues do not 
 observed to 
ssing indica-
ry-years that 
sk of conflict 
lated to con-
more than 8 
 that experi-
 91
enced conflict a long time ago or that never have experienced a conflict.35 The parame-
ter estimates of brevity of peace and previous conflicts are intercorrelated on a rela-
tively high level (-0.54 in Model 1), indicating that the reason why the latter variable is 
statistically insignificant may be that the two variables capture much of the same vari-
ance. This is supported by the fact that the previous conflict variable becomes signifi-
cant at 0.001 level when the brevity of peace variable is omitted from the analysis. It is 
possible that the separate effects of brevity of peace and previous conflicts would have 
been more visible in a model covering a longer time span. The results presented in Ta-
ble 5.1 indicate that the time since last conflict is more important than the number of 
conflicts that have taken place historically. 
Finally, I ran Model 1 with the alternative development measure, a log-
tranformed term for GDP per capita (see Model 3, Table 5.3). As many as 2,202 coun-
try-years lack information on this variable. Such units were assigned the mean value, 
and I included a dummy variable taking on the value 1 for originally missing values, 
and 0 otherwise. GDP per capita performs very similar to IMR as a proxy of develop-
ment. The term is as expected negatively associated with armed conflict, and I still fail 
to find any curvilinear effect of development on conflict propensity. 
The most interesting change from Model 1 to 3 is that population density has a 
negative effect on conflict, significant at 0.01 level, when I use GDP per capita as the 
measure for development. This finding is at odds with that of Hauge & Ellingsen 
(2001) using the conventional measure for population density. To see whether this dis-
parity in results is due to the different density measures, I replaced my population den-
sity measure with theirs. However, the results are almost identical, although the statis-
tical relationship is slightly stronger for my density measure (a p-value of 0.008 versus 
0.013 for the conventional measure). 
 
                                              
35 Beck et al. (1998) have shown that the control for time dependency generally makes it more difficult to obtain statistically 
significant effects from time-dependent explanatory variables. This is also the experience of this study. The inclusion of the 
brevity of peace variable has generally increased p-values in all models. And the shorter the half-life period was set to, the 
more difficult it was to obtain statistically significant results. Since I apply the brevity of peace variable with the shortest 
half-life, 3 years, this generally strengthens the results obtained in my models. 
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Table 5.3 Risk of Armed Conflict by Neo-Malthusian Population Pressure Variables 
1950–2000, All States and Dependent Areas, GDP per Capita as Develop-
ment Measure 
Explanatory Variables β st.e. p-value Exp(β) 
Model 3 
     
Population Pressure Variables     
Population Growth* 0.015 0.063 0.816 1.02 
Population Density* -0.139 0.052 0.008 0.87 
Growth x Density* 0.054 0.052 0.192 1.06 
Control Variables     
Total Population 0.267 0.049 <0.0005 1.31 
Dependency -0.501 0.370 0.175 0.61 
GDP per Capita* -0.499 0.126 <0.0005 0.61 
GDP per Capita, Squared* -0.032 0.089 0.719 0.97 
Missing GDP Data 0.204 0.248 0.411 1.23 
Regime 0.020 0.014 0.141 1.02 
Regime, Squared -0.012 0.003 <0.0005 0.99 
Missing Regime Data -0.254 0.304 0.403 0.78 
Controls for Statistical Dependency 
Previous Conflict 0.035 0.076 0.640 1.04 
Brevity of Peace (3 Years) 2.196 0.294 <0.0005 8.99 
     
Constant -5.792 0.472 <0.0005 - 
N 
Log Likelihood 
Pseudo R2 
8,083 
-820.78 
0.138 
   
* Centered variable.     
 
The results are somewhat surprising as Hauge & Ellingsen find a positive effect 
of population density on conflict proneness both for high threshold civil war data, and 
for low intensity armed conflict. And they also use GDP per capita as their measure 
for development. The main differences between the two studies is that Hauge & El-
lingsen categorize their density measure into dummy variables of high, medium and 
low population density, and only cover a very short period (1989–92 for the armed 
conflict data) and a relatively small number of countries.  
The explanation for why population density is significant in one model but not 
the other could be that the IMR mirrors some kind of ‘advantage’ of living in densely 
populated areas, for instance shorter distance and thus better access to health care ser-
vices, that the GDP per capita does not. If population density becomes significant in 
the GDP model because it ignores such developmental issues as health care availabil-
ity, this is another argument in favor of using IMR as a measure of development. 
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5.1.1 Consequences of Including Consecutive Conflict Onsets 
In Table 5.2 I present the results from models that are identical to Models 1 and 2, 
with the only exception being the operationalization of the dependent variables. Here, 
I have included conflicts that broke out when there was already another conflict going 
on in the same country, and I have added the ongoing conflict in country variable in-
stead of censoring consecutive years of a conflict. The ongoing conflict variable is 
highly intercorrelated with the brevity of peace variable assuming a half-life of 3 years 
(a correlation of -0.67 for the original parameter estimates in Model 4). So in Models 4 
and 5 the brevity of peace variable assumes a half-life of 16 years, reducing correlation 
between the parameter estimates to -0.38.  
The inclusion of consecutive conflict onsets in Models 4 and 5 do not produce 
any important changes in the explanatory variables. Neo-malthusian population pres-
sure variables are still insignificant, while population size, dependency status, infant 
mortality rate, regime type and economic opportunities still prove to be strongly asso-
ciated with armed conflict. The variable measuring the number of previous conflicts is 
statistically significant in both models at a 0.001 level, and the parameter estimate sug-
gests that an increase by one conflict in the past is associated with an increased 
conflict propensity of about 30%. Brevity of peace is still positive and significantly 
related to conflict, the reduction in odds results primarily from the altered operation-
alization of this variable. 
The most striking result in Models 4 and 5 is the effect of ongoing conflict in 
country. My expectation was that countries that were already experiencing an armed 
conflict would be especially likely to experience a subsequent conflict because poten-
tial rebel groups might seize the opportunity while the government army was tied up. 
Instead, the ongoing conflict variable is negatively related to conflict and significant at 
0.001 level. In years when a conflict is going on in a country, the risk that the country 
will see another conflict is only one third of the likelihood that a country in peace will 
see an armed conflict, all other factors being equal.  
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Table 5.4 Risk of Armed Conflict by Neo-Malthusian Population Pressure Variables 
1950–2000, All Conflicts, All States and Dependent Areas 
Model 4 Model 5  
Explanatory Variables β 
St.e. 
p-valuea 
Exp(β) 
β 
St.e. 
p-valuea 
Exp(β) 
Population Pressure Variables 
Population Growth* -0.052 
(0.058) 
0.370 
0.95 
-0.078 
(0.061) 
0.197 
0.92 
Population Density* -0.061 
(0.051) 
0.234 
0.94 
-0.050 
(0.052) 
0.331 
0.95 
Growth x Density* 0.037 
(0.039) 
0.338 
1.04 
0.046 
(0.042) 
0.267 
1.05 
Growth x Infant Mortality Rate*   0.044 
(0.080) 
0.582 
1.04 
Control Variables 
Total Population 0.212 
(0.046) 
<0.0005 
1.24 
0.220 
(0.047) 
<0.0005 
1.25 
Dependency -0.960 
(0.343) 
0.005 
0.38 
-0.799 
(0.360) 
0.026 
0.45 
Infant Mortality Rate 0.602 
(0.110) 
<0.0005 
1.83 
0.652 
(0.120) 
<0.0005 
1.92 
Regime 0.027 
(0.012) 
0.023 
1.03 
0.027 
(0.012) 
0.024 
1.03 
Regime, Squared -0.010 
(0.003) 
<0.0005 
0.99 
-0.010 
(0.003) 
<0.0005 
0.99 
Missing Regime Data -0.006 
(0.266) 
0.982 
0.99 
-0.056 
(0.269) 
0.835 
0.95 
Economic Opportunities   -0.050 
(0.017) 
0.004 
0.95 
Missing Economic Data   -0.124 
(0.237) 
0.600 
0.88 
Controls for Statistical Dependency 
Previous Conflict 0.273 
(0.044) 
<0.0005 
1.31 
0.284 
(0.044) 
<0.0005 
1.33 
Brevity of Peace (16 Years) 0.787 
(0.221) 
<0.0005 
2.20 
0.695 
(0.225) 
0.002 
2.00 
Ongoing Conflict in Country -1.051 
(0.221) 
<0.0005 
0.35 
-1.054 
(0.221) 
<0.0005 
0.35 
 
Constant -7.860 
(0.624) 
<0.0005 
- 
-8.042 
(0.663) 
<0.0005 
- 
N 
Log Likelihood 
Pseudo R2 
8,691 
-959.78 
0.132 
 8,691 
-955.29 
0.136 
 
a Effects that are significant at 0.05 level in bold. 
* Centered variable. 
 
When only considering the frequencies of conflict onset however, 4.2% of the 
years in conflict experience a subsequent conflict onset, while only 2.5% of all coun-
try-years in peace experience conflict onset. The reason for the higher risk of conflict 
onset in a state of conflict is due to the accumulation of other conflict-generating fac-
tors in these country-years, and not to opportunities to rebel caused by an already on-
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going conflict. The reason why the separate effect of ongoing conflict in country is 
negatively related to conflict may have a substantial explanation, or it may have a 
methodological explanation relating to the data collection procedures. A substantial 
explanation could be that when a country is experiencing an armed conflict, this actu-
ally reduces the opportunities for other rebel groups to act militarily on the govern-
ment. First, since the army is already mobilized, a government is able to crack down 
on subsequent rebel attempts much faster than they would be able to do from a state of 
peace. Second, governments of countries that experience an ongoing conflict will 
probably be likely to increase surveillance of potential rebel elements and to 
strengthen overall security efforts. Third, observing the negative effects of the on-
going conflict may act as a deterrent to the initiation of another. 
A methodological explanation for this unexpected relationship could be that 
conflict onsets from a state of ongoing conflict are underreported. This could happen if 
the actions of different rebel groups fighting for different causes are seen as part of the 
same insurgency. It may be difficult to categorize loosely organized alliances of rebel 
groups fighting a government for different reasons, but in a more or less coordinated 
way. Are the efforts made by the different groups to be counted as one armed conflict, 
or several separate ones? Especially, one could expect that in small countries that only 
have ‘space for’ one conflict at a time, a spread of conflict to new groups or areas 
would be coded as an escalation of the ongoing conflict rather than as a separate con-
flict. Large countries are more likely to have space for several independent conflicts. 
Since the ongoing conflict variable is so strongly significant and the effect so large, I 
believe however that the substantial explanation is the most likely, and that the sepa-
rate effect of experiencing an ongoing conflict actually make countries less conflict 
prone.36 
                                              
36 If the methodological explanation should be correct, I would have expected that consecutive conflicts in small countries 
were more likely to be categorized as part of an ongoing conflict, while larger countries would have sufficient ‘space’ for 
several independent conflicts. However, an interaction effect between ongoing conflict in country and total population size is 
statistically insignificant in Model 4. This supports a substantial explanation. 
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5.1.2 A Golden Age of Neo-Malthusianism? 
As previously mentioned, Kelley & Schmidt (1995) have found that population 
growth has influenced the level of economic output negatively in some time periods, 
but not in others (the 1980s versus the 1960s and 1970s respectively). As the neo-
malthusian argument is that population growth may reduce economic productivity and 
thereby provide grievances that can trigger armed conflict, I wanted to test whether 
indicators of neo-malthusian population pressure performed differently over time, per-
haps disclosing a neo-malthusian golden age. This will also reveal whether there is any 
empirical support for the expectation of a rise in conflict propensity in the 1990s fol-
lowing from neo-malthusian root causes. 
Of course, running models for different time periods do not provide any infor-
mation about what factors that contribute to make some variables more or less impor-
tant for armed conflict over time. Structural or ideological factors may contribute to 
increase or decrease the effect of some variables over time. A possible detection of 
significant effects specific to certain time periods would then be an incentive for fur-
ther research aimed at revealing factors that are unobserved in the current model. If 
statistically significant effects are detected for certain time periods, they are likely to 
be credible indicators of causal effects as the total variance in models covering a 
shorter time period is much smaller than in the overall models. 
Breaking my model down on decades certainly reveals some interesting results. 
The only evidence that I find for neo-malthusian claims is that the interaction term 
between population growth and density is positive and significant for the 1970s. Thus, 
in the decade that really saw the explosion of neo-malthusian literature, countries with 
high population growth that already experienced a high population density did actually 
have a higher risk of armed conflict, other factors being equal. This finding is very 
robust over a broad set of model specifications. I have not been able to find an ade-
quate explanation for why countries should be more exposed to neo-malthusian con-
flict factors in the 1970s.  
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Table 5.5 Risk of Armed Conflict by Neo-Malthusian Population Pressure Variables and 
Decades 1950–2000, All States and Dependent Areas 
Explanatory Variables Model 6 
1950–59 
Model 7 
1960–69 
Model 8 
1970–79 
Model 9 
1980–89 
Model 10 
1990–2000 
All 
Decades 
Population Pressure Variables 
Population Growth*            β    
     st.e. 
p-valuea 
0.026 
(0.254) 
0.919 
0.077 
(0.196) 
0.692 
-0.062 
(0.097) 
0.523 
0.027 
(0.127) 
0.831 
-0.083 
(0.084) 
0.322 
-0.034 
(0.062) 
0.584 
Population Density* 0.011 
(0.137) 
0.934 
-0.252 
(0.137) 
0.066 
-0.060 
(0.117) 
0.606 
-0.158 
(0.140) 
0.259 
-0.013 
(0.099) 
0.897 
-0.065 
(0.053) 
0.219 
Growth x Density* -0.015 
(0.095) 
0.871 
0.062 
(0.102) 
0.541 
0.138 
(0.056) 
0.014 
-0.068 
(0.086) 
0.430 
0.048 
(0.070) 
0.495 
0.036 
(0.040) 
0.358 
Refugeesb  
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
0.511 
(0.326) 
0.117 
 
- 
Control Variables      
Total Population 0.380 
(0.135) 
0.005 
0.398 
(0.127) 
0.002 
0.269 
(0.111) 
0.016 
0.193 
(0.129) 
0.134 
0.244 
(0.102) 
0.016 
0.248 
(0.048) 
<0.0005 
Dependencyc -0.459 
(0.828) 
0.580 
-0.903 
(0.673) 
0.180 
-0.474 
(0.981) 
0.629 
 
- 
 
- 
-0.763 
(0.363) 
0.036 
Infant Mortality Rate 0.245 
(0.461) 
0.595 
1.234 
(0.409) 
0.003 
1.082 
(0.299) 
<0.0005 
0.911 
(0.314) 
0.004 
0.642 
(0.209) 
0.002 
0.558 
(0.117) 
<0.0005 
Regime -0.013 
(0.043) 
0.768 
0.033 
(0.036) 
0.351 
0.050 
(0.030) 
0.097 
0.069 
(0.031) 
0.026 
-0.006 
(0.026) 
0.807 
0.020 
(0.014) 
0.132 
Regime, Squared -0.014 
(0.009) 
0.116 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
0.849 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
0.827 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
0.217 
-0.017 
(0.006) 
0.003 
-0.011 
(0.003) 
<0.0005 
Missing Regime Data 0.113 
(0.845) 
0.893 
1.516 
(0.660) 
0.022 
0.394 
(0.756) 
0.602 
1.154 
(0.883) 
0.862 
-1.585 
(0.553) 
0.004 
-0.176 
(0.298) 
0.554 
Controls for Statistical Dependency 
Previous Conflict 0.509 
(0.671) 
0.448 
0.005 
(0.309) 
0.987 
0.230 
(0.195) 
0.238 
0.236 
(0.159) 
0.138 
-0.248 
(0.132) 
0.061 
0.077 
(0.075) 
0.308 
Brevity of Peace (3 Years) 1.333 
(1.426) 
0.350 
1.886 
(0.950) 
0.047 
0.805 
(0.821) 
0.327 
0.810 
(0.888) 
0.361 
2.949 
(0.465) 
<0.0005 
2.131 
(0.300) 
<0.0005 
      
Constant -8.105 
(2.304) 
<0.0005 
-13.295 
(2.299) 
<0.0005 
-10.650 
(1.776) 
<0.0005 
-8.741 
(2.005) 
<0.0005 
-7.430 
(1.329) 
<0.0005 
-7.833 
(0.669) 
<0.0005 
N 
Log Likelihood 
Pseudo R2 
1,483 
-116.27 
0.138 
1,581 
-147.75 
0.158 
1,520 
-164.49 
0.128 
1,426 
-138.58 
0.117 
1,760 
-220.14 
0.218 
7,770 
-819.06 
0.132 
a Variables that are statistically significant at 0.10 level in bold. 
b Data on refugees are only available for the 1990s. 
c For the periods 1980–89 and 1990–2000, no dependent country-years that were analyzed experienced an armed 
conflict onset, thus the dependency variable is omitted from the analysis for these periods. 
* Centered variable. 
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High population density is found to have reduced the risk of conflict in the 
1960s. This finding is very robust at 0.10 level over different model specifications, and 
is borderline significant at 0.05 level in Model 7. There is no significant effect of 
population density in any other decade, but the sign is negative for all periods except 
the 1950s. These results provide further evidence for the cornucopian view that 
densely populated countries are less conflict prone. When I replace my density meas-
ure with the conventional one, however, the variable turns statistically insignificant 
also for the 1960s. 
The third of my neo-malthusian indicators of population pressure, large refugee 
populations, is only tested for the period 1990–2000 due to data availability. The vari-
able has a positive sign, and is almost statistically significant at 0.10 level in this 
model. Since my refugee variable is a very rough indicator of population pressure fol-
lowing from migration, a more detailed analysis concerned with possible links be-
tween migratory behavior and conflict would do more justice to this assumed relation-
ship.  
The control variables behave very much like in Model 1, although it is more 
difficult to achieve statistical significance over a decade because the variance for each 
of the decades is much smaller than in the overall model. This is especially the case 
with the 1950s, the decade with the smallest number of country-years, and also the 
smallest relative number of conflict onsets. Generally, my basic model (as it is pre-
sented in Model 1) seems to have the greatest explanatory power for the 1990s, with 
an explained variance (pseudo R2) almost the double that of the 1980s.  
The total population size and infant mortality rate variables are the most com-
monly significant in the period models, always positively related to conflict. The in-
verse U-shaped relationship between democracy and conflict is only significant for the 
last period. For the 1970s and 80s the regime variable predicts a more linear effect, 
somewhat surprisingly with the risk of conflict increasing with the level of democracy. 
For the first two decades, none of the regime terms are statistically significant, al-
though the squared regime term is almost significant at 0.10 level for the 1950s. But 
these results do not necessarily undermine the democratic peace argument. The 
squared regime term has the expected negative sign for all decades. I assume that the 
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lack of statistical significance for the squared term for the decades from the 1950s to 
the 1980s is due to the low number of units studied for each decade, rather than evi-
dence for a different causal pattern.  
The brevity of peace variable is only significant for two periods. The reason for 
this is probably the relatively short period studied here. Since we do not know about 
conflict history prior to 1950, this variable is probably severely underestimated for the 
first periods. The other control variable for time dependency, previous conflict, is only 
significant in the last period, but the direction of the effect was somewhat surprising. I 
assumed that this effect was spurious, and its significance due to the many successor 
states of the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that entered the 
dataset in the first half of the 1990s, many of which burst more or less straight into 
armed conflict. This proved to be correct. When I control for communist state dissolu-
tion in Model 10, the variable for previous conflict turns statistically insignificant. The 
communist state dissolution variable is significant at 0.05 level. 
The last point that deserves to be commented on in this section is the negative 
and clearly significant effect of the missing regime data indicator for the 1990s. To see 
whether it just captured the lower conflict risk experienced by dependent areas as the 
dependency variable was omitted in this model, I ran a separate model only for sover-
eign states. However, the missing regime indicator performed almost exactly identi-
cally. This indicates that sovereign states that were assigned the Polity score 0 in the 
1990s did have a significantly lower risk of conflict than states that actually had the 
score 0. This could be due to increasing democratization in the 1990s compared to 
previous decades. While it seems as if assigning the mean value for the missing values 
for some of the control variables generally does not violate the actual distribution of 
each of these variables, the mean value is not a good indicator of the actual distribu-
tion for countries lacking information on the regime variable in the 1990s. 
5.1.3 Summarizing the Support for Neo-Malthusian Hypotheses 
The neo-malthusian hypotheses (Hypotheses 1–4) do not receive much support in the 
models tested here. Hypothesis 1 receives no support at all; overall population growth 
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in a country does not seem to influence the risk of that country to experience armed 
conflict. Furthermore, I have not been able to detect any effect of population growth 
through the assumed intermediary relationship with economic growth. While the latter 
variable clearly influences the risk of conflict, there is no unambiguous relationship 
between population growth and economic growth.  
The lack of relationship between population growth and conflict seems to hold 
for countries at all levels of development; there is no evidence that less developed 
countries experience higher risks of conflict following from population growth. This 
runs counter to Homer-Dixon’s ingenuity hypothesis presented in Section 2.1.5. 
Homer-Dixon himself argues that it is impossible to quantify ingenuity. However, the 
three factors that Homer-Dixon believes are especially limiting ingenuity, failed mar-
ket mechanisms, social friction and shortages of financial and human capital, are far 
more present in developing than in developed countries, and more so the less devel-
oped a country is. If social ingenuity were the key to explain neo-malthusian conflict, 
the interaction between population growth and development should have produced 
significant results. 
I have found no evidence supporting Hypothesis 2. Rather, I have found some 
support for an alternative cornucopian hypothesis, assuming that high population den-
sity is a source to better economic performance and thus is likely to reduce the risk of 
armed conflict. Cornucopians argue that countries with high population density have 
advantages over less densely populated areas related to for instance better communica-
tion systems and greater economic efficiency due to large-scale and centralized pro-
duction. These advantages are believed to lead to better economic performance that in 
turn could reduce the risk of conflict. 
I found that high population density reduced the likelihood of armed conflict in 
the 1960s. Also, when using GDP per capita as the measure of development, popula-
tion density has a negative and significant effect on conflict propensity for the whole 
period studied. I do however suspect that GDP per capita fails to capture aspects about 
population density that relates to developmental issues, such as access to health care. 
The results are nevertheless the opposite of those obtained in the study by Hauge & 
Ellingsen (2001), even when applying the same measure for density as they do. The 
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research designs are quite similar. The differing results may be explained by the longer 
period and the larger number of countries in this study, possibly along with the use of 
density as a continuous measure in this study compared to the categorization of levels 
of density in the Hauge & Ellingsen study. 
By operationalizing population density relative to arable land, I assumed that I 
had established a measure that was a more valid indicator of neo-malthusian popula-
tion pressure than the conventional measure including all land. But the two measures 
have performed very similarly. As discussed in Section 4.5.3, I am not confident that I 
have been able to establish a very reliable measure of arable land, and this could be 
reason for the small deviation in results. However, in Models 3 and 7 where I have 
used both density measures, the improved density measure is actually slightly more 
strongly related to a reduction in conflict proneness than the conventional one. This 
confirms the finding from the bivariate analyses. Since I assumed that a measure that 
was more sensitive towards agricultural production would make it easier to achieve 
positive effects of density on conflict, this result further undermines the neo-
malthusian position.  
Some limited evidence for Homer-Dixon’s theory is found for Hypothesis 3. 
Countries that experienced both high population growth and high population density in 
the 1970s did have a significantly higher risk of conflict, but only in this decade. It is 
intriguing that this finding coincides with the rise of neo-malthusian literature. More 
likely than being a self-fulfilling prophecy, it could be that the increased concern over 
population and environmental issues in the 1970s mirrored an increase in neo-
malthusian conflicts in that decade. The interaction term between population growth 
and density is clearly insignificant in all models for the other time periods, and for two 
of these periods the sign is in the opposite direction. I assumed in Section 2.1.7 that 
this measure was the most valid indicator of neo-malthusian population pressure. The 
general lack of statistical significance for relationships between the interaction meas-
ure and armed conflict seriously weakens the neo-malthusian conflict scenario. 
Empirical support for Hypothesis 4, predicting an increased risk of conflict fol-
lowing from large refugee populations, is ambiguous. The effect on conflict propensity 
of hosting large refugee groups is positive, and almost statistically significant at 0.10 
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level. As argued in the previous section, the measure employed here is very crude, and 
data on refugees are generally unreliable. Better data for a longer period might have 
produced more significant results, and the relationship between refugee populations 
and armed conflicts should be investigated further. However, a positive and significant 
relationship between the two would not necessarily provide support for neo-
malthusian theory. Refugee populations need not be the result of resource scarcity, nor 
do they necessarily produce scarcity in the area of arrival. Furthermore, the refugee 
variable may just proxy geographical proximity to a country experiencing armed con-
flict. Thus, the variable may actually measure a spillover effect of conflict across bor-
ders that need not be related to the refugee populations themselves.37 
5.2 Do Youth Bulges Make Countries More Conflict Prone? 
In Table 5.6 I test whether population pressure in the form of youth bulges make coun-
tries more conflict prone. Models 11 and 12 include the same control variables as 
Model 1. Since it has been suggested that youth bulges above a certain size make 
countries especially conflict prone, I have included a squared term. The results in 
Models 11 and 12 do support a hypothesis that large youth bulges increase the risk of 
armed conflict. And apparently, Huntington’s argument that youth bulges above a cer-
tain level make countries especially conflict prone, receives some support in Model 
11. The positive and significant effect of the squared term suggests that the larger 
youth bulges, the more does the risk of conflict increase. The effects of the control 
variables are very similar to Model 1. 
 
Table 5.6 Risk of Armed Conflict by Youth Bulges 1950–2000, All States and De-
pendent Areas 
Model 11 Model 12  
Explanatory Variables β 
st.e. 
p-valuea 
Exp(β) 
β 
st.e. 
p-valuea 
Exp(β) 
Population Pressure Variables 
Youth Bulges* 0.030 0.095 0.049 0.011 
                                              
37 However, Hegre et al. (2001: 39) do not find any significant effect on conflict propensity of an ongoing neighboring war. 
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(0.018) 1.03 (0.019) 1.05 
Youth Bulges, Squared* 0.005 
(0.002) 
0.036 
1.01 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.137 
1.003 
Control Variables     
Communist State Dissolution   2.039 
(0.430) 
<0.0005 
7.68 
Total Population 0.258 
(0.050) 
<0.0005 
1.29 
0.268 
(0.050) 
<0.0005 
1.31 
Dependency -0.533 
(0.354) 
0.132 
0.59 
-0.552 
(0.355) 
0.120 
0.58 
Infant Mortality Rate* 0.583 
(0.144) 
<0.0005 
1.79 
0.628 
(0.147) 
<0.0005 
1.87 
Regime 0.021 
(0.014) 
0.114 
1.02 
0.025 
(0.014) 
0.069 
1.03 
Regime, Squared -0.010 
(0.003) 
<0.0005 
0.99 
-0.008 
(0.003) 
0.005 
0.99 
Missing Regime Data -0.166 
(0.297) 
0.576 
0.85 
-0.026 
(0.299) 
0.930 
0.97 
Controls for Statistical Dependency 
Previous Conflict 0.065 
(0.078) 
0.407 
1.07 
0.088 
(0.078) 
0.259 
1.09 
Brevity of Peace (3 Years) 2.095 
(0.301) 
<0.0005 
8.13 
1.901 
(0.303) 
<0.0005 
6.69 
 
Constant -5.901 
(0.494) 
<0.0005 
- 
-6.134 
(0.502) 
<0.0005 
- 
N 
Log Likelihood 
Pseudo R2 
7,658 
-827.70 
0.130 
 7,658 
-818.95 
0.139 
 
a Effects that are significant at 0.05 level in bold. 
* Centered variable. 
  
As argued in Section 4.5.6, I suspected that this curvilinear pattern is due to the 
many conflicts in the successor states of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the first 
half of the 1990s. At that time these states had very small youth cohorts. There is little 
reason to think that the conflicts in post-communist societies were partly attributed to 
their relatively small youth cohorts, and I thus believe that causes of these conflicts are 
not captured very well in the present model. To control for unobserved explanatory 
variables I add a dummy variable for communist state dissolution (Model 12), taking 
the value 1 for all successor states for five years after the dissolution of the Soviet Un-
ion and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The dummy variable is clearly significant 
and positive, indicating that there are certainly causes of the conflicts in post-
communist states that are not captured in my model. The squared term for youth 
bulges is insignificant in Model 12, leaving the single term for youth bulges significant 
and positive. An increase in youth bulges of one percentage point is associated with an 
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increased risk of conflict of 5%, other factors being equal. In Figure 5.4, the youth 
bulge and development variables are represented jointly. 
 
Figure 5.4 Probability of Armed Conflict as a Function of Youth Bulges and Infant 
Mortality Rate, All Control Variables at Mean 
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The figure is based on estimates from Model 12 in Table 5.6. 
 
As argued in Section 4.5.5, I believe that the operat
bulge variable is of great importance. When my youth bulg
Models 11 and 12 with one measuring youth cohorts relative
done by Collier and associates (Collier, 2000; Collier & Ho
in insignificant effects of youth bulges in both models. An 
tion of this variable can thus hide the role that large youth c
flicts. This may be why Paul Collier and associates fail to fi
bulges on conflict propensity.  
 
Table 5.7 Risk of Armed Conflict by Youth Bulges 1950–2
pendent Areas, GDP per Capita as Development M
Explanatory Variables β s
Model 13 
Population Pressure Variables 
Youth Bulges* 0.070 0.
Youth Bulges, Squared* 0.001 0.Low 
ionalization of the youth 
e variable is replaced in 
 to the total population as 
effler, 2002a), this results 
erroneous operationaliza-
ohorts play in armed con-
nd strong effects of youth 
000, All States and De-
easure 
t.e. p-value Exp(β) 
018 <0.0005 1.07 
002 0.626 1.001 
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Control Variables 
Communist State Dissolution 1.898 0.448 <0.0005 6.67 
Total Population 0.278 0.050 <0.0005 1.32 
Dependency -0.214 0.360 0.552 0.81 
GDP per Capita* -0.349 0.106 0.001 0.71 
Missing GDP Data -0.020 0.254 0.938 0.98 
Regime 0.021 0.014 0.125 1.02 
Regime, Squared -0.009 0.003 0.002 0.99 
Missing Regime Data -0.102 0.300 0.733 0.90 
Controls for Statistical Dependency     
Previous Conflict 0.030 0.076 0.692 1.03 
Brevity of Peace (3 Years) 2.052 0.294 <0.0005 7.78 
 
Constant -3.366 0.968 0.001 - 
N 
Log Likelihood 
Pseudo R2 
7,787 
-822.98 
0.138 
   
* Centered variable.     
 
The high correlation between the IMR and youth bulge variables described in 
Section 4.5.6 indicated that there could be a multicollinearity problem. But as these 
variables have been standardized in Models 11 and 12, the problem seems to be mar-
ginal. A correlation matrix of the parameter estimates of Model 12 shows that the cor-
relation between the IMR and youth bulge estimates is well below 0.5 (Appendix 3). 
But to further counter allegations that my use of IMR to proxy development makes the 
youth bulge measure unreliable, I ran a model identical to Model 12 with GDP per 
capita as the development measure (Model 13). The only difference of such a proce-
dure is that the effect of youth bulges is now significant at <0.0005 level, and the ef-
fect of a change on this variable is even stronger than in Model 12. An increase in the 
youth bulge variable of one percentage point is now associated with an increase in 
conflict propensity of more than 7%. A correlation matrix of the parameter estimates 
for this alternative model specification shows a relatively low correlation between the 
youth bulge and GDP per capita estimates (Appendix 4). 
If youth bulges increase the likelihood of conflict, can we say anything about 
how and why they matter? In Model 14 presented in Table 5.8 I include two interac-
tion terms aimed at testing Hypotheses 6 and 7, arguing that youth bulges increase the 
risk of conflict especially under conditions of economic recession and autocratic re-
gimes. 
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Table 5.8 Risk of Armed Conflict by Youth Bulges and Interactions 1950–2000, All 
States and Dependent Areas 
Explanatory Variables β st.e. p-value Exp(β) 
Model 14 
Population Pressure Variables 
Youth Bulges* 0.042 0.020 0.036 1.04 
Regime x Youth Bulges* -0.0003 0.002 0.916 1.00 
Economic Opportunities x Youth Bulges* 0.006 0.003 0.086 1.01 
Control Variables 
Communist State Dissolution 2.312 0.487 <0.0005 10.09 
Total Population 0.264 0.051 <0.0005 1.30 
Dependency -0.424 0.370 0.252 0.65 
Infant Mortality Rate* 0.589 0.139 <0.0005 1.80 
Regime* 0.031 0.014 0.030 1.03 
Regime, Squared* -0.009 0.003 0.005 0.99 
Missing Regime Data -0.005 0.302 0.988 1.00 
Economic Opportunities* -0.022 0.020 0.285 0.98 
Missing Economic Data -0.264 0.253 0.295 0.77 
Controls for Statistical Dependency     
Previous Conflict 0.081 0.078 0.302 1.08 
Brevity of Peace (3 Years) 1.875 0.299 <0.0005 6.52 
 
Constant -5.957 0.496 <0.0005 - 
N 
Log Likelihood 
Pseudo R2 
7,658 
-816.61 
0.142 
   
* Centered variable.     
 
The interaction term between economic opportunities and youth bulges is rela-
tively close to being statistically significant at 0.05 level, and the sign is positive as 
expected. Even though this statistical relationship is weak it may indicate that eco-
nomic issues influence the conflict propensity of large youth cohorts. The economic 
opportunities variable applied here is a rather crude measure. A measure that capture 
more specifically the economic hardship of young generations, such as youth unem-
ployment rates, might have fared better. The interaction term between youth bulges 
and regime type is far from statistically significant, indicating that the effect of youth 
bulges does not vary with level of democracy.38  
                                              
38 The lack of relationship holds when I introduce a squared interaction term to see whether youth bulges increase the risk of 
conflict more in intermediary regimes. 
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5.2.1 Including Consecutive Conflicts Onsets 
In Model 15 the dependent variable also includes conflict onsets that erupted from a 
state of armed conflict. This is one of the very few models that I have run that do not 
yield statistically significant effects of youth bulges. All control variables behave as 
expected, more or less identical to the effects in Models 4 and 5, including the ongoing 
conflict variable.  
 
Table 5.9 Risk of Armed Conflict by Youth Bulges, All Conflicts 1950–2000, All States 
and Dependent Areas 
Explanatory Variables β st.e. p-value Exp(β) 
Model 15 
Population Pressure Variables     
Youth Bulges* 0.029 0.018 0.118 1.03 
Youth Bulges, squared* 0.003 0.002 0.206 1.00 
Control Variables     
Communist State Dissolution 2.400 0.385 <0.0005 11.02 
Total Population 0.220 0.047 <0.0005 1.25 
Dependency -0.779 0.334 0.020 0.46 
Infant Mortality Rate * 0.728 0.136 <0.0005 2.07 
Regime* 0.035 0.012 0.004 1.04 
Regime, Squared* -0.007 0.003 0.007 0.99 
Missing Regime Data 0.134 0.267 0.617 1.14 
Controls for Statistical Dependency 
Ongoing Conflict in Country -1.105 0.220 <0.0005 0.33 
Previous Conflict 0.285 0.044 <0.0005 1.33 
Brevity of Peace (16 Years) 0.706 0.220 0.001 2.03 
     
Constant -5.865 0.473 <0.0005 - 
N 
Log Likelihood 
Pseudo R2 
8,594 
-955.62 
0.142 
   
* Centered variable. 
 
It may be that an endogeneity problem causes the youth bulge effect to turn sta-
tistically insignificant in Model 15. Periods of serious armed conflict tend to thin out 
the cohorts of men at military age, ages that for most countries would be within what I 
define as youth cohorts. However, an attempt to model for such endogeneity through 
an interaction effect between youth bulges and ongoing conflict was not entirely suc-
cessful. While the interaction effect itself was not statistically significant in Model 15, 
the introduction of the term resulted in a borderline significant effect of youth bulges. 
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This may be an indication of a slight endogeneity problem.39 When using GDP per 
capita as the measure for development instead of IMR in Model 15, the effect of youth 
bulges is however clearly significant. But the size of the parameter estimate is reduced 
from previous models. 
5.2.2 Effects of Youth Bulges Over Time 
In this section, only the model for the 1990s is presented. For all the decades up to 
this, the effect of youth bulges is positive, but insignificant, and the results of the con-
trol variables do not differ substantially from those presented in Models 6–10. For the 
1990s however, there is a significant and negative effect of youth bulges (Model 16). 
But as illustrated in Model 17, this effect turns insignificant when controlled for com-
munist state dissolution. 
As argued in Section 5.1.2, to find significant effects when analyzing separate 
decades is difficult since the total variance is much smaller in each model. So the non-
results for youth bulges in models broken down on decades indicate that youth bulges 
are not as strongly related to armed conflict as are control variables like population 
size, infant mortality rate and regime type. When I replace IMR with GDP per capita 
as the development measure, I do find significant and positive effects of youth bulges 
in the 1960s and 70s, while there is no significant negative effect of youth bulges for 
the 1990s even before controlling for communist state dissolution. 
 
 
Table 5.10 Risk of Armed Conflict by Youth Bulges 1990–2000, All States and Depend-
ent Areas 
Model 16 
1990–2000 
Model 17 
1990–2000 
 
Explanatory Variables 
β st.e. p-value β st.e. p-value 
Population Pressure Variable       
Youth Bulges*  -0.066 0.034 0.051 -0.037 0.037 0.321 
Control Variables       
Communist State Dissolution    1.080 0.518 0.037 
                                              
39 An interaction effect between ongoing conflict in country and IMR is borderline significant in model 14, indicating that 
the endogeneity problem may be more severe for infant mortality than for youth bulges. 
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Total Population 0.274 0.092 0.003 0.281 0.094 0.003 
Infant Mortality Rate 1.052 0.298 <0.0005 1.045 0.307 0.001 
Regime* 0.005 0.026 0.853 0.006 0.026 0.807 
Regime, Squared* -0.019 0.006 0.001 -0.017 0.006 0.005 
Missing Regime Data -1.256 0.488 0.010 -1.068 0.497 0.032 
Controls for Statistical Dependency 
Previous Conflict -0.198 0.130 0.127 -0.151 0.130 0.244 
Brevity of Peace (3 Years) 2.734 0.450 <0.0005 2.526 0.459 <0.0005 
       
Constant -9.039 1.521 <0.0005 -9.312 1.564 <0.0005 
N 
Log Likelihood 
Pseudo R2 
1,729 
-227.13 
0.208 
  1,729 
-225.09 
0.215 
  
 
* Centered variable.     
 
5.2.3 Summarizing the Support for Youth Bulge Hypotheses 
While evidence is scarce for a neo-malthusian conflict scenario, it is convincingly 
strong for Hypothesis 5 arguing for a causal relationship between youth bulges and 
armed conflict. In almost all models that I have run, youth bulges do increase the like-
lihood of conflict. But I have not found substantial evidence for Huntington’s argu-
ment that youth bulges above a certain size make countries especially conflict prone. 
Initially I expected that the use of infant mortality to proxy development would tap 
some of the effect of youth bulges. This seems to be correct as models run with GDP 
per capita as the development indicator yield even stronger and more significant ef-
fects of youth bulges.  
As argued above, the results obtained in the models that include all conflicts in-
dicate that especially demographic factors are likely to be influenced by an ongoing 
conflict. One major finding when including all conflicts was that the effect of youth 
bulges was no longer statistically significant. But it is not possible to say from this 
study if the change in effect is actually reflecting different causal relationships for the 
two conflict transition types. It could also very well be that I have not been able to 
measure the exact point in time when demographic changes occur during an armed 
conflict, so that the effect of demographic variables on consecutive conflicts are not 
measured correctly. 
I have not been able to find convincing empirical evidence for the mechanisms 
that cause youth bulges to increase the risk of conflict. I have found some evidence for 
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Hypothesis 6, assuming that youth bulges are more likely to cause armed conflict un-
der conditions of economic recession. This statistical relationship is found to be quite 
weak, and measures that capture economic conditions that concern youth more directly 
than overall economic growth may produce stronger effects. I did not find any evi-
dence for Hypothesis 7 that youth bulges would be more likely to cause conflict in 
autocratic regimes. 
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6. Conclusion 
Claims proliferate that certain demographic characteristics make countries more prone 
to armed conflict. The aim of this study has been to test empirically whether two types 
of population pressure, a neo-malthusian pressure on natural resources and a youth 
bulge pressure on social institutions, are related to armed conflict. I have found that 
the devil is in parts of the demographics, but not in the parts that have received the 
most attention. 
A main reason for concerns over the demographics is that the world over the 
past century has experienced a growth in population greater than any other time in his-
tory, presumably straining the carrying capacity of the world’s natural resources. Are 
we able to feed the ever-increasing world population? Does population pressure cause 
an over-exploitation of natural resources in general, leading to large-scale and irre-
versible environmental degradation? Concerns over the consequences of the growing 
world population became a major academic issue in the 1970s. In the 1990s, demo-
graphic and environmental factors were increasingly regarded as security issues.  
Those who argue for a relationship between population, environment and armed 
conflict are generally referred to as neo-malthusians. Among them, one of the most 
influential has been Thomas Homer-Dixon, who argues that population growth is an 
important source of natural resource scarcity. Homer-Dixon believes that some socie-
ties lack what he calls social ingenuity and are not able to adapt to increased resource 
scarcity. These societies are likely to perform worse in terms of food production and 
economic development, and will thus have an increased risk of domestic armed con-
flict. Neo-malthusian claims are countered by a school of resource optimists, or cornu-
copians. They argue that population pressure on resources forces societies to develop 
and implement new technology, and that this in turn triggers economic development. 
The debate over the role of population pressure on natural resources has given 
rise to a debate over other potential linkages between demographic change and conflict 
propensity. While rejecting the traditional neo-malthusian claim that overall popula-
tion growth is the problem, Jack Goldstone argues that large youth bulges is the kind 
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of population pressure that influences the risk of armed conflict most. Youth bulges 
are not associated with natural resource scarcity. Rather, Goldstone expects youth 
bulges to increase the risk of armed conflict when employment opportunities and re-
cruitment to political elite positions, especially for well-educated youth, are limited. 
Based on the theoretical work of Thomas Homer-Dixon and Jack Goldstone, I 
derived a set of empirically testable hypotheses on relationships between indicators of 
population pressure and armed conflict. I tested the hypotheses over a number of event 
history models using conflict data with a low threshold for violence. I also analyzed 
causes of conflicts for different decades in order to investigate whether population 
pressure variables have become more important after the end of the Cold War. 
An overall conclusion from my empirical analysis is that the devil is not in the 
neo-malthusian understanding of population pressure. Homer-Dixon most often refers 
to population growth when addressing population pressure, but the level of population 
growth in a country is not significantly related to armed conflict in any of my models. 
While also insignificant in most models, population density affects conflict propensity 
under some conditions. But the effect is the opposite of the neo-malthusian expecta-
tion; high population density is associated with a drop in the risk of armed conflict, 
and even slightly more so when population density is measured as the ratio between 
population and arable land. A third indicator of neo-malthusian population pressure, 
large refugee populations, is insignificantly related to conflict. 
I have argued that both population growth and population density have short-
comings as indicators of population pressure on natural resources. The variable that I 
see as the most valid indicator of population pressure on natural resources is the inter-
action between the two; countries with high population density experiencing high 
population growth should be the most likely to experience natural resource scarcity. 
However, even this indicator is insignificant in all models but the one for the 1970s. 
Perhaps the rise of neo-malthusian literature in 1970s reflects a stronger effect of 
population pressure on conflict propensity in that decade. Finally I found that less de-
veloped countries are no more likely to experience a positive relationship between 
neo-malthusian population pressure and armed conflict. 
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The overall conclusion regarding the other form of population pressure is that 
youth bulges increase the risk that a country will experience armed conflict. This is 
where the devil is in the demographics. My youth bulge variable has been positive and 
significantly related to conflict under nearly all model specifications, and the finding is 
thus very robust. But I have not found any evidence for the claim made by Samuel P. 
Huntington that youth bulges above a certain critical level makes countries especially 
conflict prone. My analysis further shows that the operationalization of the youth 
bulge variable matters a lot. When youth bulges are defined relative to total rather than 
the adult population, as in the work of Paul Collier and associates, there is no signifi-
cant effect of the variable. Also, I have found that the effect of youth bulges does not 
vary with regime type, but that there is some weak evidence that aspects of economic 
performance may influence the conflict propensity of youth cohorts. 
Are we moving towards a new age of insecurity, the Coming Anarchy of Robert 
Kaplan? There is nothing in my study to support this claim, neither with regard to neo-
malthusian population pressure nor to youth bulges. All the neo-malthusian variables 
are insignificant for the post-Cold War period. The effect of youth bulges is also in-
significant for this period, while positive and significant for previous decades. This 
finding is more supportive of Jack Goldstone’s claim that youth bulges are historically 
associated with conflict than of a new security paradigm. What is most striking about 
the post-Cold War models is the strong explanatory power of the ‘traditional’ explana-
tions related to level of development, regime type and geography (the latter measured 
by total population). 
6.1.1 Implications for Population Pressure Theory 
Neo-malthusians may claim that the aggregated data used here to test population pres-
sure hypotheses may fail to reflect local population pressure causing local conflicts. 
But similar criticism should also then be directed to Thomas Homer-Dixon and associ-
ates. Four out of the five cases investigated in Homer-Dixon & Blitt (1998) deal with 
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whole countries, while only one case study is limited to a region within a country.40 In 
all these cases Homer-Dixon and associates argue that overall population growth in a 
country contributes to resource scarcity. This study finds that the relationship between 
population-induced scarcity and conflict that was found for some of the cases does not 
hold over a large number of countries and times. 
A more relevant objection would be that the conflict data used in this study may 
not be ideal for the testing of neo-malthusian theory. The Uppsala dataset (Gleditsch et 
al., 2001) includes only conflicts where the government of the country is an active 
part, thereby omitting communal conflicts and other conflicts between non-
governmental groups. However, most conflicts that demand 25 casualties or more are 
likely to involve the government of the state. If neo-malthusian population pressure 
can only explain the rare occasions where the government stands aside while an inter-
nal conflict is going on, or conflicts at even lower levels of intensity, it is hardly an 
important cause of contemporary conflict. 
The significant and negative relationship between population density and con-
flict in some models seriously undermines the neo-malthusian position. This finding 
support Ester Boserup’s assumption that densely populated areas are forced to develop 
in order to overcome resource scarcity. The fact that population density measured rela-
tive to arable land is more strongly associated with a reduction in conflict proneness 
than the conventional population density measure underlines this point. This may indi-
cate that countries that have experienced population pressure more specifically related 
to the land available for agricultural production have had to develop and diversify eco-
nomically, and that this development has eventually made countries somewhat more 
peaceful. The finding counters the popular ‘Rwanda syndrome’ conception that 
conflict can arise as a result of people’s desire for their neighbor’s piece of land and 
cattle. As Ferguson (1992: 61) argues; ‘even when people do acquire land through 
war, they actually go to war for other reasons’. 
                                              
40 The countries studied by Homer-Dixon and associates are Gaza (while the listing of Gaza as a country could of course be 
questioned, it is included in my study as a separate entity), South Africa, Pakistan and Rwanda. The region studied is Chia-
pas, Mexico. 
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Thomas Homer-Dixon puts a strong emphasis on the role of contextual factors 
like development and regime type in transforming cases of resource scarcity into 
armed conflict. The former decides a country’s ability to overcome resource scarcity 
through the supply of ingenuity. Regarding the latter, weak states acts as a ‘filter’ de-
fining the opportunities for violent reaction to grievance. Since I control for both these 
factors in my models, one could argue that I tap the effect of population-induced re-
source scarcity. But if these contextual factors are so powerful that the effect of neo-
malthusian variables disappears, the neo-malthusian factors are hardly important as 
explanatory variables of conflict in themselves. Especially, if level of development 
decides whether countries overcome resource scarcity, the devil is in underdevelop-
ment rather than in population pressure. Furthermore, these two contextual factors also 
matter in exactly the same way for most other assumed ‘root causes’ of conflict; less 
developed countries are generally less able to alleviate grievances than developed 
countries, and intermediary regimes, weak states, generally offer more openings for 
violent opposition. 
An optimistic expectation that would be an alternative to the youth bulge hy-
pothesis stated in this study is that youth bulges are likely to cause a boost in the econ-
omy through their large supply of labor. This could further be expected to reduce con-
flict propensity. I do not dismiss this possibility, but I believe that structural aspects of 
the economy will determine the significance of this effect. My study indicates that the 
direct positive effect of youth bulges on conflict propensity is greater than the indirect 
peace-conducive effect through increased labor supply. While the youth bulge hy-
pothesis in general is supported by empirical evidence, the ways that youth bulges in-
fluences conflict propensity have not been well clarified here. There is only weak evi-
dence for the assumption that youth bulges are especially conflict-conducive in times 
of poor economic performance. And youth bulges do not seem to interact with regime 
type in order to cause conflict. It is possible, however, that this variable is better suited 
to control for state weakness than to reflect whether a state has a closed recruitment 
system. 
Unlike the neo-malthusian variables, youth bulge variables are statistically sig-
nificant in models that include development and regime variables. These contextual 
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factors are believed to influence the conflict propensity of youth bulges in ways very 
similar to those assumed by Thomas Homer-Dixon. Developed and rich countries are 
likely to be able to ‘pay off’ youth bulges by increasing the capacity in the education 
system or by expanding the number of public sector jobs. Further, weak states more 
easily fall prey to youth bulges. But there is a third factor that is of great importance 
for determining whether the devil is in youth bulges: the possibilities for migration to 
other countries. Developing countries that today export a substantial part of their ex-
cess youth to more developed countries would otherwise risk a rise in youth discon-
tent. Migration works as a safety valve. If migration opportunities are substantially 
restricted this is likely to cause an increased pressure from youth bulges accompanied 
by a higher risk of discontent and violence in many countries. Moller believes that the 
possibility for Europe’s large youth cohorts in the 19th century to emigrate to the US is 
an important explanation for the absence of youth-generated violence in Europe in this 
period (1968: 242). 
6.1.2 Future Research 
New technology that is now being developed and tested may in the future provide 
more reliable analyses of the complex links between population, environment and con-
flict. GIS systems that include information from satellite pictures may better show how 
human activity influences the renewable resource base, and the same technology en-
ables us to better pinpoint the exact location of conflicts. For instance, GIS methods 
can be used to evaluate the productive capacity of a country’s soil by investigating 
satellite pictures revealing soil quality and adding climate zones and other potentially 
important factors. The application of such methods can be used for analyzing current 
and future conflicts to see whether neo-malthusian or cornucopian arguments may 
hold. The applicability of such methods for the study of past conflicts is however lim-
ited, as historical data needed for this kind of analyses are limited. 
I will point to some issues of population pressure that this study leaves unan-
swered, but that are interesting avenues for future research. First, further investigation 
is needed on my material to reveal what the reasons are for the significant effect of the 
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population growth and density interaction in the 1970s. Since this decade was charac-
terized by Soviet and US efforts to rally ideological allies and fight each other in third 
countries, it could be that the superpowers engaged in conflict in countries that they 
assumed had a considerable conflict potential. Such a foundation may have been high 
population pressure and resource scarcity, but this is speculation.  
Another promising area of research is meso-level quantitative studies of certain 
countries, aimed at revealing possible effects on conflict propensity of neo-malthusian 
population pressure on local level. Potential candidates for such studies are India and 
Indonesia. Both countries have had a number of conflicts, considerable population 
growth, and face different resource degradation problems.  
A third suggestion for further quantitative testing of neo-malthusian theory is to 
investigate the role of migration more thoroughly. This study indicates that there may 
be some connection between refugee populations and conflict. Future studies should 
try to establish a more reliable measure for refugee populations, but also pay attention 
to large-scale cross-country migration of non-refugees, such as the migration of Bang-
ladeshi into the region of Assam in India. Ideally, such a study should also include a 
measure for internally displaced people. It would be interesting to investigate more 
closely whether refugees may provide a spill-over effect of conflict between countries. 
The potential for further quantitative research on youth bulges is great. Espe-
cially would a more fine-grained study of interaction effects between youth bulges and 
economic factors that especially concern youth, such as youth unemployment rates, be 
of great interest. Empirical studies of the role played by education on an individual 
level and of the dynamic of large expansions of education are required to answer some 
main research questions left by the youth bulge theoretical framework provided here. 
A final major youth bulge issue left by this study for future projects is the role that 
ethnicity plays for youth-generated conflict. Both the State Failure Task Force and 
Samuel P. Huntington claim that ethnicity is a central feature of youth bulge riots. 
In this section I have focused on further research on the types of population 
pressure described in this study. There is however also a third form of population pres-
sure that I have reserved for future research; unequal growth rates between different 
ethnic groups in a country. My very provisional observations on this issue from my 
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work on the civil war in Bosnia-Hercegovina indicates that there may well be another 
devil in the fear of being demographically outnumbered by another ethnic or religious 
group. Simon (1989: 167) argues that it is really unequal growth rates between groups, 
and not overall population growth, that Choucri (1974) sees as support for her popula-
tion growth hypothesis. Quantitative studies of the unequal growth rates hypothesis 
can potentially be tested both over a large number of countries over time, and on a 
sub-national level by comparing the changing ethnic or religious composition of re-
gions over time. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: All Countries and Periods Included in the Analyses 
Code Country Time Code Country Time 
2 United States of America 1950-2000 165 Uruguay 1950-2000 
20 Canada 1950-2000 200 United Kingdom 1950-2000 
31 Bahamas 1950-2000 205 Ireland 1950-2000 
40 Cuba 1950-2000 210 Netherlands 1950-2000 
41 Haiti 1950-2000 211 Belgium 1950-2000 
42 Dominican Republic 1950-2000 212 Luxemburg 1950-2000 
51 Jamaica 1950-1957 220 France 1950-2000 
51 Jamaica 1963-2000 221 Monaco 1950-2000 
52 Trinidad and Tobago 1950-1957 223 Liechtenstein 1950-2000 
52 Trinidad and Tobago 1963-2000 225 Switzerland 1950-2000 
53 Barbados 1950-1957 230 Spain 1950-2000 
53 Barbados 1963-2000 232 Andorra 1950-2000 
54 Dominica 1957-1957 235 Portugal 1950-2000 
54 Dominica 1963-2000 255 Germany 1991-2000 
55 Grenada 1957-1957 260 German Federal Republic 1950-1990 
55 Grenada 1963-2000 265 German Democratic Republic 1950-1990 
56 St. Lucia 1957-1957 290 Poland 1950-2000 
56 St. Lucia 1963-2000 305 Austria 1950-2000 
57 St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1957-1957 310 Hungary 1950-2000 
57 St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1963-2000 315 Czechoslovakia 1950-1992 
58 Antigua & Barbuda 1957-1957 316 Czech Republic 1993-2000 
58 Antigua & Barbuda 1963-2000 317 Slovakia 1993-2000 
60 St. Kitts-Nevis 1957-1957 325 Italy 1950-2000 
60 St. Kitts-Nevis 1963-2000 331 San Marino 1950-2000 
70 Mexico 1950-2000 338 Malta 1950-2000 
80 Belize 1950-2000 339 Albania 1950-2000 
90 Guatemala 1950-2000 343 Macedonia 1993-2000 
91 Honduras 1950-2000 344 Croatia 1992-2000 
92 El Salvador 1950-2000 345 Yugoslavia 1950-2000 
93 Nicaragua 1950-2000 346 Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-2000 
94 Costa Rica 1950-2000 349 Slovenia 1992-2000 
95 Panama 1950-2000 350 Greece 1950-2000 
100 Colombia 1950-2000 352 Cyprus 1950-2000 
101 Venezuela 1950-2000 355 Bulgaria 1950-2000 
110 Guyana 1950-2000 359 Moldova 1992-2000 
115 Surinam 1950-2000 360 Rumania 1950-2000 
130 Ecuador 1950-2000 365 Russia 1950-2000 
135 Peru 1950-2000 366 Estonia 1992-2000 
140 Brazil 1950-2000 367 Latvia 1992-2000 
145 Bolivia 1950-2000 368 Lithuania 1992-2000 
150 Paraguay 1950-2000 369 Ukraine 1992-2000 
155 Chile 1950-2000 370 Belarus 1992-2000 
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160 Argentina 1950-2000 371 Armenia 1992-2000 
372 Georgia 1992-2000 560 South Africa 1950-2000 
373 Azerbaijan 1992-2000 565 Namibia 1950-2000 
375 Finland 1950-2000 570 Lesotho 1950-2000 
380 Sweden 1950-2000 571 Botswana 1950-2000 
385 Norway 1950-2000 572 Swaziland 1950-2000 
390 Denmark 1950-2000 580 Malagasy Republic 1950-2000 
395 Iceland 1950-2000 581 Comoros 1950-2000 
402 Cape Verde 1950-2000 590 Mauritius 1950-2000 
403 Sao Tome-Principe 1950-2000 591 Seychelles 1950-2000 
404 Guinea-Bissau 1950-2000 600 Morocco 1950-2000 
411 Equatorial Guinea 1950-2000 615 Algeria 1950-2000 
420 Gambia 1950-2000 616 Tunisia 1950-2000 
432 Mali 1961-2000 620 Libya 1950-2000 
433 Senegal 1961-2000 625 Sudan 1950-2000 
434 Benin 1959-2000 630 Iran 1950-2000 
435 Mauritania 1959-2000 640 Turkey 1950-2000 
436 Niger 1959-2000 645 Iraq 1950-2000 
437 Ivory Coast 1959-2000 651 Egypt 1950-1957 
438 Guinea 1959-2000 651 Egypt 1962-2000 
439 Burkina Faso 1959-2000 652 Syria 1950-1957 
450 Liberia 1950-2000 652 Syria 1962-2000 
451 Sierra Leone 1950-2000 660 Lebanon 1950-2000 
452 Ghana 1957-2000 663 Jordan 1950-2000 
461 Togo 1950-2000 666 Israel 1950-2000 
471 Cameroun 1950-2000 670 Saudi Arabia 1950-2000 
475 Nigeria 1950-2000 678 Yemen Arab Republic 1950-1989 
481 Gabon 1958-2000 679 Yemen 1990-2000 
482 Central African Republic 1958-2000 680 Yemen People's Republic 1950-1989 
483 Chad 1958-2000 690 Kuwait 1950-2000 
484 Congo 1958-2000 692 Bahrain 1950-2000 
490 Zaire 1950-2000 694 Qatar 1950-2000 
500 Uganda 1950-2000 696 United Arab Emirates 1950-2000 
501 Kenya 1950-2000 698 Oman 1950-2000 
510 Tanzania 1950-2000 700 Afghanistan 1950-2000 
511 Zanzibar 1950-1963 701 Turkmenistan 1992-2000 
516 Burundi 1962-2000 702 Tajikistan 1992-2000 
517 Rwanda 1962-2000 703 Kyrgyz Republic 1992-2000 
520 Somalia 1960-2000 704 Uzbekistan 1992-2000 
522 Djibouti 1950-2000 705 Kazakhstan 1992-2000 
530 Ethiopia 1950-2000 710 China 1950-2000 
531 Eritrea 1950-1952 712 Mongolia 1950-2000 
531 Eritrea 1993-2000 713 Republic of China 1950-2000 
540 Angola 1950-2000 731 Korea, North 1950-2000 
541 Mozambique 1950-2000 732 Korea,South 1950-2000 
551 Zambia 1950-1953 740 Japan 1950-2000 
551 Zambia 1964-2000 750 India 1950-2000 
552 Zimbabwe 1950-1953 760 Bhutan 1950-2000 
552 Zimbabwe 1964-2000 770 Pakistan 1950-2000 
553 Malawi 1950-1953 771 Bangladesh 1972-2000 
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553 Malawi 1964-2000 775 Burma 1950-2000 
      
780 Sri Lanka 1950-2000 1203 Federation of Mali 1959-1960 
781 Maldive Islands 1950-2000 1205 Ruanda-Urundi 1950-1961 
790 Nepal 1950-2000 1204 Fed of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 1954-1963 
800 Thailand 1950-2000 1201 French West Africa 1950-1958 
811 Cambodia 1950-2000 1202 French Equatorial Africa 1950-1958 
812 Laos 1950-2000 1206 United Arab Republic 1958-1961 
816 Vietnam, Dem. Rep. of 1950-2000 1001 Leeward isls 1950-1956 
817 Vietnam, Republic of 1954-1975 1003 West Indies 1958-1962 
820 Malaysia 1950-2000 1002 Windward isl 1950-1956 
830 Singapore 1950-1962 1401 Pacific isls 1950-1975 
830 Singapore 1966-2000 1220 Reunion 1950-2000 
835 Brunei 1950-2000 1210 Western Sahara 1958-2000 
840 Philippines 1950-2000 1040 Guadeloupe 1950-2000 
850 Indonesia 1950-2000 1020 Martinique 1950-2000 
900 Australia 1950-2000 1030 Netherlands Antilles 1950-2000 
910 Papua New Guinea 1950-2000 1010 Puerto Rico 1950-2000 
920 New Zealand 1950-2000 1340 East Timor 1950-2000 
935 Vanuatu 1950-2000 1310 Gaza 1950-2000 
940 Solomon Islands 1950-2000 1330 Hong Kong 1950-2000 
950 Fiji 1950-2000 1320 Macau 1950-2000 
983 Marshall Islands 1976-2000 1420 French Polynesia 1950-2000 
986 Palau 1976-2000 1430 Guam 1950-2000 
987 Federated States of Micronesia 1976-2000 1410 New Caledonia 1950-2000 
990 Western Samoa 1950-2000    
 
Note: Country numbers refer to the Singer & Small (1994) numbers. Countries with 
discontinuous appearances in the international systems are listed for all uninterrupted 
periods. 
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Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables N Mean St.d. Min Max 
Population Pressure Variables 
Population Growth  9,183 2.07 1.71 -32.3 16.66 
Population Density, Arable (LN)  9,004 4.29 1.89 0 13.98 
Population Density, Total Land (LN) 9,159 3.76 1.71 0 10.07 
Growth x Density 9,004 8.61 9.49 -172.25 103.05 
Growth x Infant Mortality Rate 8,797 8.82 7.00 -119.95 60.87 
Refugees 2,340 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Youth Bulges 8,723 29.80 6.29 9.6 45 
Youth Bulges, Squared 8,723 927.39 347.36 92.16 2025 
Youth Bulges x Economic Opportunities 8,723 58.83 113.76 -647.29 1530.9 
Youth Bulges x Regime Type 8,723 -23.92 185.89 -388 374 
Control Variables 
Total Population (LN) 9,183 8.01 2.20 1.79 14.06 
Dependency 9,183 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Infant Mortality Rate (LN) 8,797 4.00 0.98 0.69 5.58 
Infant Mortality Rate (LN), Squared 8,797 16.96 7.30 0.48 31.09 
Regime Type 9,183 -0.25 6.39 -10 10 
Regime Type, Squared 9,183 40.90 37.63 0 100 
Missing Regime Data 9,183 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Economic Opportunities 9,183 2.03 3.58 -28.61 44.50 
Missing Economic Data  9,183 0.24 0.42 0 1 
GDP per Capita (LN) 9,183 7.83 0.94 5.19 10.83 
GDP per Capita (LN), Squared 9,183 62.26 14.68 26.91 117.30 
Missing GDP Data  9,183 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Communist State Dissolution 9,183 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Controls for Statistical Dependency 
Previous Conflict 9,183 0.43 0.90 0 7 
Brevity of Peace (3 Years) 9,183 0.15 0.33 0 1 
Ongoing Conflict in Country 9,183 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Note: Number of country-years with originally missing values in brackets: Regime Type 
(2,866), Economic Opportunities (2,167), GDP per Capita (2,202). 
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Appendix 3: Correlation Matrix for Parameter Estimates From Model 12 
 
 YB YB2 Com TP Dep IMR Reg Re2 ReM PC BP Con 
Youth Blg 1.00            
Youth Blg, sq. -0.09 1.00           
Communist SD 0.31 -0.16 1.00          
Tot Pop 0.25 0.07 0.07 1.00         
Dependency 0.15 0.08 -0.01 0.17 1.00        
IMR -0.44 0.40 0.11 -0.11 -0.13 1.00       
Regime 0.05 -0.01 0.08 -0.09 -0.03 0.28 1.00      
Regime, sq 0.19 -0.06 0.19 -0.02 0.01 0.06 0.07 1.00     
Regime, miss 0.02 -0.06 0.13 0.16 -0.57 0.01 -0.07 0.42 1.00    
Previous Conf -0.23 0.08 0.09 -0.34 -0.04 0.24 0.17 -0.00 0.02 1.00   
Brevity Peace 0.06 -0.10 -0.16 0.03 0.17 -0.19 -0.09 0.06 -0.12 -0.55 1.00  
Constant -0.29 -0.23 -0.16 -0.91 -0.19 -0.05 0.06 -0.27 -0.29 0.21 -0.05 1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4: Correlation Matrix for Parameter Estimates From Model 13 
 
 YB YB2 Com TP Dep Gdp GM Reg Re2 RM PC BP Con 
Youth Blg 1.00             
Youth Blg, sq. 0.06 1.00            
Communist  0.38 -0.20 1.00           
Tot Pop 0.25 0.09 0.06 1.00          
Dependency 0.10 0.16 0.08 0.11 1.00         
GDP cap 0.29 -0.16 0.11 0.12 0.00 1.00        
GDP miss -0.07 -0.03 -0.30 0.05 -0.22 -0.39 1.00       
Regime 0.11 -0.07 0.04 -0.07 0.03 -0.28 0.03 1.00      
Regime, sq 0.22 -0.08 0.16 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 0.08 0.04 1.00     
Regime, miss 0.05 -0.08 0.14 0.20 -0.54 0.05 -0.03 -0.08 0.42 1.00    
Previous Conf -0.13 0.02 0.10 -0.34 0.04 -0.06 -0.11 0.12 -0.02 -0.00 1.00   
Brevity Peace 0.00 -0.05 -0.13 0.02 0.12 0.12 -0.02 -0.09 0.07 -0.09 -0.51 1.00  
Constant -0.33 -0.22 -0.11 -0.91 -0.25 0.01 -0.13 0.06 -0.29 -0.32 0.24 -0.06 1.00 
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